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Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften der
Universita¨t Mannheim
-
Einleitung
Die vorliegenden fu¨nf Essays sind Bestandteile einer Inauguraldissertation zur Erlan-
gung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Uni-
versita¨t Mannheim. Sie widmen sich Themen aus der Familienunternehmens-, Mittel-
stands- und Unternehmertumsforschung. Des Weiteren sind sie in fu¨nf einzelne Kapitel
unterteilt, davon vier empirischer und eines logischer Natur, wobei diese Unterteilung
dem Wesen des jeweiligen Forschungsgegenstandes des Kapitels geschuldet ist. So be-
fassen sich die Kapitel eins bis vier mit der Unternehmensnachfolge in mittelsta¨ndischen
Familienunternehmen, wa¨hrend sich Kapitel fu¨nf dem Unternehmertum in Ma¨rkten mit
unvollkommenen Institutionen widmet.
Ferner sind die Essays in englischer Sprache verfasst um dem Umstand Rechnung zu
tragen, dass ein Großteil des akademischen Diskurses derzeit in dieser Sprache erfolgt.
Die Kapitel eins bis vier sind Folge eines gemeinsamen Forschungsprojektes des Instituts
fu¨r Mittelstandsforschung der Universita¨t Mannheim und des Zentrums fu¨r europa¨ische
Wirtschaftsforschung zum Thema Unternehmensnachfolge, an welchem der Autor mit-
gewirkt hat. Die Idee zu dem fu¨nften Essay entstand wa¨hrend der Doktorandenkurse
an den Lehrstu¨hlen von Professor Strausz und Professor Wolfstetter an der Humboldt-
Universita¨t zu Berlin.
Das Thema Unternehmensnachfolge als Forschungsgegenstand ist von vielen mensch-
lichen Aspekten gepra¨gt, daher vielschichtig, komplex und mit rationalen Ansa¨tzen nur
teilweise erkla¨rbar. Vielmehr erfordert es geradezu aufgrund seiner unebenen, polyva-
lenten und unregelma¨ßigen Beschaffenheit einen quantitativ- und qualitativ-empirischen
Forschungsansatz. In Anbetracht der Gro¨ße dieses Forschungsgegenstandes beschra¨nken
sich die vorliegenden Essays auf vier spezielle Facetten der Unternehmensnachfolge.
Diese Teilgebiete werden anhand beobachteter Nachfolgen aus den Jahren 2002 bis 2008
in deutschen mittelsta¨ndischen und eigentu¨mergefu¨hrten Familienbetrieben in der Gro¨ße
dreißig bis tausend Mitarbeiter erforscht. Gleichzeitig wird durch die Einbeziehung der
Auswirkungen des jeweiligen zu untersuchenden Pha¨nomens auf den Unternehmenser-
folg gewa¨hrleistet, dass eine klare Relevanz, auch u¨ber die Grenzen der akademischen
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Spha¨re hinaus, gegeben ist.1
Kapitel eins befasst sich mit Pra¨ferenzen fu¨r Familienmitglieder im Rahmen von Un-
ternehmensnachfolgen und der daraus resultierenden mo¨glichen Bevorzugung von Fami-
lienmitgliedern sowie ihrer Auswirkungen auf den Unternehmenserfolg. Die Ergebnisse
nach Firmen-, Branchen-, Trend- und Zeitkontrollen zeigen, dass sich Bevorzugung ne-
gativ auf die natu¨rliche Selektionskraft des Arbeitsmarktes fu¨r Gescha¨ftsfu¨hrer auswirkt
und es dadurch zu Erfolgseinbußen auf der Unternehmensebene im Zeitraum nach der
Unternehmensnachfolge kommt.
Generell wird beobachtet, dass Familiennachfolger im Schnitt signifikant schlechtere
Humankapitalwerte aufweisen als externe Nachfolger, was vermutlich als eine Folge der
gelockerten Auswahlkriterien aufgrund familia¨rer Bevorzugungen erkla¨rt werden kann.
Gleichzeitig wird gemessen, dass externe Nachfolger in den Jahren nach der Nachfol-
ge deutlich mehr organisationale Vera¨nderungen initiieren als Familiennachfolger und
ferner, dass familiennachfolgergefu¨hrte Firmen sich im Vergleich zu Firmen mit einem
externen Nachfolger signifikant schlechter hinsichtlich des Unternehmenserfolges und
der Arbeitsplatzgenerierung entwickeln. Interessanterweise la¨sst sich kein signifikanter
Unterschied in der Unternehmenserfolgsentwicklung zwischen Familiennachfolgern und
externen Nachfolgern feststellen, wenn nur Nachfolger mit starken Humankapitalwerten
analysiert werden.2 Dies deutet darauf hin, dass die Erfolgsentwicklungen nicht mit dem
Familienhintergrund an sich zu erkla¨ren sind, sondern durch gelockerte Selektionskrite-
rien bedingt durch Pra¨ferenzen fu¨r Familiennachfolger.
Die Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Bedeutung von objektiven Auswahl- und Bewer-
tungskriterien im Wettbewerb der potentiellen Firmennachfolger. Wird diesem Vernunft-
kriterium nicht Rechnung getragen und beschra¨nkt der scheidende Firmenlenker die
Auswahl der Nachfolger nur auf den Kreis der Familienmitglieder, so ist ein starker und
signifikanter Einschnitt in der Erfolgsentwicklung des jeweiligen Unternehmens beob-
achtbar. Der Beitrag dieses Essays fu¨r die Forschung ist, dass in diesem Zusammenhang
und nach bestem Wissen des Autoren erstmalig Bevorzugung und ihre Konsequenzen
direkt beobachtet werden. Ferner ko¨nnen die Ergebnisse einer Studie zu großen US-
amerikanischen Familienunternehmen mit einem Eigenkapital von 1,1 bis 1,7 Milliarden
US-Dollar (Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006) durch dieses Werk fu¨r deutsche eigentu¨mergefu¨hrte
mittlere Familienunternehmen besta¨tigt und um zusa¨tzliche Erkenntnisse bezu¨glich des
Humankapitals und des organisationalen Wandels erweitert werden.
Das zweite Kapitel geht der Frage nach, unter welchen Umsta¨nden der Senior-Unter-
nehmer im Rahmen einer Nachfolge weiterhin im Unternehmen aktiv bleibt und welche
Auswirkungen dies auf die anschließende Erfolgsentwicklung hat. Nach bestem Wis-
sen des Autoren erkundet der Essay damit akademisches Neuland, welches bis dato,
insbesondere bezu¨glich der Erfolgsauswirkungen, allenfalls durch Fallstudien und An-
ekdoten beschrieben wurde. Gleichzeitig ist die Relevanz des Themas durchaus gegeben,
1Speziell fu¨r Familienunternehmen hat das Thema Unternehmensnachfolge eine hohe Relevanz. Jedes Jahr erleben
tausende Familienunternehmen eine Unternehmensnachfolge, jedoch nur 30 Prozent der Familienunternehmen werden
a¨lter als die Lebensspanne ihrer Gru¨nder (Sonnenfeld und Spence, 1989).
2Die Erfolgsmessung erfolgt hierbei auf Basis der Methoden und des Werkes von Barber und Lyon (1996). Bezu¨glich
des Humankapitals orientiert sich der Essay an den Ideen von Murphy und Za´bojnı´k (2004).
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denn die Ergebnisse des Essays zeigen, dass der Vorga¨nger in zwei Drittel aller Unter-
nehmensnachfolgen dem Unternehmen erhalten bleibt. Ferner wird beobachtet, dass der
Vorga¨nger mit signifikant ho¨herer Wahrscheinlichkeit aktiv bleibt, wenn es sich um eine
Familiennachfolge handelt, die Nachfolge als nepotistisch charakterisiert werden kann
oder das Unternehmen in einer Branche aktiv ist, die in hohen Maße mit spezifischem
oder tazitem Wissen verbunden ist. Eine signifikant niedrigere Verbleibenswahrschein-
lichkeit wird hingegen fu¨r Fa¨lle nachgewiesen, in welchen der Nachfolger mit hohem
Humankapital ausgestattet ist. Ebenfalls scheint der Besitz von Unternehmensanteilen
durch den Nachfolger zum Zeitpunkt der Nachfolge mit einer niedrigeren Wahrschein-
lichkeit von verla¨ngerter Aktivita¨t des Senior-Unternehmers einherzugehen.
Fu¨r Unternehmer mag die Frage nach den Auswirkungen einer weiteren Aktivita¨t im
Unternehmen auf den Unternehmenserfolg am wichtigsten sein. Nach Firm-, Branchen-,
Trend- und Zeitkontrollen und unter Anwendung von instrumentierten Variablen ergeben
die Resultate des Essays folgendes Bild: Eine weitere Aktivita¨t des scheidenden Unter-
nehmers ist mit einem signifikant positiven Einfluss auf den Unternehmenserfolg verbun-
den wenn der Nachfolger relativ niedriges Humankapital besitzt. Jedoch nimmt dieser
positive Effekt auf den Unternehmenserfolg mit zunehmenden Humankapital des Nach-
folgers ab und wird bei sehr hohen Humankapital signifikant negativ, was auf mo¨gliche
Konflikte hindeutet. Ein weiteres Ergebnis hierbei ist, dass der oben beschriebene Zu-
sammenhang durch die Intensita¨t des Einflusses des Senior-Unternehmers versta¨rkt wird.
Daraus la¨sst sich fu¨r die Praxis eine direkte Empfehlung ableiten. Wenn der Nachfolger
noch relativ schwache Fa¨higkeiten aufweist, so ist eine sta¨rkere Begleitung des Nach-
folgers oft mit positiven und schu¨tzenden Effekten verbunden. Mit zunehmender Ver-
antwortung und Fa¨higkeit des Nachfolgers sollte jedoch die Rolle des Seniors sukzessi-
ve reduziert werden und dem Nachfolger das Feld u¨berlassen werden. Dieses Ergebnis
kann als empirische Validierung der Theorie vom Tanz der Nachfolge (Handler, 1990)
angesehen werden, in welcher die Unternehmensnachfolge als ein Prozess der graduellen
Rollenanpassung beschrieben wird.
In Kapitel drei wird der Einfluss der Familienstruktur der Vorga¨ngers auf die Nach-
folgeentscheidung in eigentu¨mergefu¨hrten Familienunternehmen beleuchtet. Dabei wird
der Frage nachgegangen, ob es zusa¨tzlich zur Pra¨ferenz fu¨r Familiennachfolger gegenu¨ber
externen Nachfolgern, innerhalb der Klasse der Familiennachfolger weitere den Selekti-
onsprozess beeinflussende Pra¨ferenzen des Vorga¨ngers gibt. Insbesondere die Studie von
Dahl und Moretti (2008) u¨ber Pra¨ferenzen von Eltern in US-amerikanischen Haushalten
unter dem Titel The Demand for Sons gibt fu¨r diese U¨berlegung begru¨ndeten Anlass.
Die Ergebnisse des dritten Essays deuten auf eine recht deutliche Favorisierung von
So¨hnen gegenu¨ber To¨chtern als Nachfolger durch die Vorga¨nger hin. Bei Vorga¨ngern mit
Kindern wird die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Familiennachfolgen signifikant positiv durch
die Pra¨senz von So¨hnen unter den Kindern des Vorga¨ngers beeinflusst. Des Weiteren
legt ein Blick auf die Familienstruktur nahe, dass der Wunsch nach einem Sohn sich
sogar auf die Familienplanung der Unternehmer niederschla¨gt, da Unternehmer mit aus-
schließlich To¨chtern viel seltener zu beobachten sind als Unternehmer, die ausschließlich
So¨hne haben. Daru¨ber hinaus ist erkennbar, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit von nepotisti-
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schen Tendenzen im Rahmen von Nachfolgen ebenfalls durch So¨hne in der Familie des
Vorga¨ngers positiv beeinflusst wird. Dieses Ergebnis spiegelt sich unter anderem auch
in der Beobachtung wider, dass weibliche Familiennachfolger tendenziell mit sta¨rkerem
Humankapital ausgestattet sind als ma¨nnliche Familiennachfolger, was wiederum Kon-
sequenzen auf die Erfolgsentwicklung der eigentu¨mergefu¨hrten Unternehmen mit sich
bringt. U¨ber diese Beitra¨ge fu¨r die Forschung hinaus la¨sst sich daraus fu¨r die Praxis
ableiten, dass die Pra¨ferenzen des Vorga¨ngers eine zentrale Rolle im Nachfolgeprozess
spielen. Eine Sensibilisierung des Senior-Unternehmers auf diesen Umstand, auch im
Hinblick auf die damit verbundenen Erfolgsauswirkungen, erscheint vor diesem Hinter-
grund durchaus empfehlenswert.
Das vierte Kapitel befasst sich mit dem organisationalen Wandel im Rahmen der Nach-
folge in eigentu¨mergefu¨hrten Familienunternehmen. Insbesondere werden dabei auch
Nachfolgen in Krisensituationen betrachtet, wie Unternehmen in Turnaround- und Re-
strukturierungssituationen, Unternehmen in Ma¨rkten welche einem Abschwung ausge-
setzt sind und Unternehmen mit schwacher Profitmarge im Vergleich zum Wettbewerbs-
feld.3 In seinem Essay Some Organizational Consequences of CEO Succession zeigte
Miller (1993), dass Organisationen, welche eine Nachfolge erleben, durch eine Phase
von starkem organisationalen Wandel gehen. Allerdings ist u¨ber die Natur dieses Wan-
dels relativ wenig und insbesondere u¨ber die Erfolgsauswirkungen, nach bestem Wissen
des Autoren, kaum etwas bekannt, was den Ausgangspunkt und die Motivation fu¨r die
Betrachtungen des vierten Essays darstellt.
Eine wichtige Beobachtung des vierten Essays ist, dass sich in vielen Nachfolgefa¨llen
ein Potential fu¨r erfolgssteigernde Verbesserungen aufgebaut hat, welches durch intensi-
ven Wandel in der Zeit nach der Nachfolge gehoben werden kann.4 Es la¨sst sich beobach-
ten, dass die Hebung dieses Potentials nach Firmen-, Branchen-, Trend- und Zeiteffekten
mit signifikant positiven Erfolgsauswirkungen verbunden ist. Weiterhin la¨sst die Analy-
se den Schluss zu, dass Nachfolger mit hohem Humankapital signifikant mehr Wandel
initiieren als Nachfolger mit niedrigem Humankapital. Dies ist vermutlich der Fall, weil
Nachfolger mit hohem Humankapital die Verbesserungspotentiale besser erkennen und
heben ko¨nnen als Nachfolger mit niedrigem Humankapital.
Gleichzeitig la¨sst sich beobachten, dass die Art und die Intensita¨t des Wandels deut-
lich von der Situation des Unternehmens abha¨ngig ist. So ist die Intensita¨t des Wandels
in Nachfolgefa¨llen in Turnaroundsituationen deutlich und signifikant ho¨her als in Nach-
folgefa¨llen unter normalen Bedingungen. Weiterhin werden spezifische Erfolgsfaktoren
identifiziert. So wird beobachtet, dass insbesondere mit der U¨berpru¨fung und Anpas-
sung von alten Zuliefererbeziehungen und der Vergu¨tungsstrukturen, sowie mit einer
moderaten U¨berpru¨fung des Produktportfolios ein signifikanter Anstieg des Unterneh-
menserfolges verbunden ist, wa¨hrend sich dieser positive Effekt durch den Gewinn neuer
Kundengruppen teilweise versta¨rkt. Dies legt nahe, dass das oben beschriebene Verbes-
3Diese situative Betrachtung folgt dabei der Unternehmenskrisenliteratur, insbesondere den Werken von Harrigan
(1980), Hambrick und Schecter (1983), Whetten (1987), Robbins und Pearce II (1992) und Barker III und Duhaime
(1997).
4Diese Ergebnisse sind im Einklang mit Argumenten und Beobachtungen aus dem Essay Stale in the Saddle: CEO
Tenure and the Match between Organization and Environment von Miller (1991).
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serungspotential oftmals in diesen Bereichen zu vermuten ist. Internationalisierungen
im Rahmen der Nachfolge sind hingegen oftmals mit signifikant negativen Erfolgsaus-
wirkungen verbunden. Diese Beobachtung deutet darauf hin, dass durch die Doppelbe-
lastung durch Nachfolge und Internationalisierung fu¨r viele Unternehmen eine Mach-
barkeitsgrenze erreicht wird. Obwohl sich diese Ergebnisse nach Firmen-, Branchen-,
Trend- und Zeiteffekten sowie fu¨r diverse Unterstichproben als gro¨ßtenteils robust er-
weisen, wird gleichzeitig darauf verwiesen, dass die daraus abgeleiteten Hinweise nicht
als Gesetzma¨ßigkeiten zu verstehen sind. Vielmehr ist ein Versta¨ndnis der individuellen
Unternehmenssituation unerla¨sslich und kann zu situativ bedingt anderen Empfehlungen
fu¨hren.
Fu¨r den Forschungsgegenstand des fu¨nften Essays, eine makroskopische Anschauung
von Ma¨rkten mit unvollkommenen Institutionen, bevo¨lkert mit von Anreizen motivier-
ten Unternehmern, bietet sich eine von Vereinfachungen und Idealisierungen inspirier-
te abstrakte Herangehensweise an. So wird der Unternehmer weitgehend reduziert auf
einen gewinnmaximierenden homo oeconomicus im Sinne eines ideengetriebenen und
initiierenden Schumpeterianischen Unternehmers. Ausgangspunkt fu¨r dieses theoreti-
sche Kapitel bilden ambivalente Argumente und Beobachtungen in der Literatur, so-
wohl bezu¨glich des Volumens des sich unter unvollkommenen Institutionen entfaltenden
Unternehmertums, als auch des daraus resultierenden Wohlstandswachstums.5 Um die-
sen scheinbar widerspru¨chlichen Zustand zu u¨berwinden, wird ein konzeptionelles und
geometrisches Rahmenwerk verwendet, welches in der Lage ist, die divergierenden Ar-
gumente zu umfassen. Dabei wird auf die Prinzipal-Agenten-Theorie, insbesondere auf
das mathematische Werk von Laffont und Martimont (2002), zuru¨ckgegriffen. Der Bei-
trag des Essays beschra¨nkt sich dabei auf die Anwendung und den Transfer der Theorie
und der Mathematik von Laffont und Martimont (2002) in den Bereich Unternehmertum,
damit aus diesem konzeptionellen Rahmenwerk als Spha¨re der Anschauung Handlungs-
empfehlungen sowohl fu¨r die fu¨r Politik als auch fu¨r unternehmerische Praxis abgeleitet
werden ko¨nnen.6
Aus den Ergebnissen des fu¨nften Essays geht hervor, dass sich, unter unvollkommenen
Institutionen und verglichen mit der Aktivita¨t unter Institutionen der Qualita¨t der ersten
Welt, sowohl das Volumen unternehmerischer Aktivita¨t, als auch die Profitabilita¨t fu¨r
den Initiator der Aktivita¨t, reduziert. Im generellen Fall la¨sst sich daraus ein negativer
Wohlstandseffekt ableiten. In Grenzfa¨llen ist jedoch mo¨glich, dass dadurch auf nationa-
ler oder regionaler Ebene vorteilhafte Wohlstandsentwicklungen entstehen ko¨nnen. So
zum Beispiel, wenn der Wohlstandsverlust durch die Abnahme der unternehmerischen
Aktivita¨t kleiner ist, als der Wohlstandsgewinn durch die Kapital- oder Wissensakkumu-
lation einzelner Agenten, welche beispielsweise durch unzureichenden Technologie- und
Patentschutz aufgrund einer unvollkommenen Institution ermo¨glicht wurde.
Ferner wird diskutiert, ob und unter welchen Umsta¨nden es sinnvoll sein kann, unvoll-
5Siehe zum Beispiel Leff (1964), Mauro (1995), Me´ndez und Sepu´lveda (2006) und Me´on und Weill (2010).
6Dies ist insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund relevant, dass viele deutsche Unternehmen international orientiert sind
und somit ha¨ufig auch in Ma¨rkten mit unvollkommenen Institutionen (beispielsweise mit unvollkommenem Rechts-,
Vertrags- und Patentschutz) agieren.
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kommene Institutionen durch bessere zu ersetzen. Dabei wird insbesondere die Wichtig-
keit des Verstehens der individuellen Situation des Landes beziehungsweise der Region
hervorgehoben. Handeln die Unternehmer beispielsweise nur mit wenigen Kaufleuten,
ko¨nnte ein auf Vertrauen basierendes und somit mit ho¨heren marginalen Handelskos-
ten verbundenes Model vorzuziehen sein. Sind die Unternehmer jedoch vernetzt und
haben sehr viele Kontakte, so sind unter Umsta¨nden funktionierende Institutionen mit
ho¨heren Fixkosten, dafu¨r aber niedrigeren marginalen Handelskosten opportuner. Des
Weiteren wird diskutiert, wie sich Unternehmen unter unvollkommenen Institution er-
folgreich bewegen ko¨nnen. Beleuchtet werden sowohl altertu¨mliche Zusammenschlu¨sse
wie Handelsgilden, als auch moderne strategischen Governance-Allianzen, welche Han-
delsverfehlungen gegenu¨ber Mitgliedern der Allianz durch Bestrafungen durch die ge-
samte Allianz ahnden und somit eine Abschreckung aufbauen. Ferner werden Inter-
nalisierungsstrategien diskutiert, welche beispielsweise mit sogenannten Township and
Village Enterprises in China einen Ausdruck finden. Die Idee dabei ist, die Institution
selbst mit dem Prinzipal zu verschmelzen, was zu einer Parallelisierung der Zielfunk-
tionen fu¨hrt und somit Handelsverfehlungen gegenu¨ber dem initiierenden Unternehmer
unwahrscheinlicher werden.
In einer zusammenfassenden Betrachtung stellen die fu¨nf Essays zu den Themenge-
bieten Nachfolge, Pra¨ferenzen, Humankapital und Unternehmenserfolg, als auch den
Themenkreisen organisationaler Wandel, Unternehmen in Turnaroundsituationen und
in Ma¨rkten, welche die durch einen Abschwung gekennzeichnet oder mit nur unvoll-
kommenen Institutionen ausgestattet sind, einen nach Sicht des Autors u¨bergreifenden
und zusammenha¨ngenden Beitrag zur Unternehmertums- und Familienunternehmens-
forschung dar. Dieser wird nun als Dissertation gema¨ß der Promotionsordnung zur Er-
langung des Doktorgrades der Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universita¨t Mannheim vom
27. Ma¨rz 2006 den Referenten und Koreferenten zur Begutachtung vorgelegt.
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Chapter 1
Nepotism
-
CEO Succession, Ownership and Enterprise Performance
By JAN-PHILIPP AHRENS, SANDRA GOTTSCHALK AND MICHAEL WOYWODE ∗
We consider the effects of CEO successions on enterprise performance
in medium-sized enterprises with strong ownership concentration (fam-
ily firms). By evaluating an unique data set we show that firms which
install relatives or heirs as CEO successors perform worse as compared
to firms which install external CEO successors. Furthermore we identify
the driving forces behind this inferior performance as lower human cap-
ital and a lower propensity to implement organizational changes, which
is presumably caused by limited selectivity of CEO succession contests
due to concentrated ownership structures. Interestingly, no performance
gap is observable for well-chosen high human capital family successors.
(JEL: E32, G30, J24, L25, M51)
Keywords: CEO succession, ownership structure, nepotism, agency
costs, firm performance.
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“But whereas I said a moment ago that we have to follow in the steps of our fathers,
let me make the following exceptions: first, we need not imitate their faults; second, we
need not imitate certain other things, if our nature does not permit such imitation; [...]”
Marcus Tullius Cicero (44 BC)1
I. Introduction
When power changes hands, companies, institutions and even states reach a critical
moment. In a large number of medium sized enterprises resigning owners and chief
executive officers (CEOs) can install family successors in key corporate positions in
a nearly autonomous manner due to strong ownership concentration. Given that the
resigning owner’s reign extends to the empowerment of his successor, then a veil of
uncertainty is cast over the question of whether he maximizes the wealth of the enterprise
he commands or the wealth of his kin? Alternatively, he might even maximize and
prolong his own influence by choosing a successor who acts tributary.
Furthermore, CEO successions can also be understood as selective signaling contests
according to the voting majority’s rules. Restricting the pool of contestants, for exam-
ple by limiting the search to ones kin or acquaintances, could thus lead to imperfect
succession decisions, since the candidate might have been inferior given a larger pool.
However, an internal successor (a CEO successor related to or acquainted with his pre-
decessor) may also exert particularly high levels of effort to justify his positive selection.
For example, the honor of heading this particular company may make him proud and
particularly motivate him intrinsically (Davis et al., 1997). In addition, compared to an
external succession in an internal succession the transition process might be particularly
smooth and the transition of critical business related knowledge and values might be eas-
ier due to a close relationship between predecessor and successor (Cabrera-Sua´rez et al.,
2001, and Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). The later arguments would speak in favor of
internal successions. Surprisingly, relatively little empirical research has been conducted
to explicate the impact of this potential imperfection on enterprise performance (Pe´rez-
Gonza´lez, 2006). Every year around the world millions of firm successions take place
and potential inefficiencies in the transition process may cause high costs at the firm as
well as on the societal level. However, if the succession is managed well and the right
successor is chosen, then a succession might be a chance for company rejuvenation and
sustainable growth.
Thus, what is the impact of CEO successions on the performance of firms with highly
concentrated ownership structures? And can different performance levels of successors
be explained by differences in human capital and the record of managerial actions exe-
cuted?
For this purpose, we develop in this article a contest-theory based succession model
and analyze mid-run post-succession enterprise performance using an unique data set on
CEO successions. Going beyond the limits of previous research, this article also explores
1Marcus T. Cicero (44 BC), De Officiis, Book I, XXXIII, p.121 in reprint (1913).
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the role of human capital (such as academic degree and leadership experience) and the
post-succession managerial decision patterns (we track 25 managerial actions types) of
CEO successors, two aspects which potentially give rise to particular performance differ-
entials and which have experienced only minor attention in previous research. We gather
and evaluate information from 804 CEO successions in enterprises with high ownership
concentration and ownership control over a time period of up to eight years. These obser-
vations are categorized as either involving successors from inside the family (family suc-
cessions), successors who previously worked for the company (enterprise successions)
or external successors without previous ties to the company (external successions). The
data are complemented by 22 qualitative in-depth interviews with successors and experts
to capture causalities and motivations not covered by the empirical analysis.
This article focuses on non-publicly traded medium sized enterprises, thus most of
the performance analysis in this article is accounting-based. We employ a difference-in-
difference approach by comparing profit margins to investigate the impact of appointing
a certain type of successor.2 Furthermore, the performance data are adjusted by using
industry-adjustments and performance-matched adjustments of control groups to reduce
the effects of time and industry trends as well as possible mean reversion effects (Bar-
ber and Lyon, 1996). Following the literature on firm performance, we include common
controls for firm characteristics such as size, momentum, ownership and default proba-
bility in our regressions to control for firm performance prior to the succession event to
increase the robustness of our results.
In line with the literature on ownership and on private benefits (Dyck and Zingales,
2004), the results of this article offer empirical evidence that concentrated ownership
structures can lead to imperfect successions and a decreased appreciation of typical la-
bor market signals of future CEOs. This is reflected in highly significant differences in
the attributes of the successors: Only 9.0% of family CEO successors benefit from pre-
vious executive board experience, whereas the majority of external CEO successors are
experienced in this respect. Furthermore, family CEOs possess 2.6 years less industry
experience and are 6.6 years younger relative to external successors. In addition, family
heirs are 10.9 percentage points less likely to have an university degree compared to ex-
ternal CEO successors. Also, with respect to the measures of post-succession operative
managerial activity one observes significant differences between family and external suc-
cessors. For instance, family heirs are significantly less active in terms of organizational
changes implemented in the post-succession period and, finally, only 46.8% of family
successors employ a business plan during the succession, while 70.8% of the external
CEOs flank the succession process with this professional planning instrument.
Since all the differences listed above turn out to be highly significant, this suggests
that the successor-selection follows other motives than picking the best in class. Ar-
guably private benefits from promoting a kin surpass the costs arising from choosing an
inferior successor. These costs can be measured by tracking the performance gap be-
2A difference in difference-approach is advantageous because it controls for time-invariant firm characteristics which
might drive performance. In addition, we employ an array of additional performance measures. For articles which employ
a comparable approach we refer to Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2007).
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tween external and family successors, which in our sample is -1.3 percentage points in
profit margin significant at the five percent level, and -1.6 percentage points in industry-
and performance-adjusted profit margin using a propensity score matching. Furthermore,
it can be shown that the performance gap is driven by family heirs with poor human cap-
ital. We also show, that, if exclusively and only family members were considered as
successors (a case which we call strong nepotism), a highly significant performance gap
of -1.95 percentage points of industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin is observ-
able, which is robust to the inclusion of several commonly used controls. Our regression
results furthermore indicate that the level of human capital of the firm successor as well
as the level of post-succession business restructuring are significantly positively related
with enterprise performance. Interestingly, there is no performance gap if high human
capital successors are compared. Here family heirs perform slightly (and insignificantly,
id est outside the 10% level) better than externals on average.
Overall, this article hints that in a considerable number of cases nepotism tends to dam-
age the performance of medium sized enterprises with strong ownership concentration
which experience a CEO succession. The results confirm theories of nepotism articu-
lated in the literature (e.g. Levinson, 1971, and Pollak, 1985).3 The costs of nepotistic
behavior are likely to be borne by stakeholders and minority shareholders with weak
control rights (Gompers et al., 2003), which do not reap the private benefits of seeing a
family heir steering the fortunes of their family business. By investigating medium-sized
(with 30 to 1000 employees) enterprises with very high ownership concentration (more
than 50%), as well as successor attributes and post-succession managerial actions, this
article is a contribution to the recent literature on CEO turnover and firm performance
(Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006, Bennedsen et al., 2007, and Mehrotra et al., 2011).
The structure of this article is designed as follows: section II gives an overview of the
literature, while the main propositions are derived from a succession model presented in
the theoretical section III. Section IV informs in detail on the sample selection. In section
V the data are analyzed and discussed. Section VI summarizes the results.
II. Review of Empirical Literature and Evidence
The key issue of finding an optimal CEO successor (or agent) is related to manifold
strands of literature. To start with, the topic possesses theoretical links to the theory of the
firm literature, as ownership structure and agency problems are focal (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976, and Fama, 1980).4 Furthermore, it is related to the signaling (Arrow, 1973,
Spence, 1973, and Spence, 1974) and contest literature strand. The agents’ (successors’)
ability-signaling in the inter-firm CEO labor market (Fama, 1980) can be interpreted as
a career ladder contest in the spirit of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986).
The empirical literature on family control and firm performance is complex and some-
times contradictory. Morck et al. (1988) find that in new firms the control of the found-
ing family raises market-to-book values (Tobin’s Q), while the relationship is negative
3Pollak (1985) writes that “nepotism may prove a serious problem for the family firm”.
4A view that extends the Jensen and Meckling (1976) model for family firms, is presented by Schulze et al. (2001).
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for old firms. They attribute this result to the entrepreneurial spirit and the high levels
of energy exerted by founders and suspect descendants of entrenchment. McConaughy
et al. (1998) show that firms whose CEOs are founders or descendants of the founder
are more efficient and valuable compared to similar enterprises. Following this line of
argument, Anderson and Reeb (2003) report evidence for S&P 500 firms with family
influence and family CEOs, indicating that family firms perform significantly better than
non-family firms. However, Anderson and Reeb find that these effects wash out if fam-
ily influence becomes overwhelming. Maury (2006) shows that active family control
enhances firm performance and valuation when compared to non-family firms. Further-
more, Villalonga and Amit (2006) indicate that founder CEO management is beneficial
to firm value, but descendant family CEOs seem to destroy firm value. This result is
mirrored by Adams et al. (2009), who find a positive impact of founder CEOs on firm
performance. Finally, Mehrotra et al. (2011) find that Japanese family firms outperform
non-family firms, indicating adoptions are likely to drive descendants’ performance and
discuss possible beneficial effects of family control and connectedness in countries with
weak institutions (Faccio, 2006, and Mehrotra et al., 2011).5
A second group of studies documents rather negative influences of internal succes-
sions. Yermack (1996) observes that founding family board membership is detrimental
to company valuation. In line with these findings Morck et al. (2000) observe that inher-
ited wealth is detrimental to growth and find evidence that family CEO successors are
associated with lower operational performance. Bennedsen et al. (2007) find that descen-
dant family CEOs significantly damage enterprise performance, particularly in industries
with large firms or a particularly well skilled labor force. Miller et al. (2007) observe
empirically that only lone founder firms perform in a superior way, while superior per-
formance cannot be found for other family firms. Finally, Hillier and McColgan (2009)
find evidence that stock prices rise if family CEOs announce their departure.
We are aware of only a small number of empirical studies which address the critical
post-succession phase. These studies (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez’s,
2006, and Bennedsen et al., 2007) find a negative impact of family successions on
post-succession performance, but they all have their limitations: A study of Smith and
Amoako-Adu (1999) on the immediate and long-term financial performance impact of
successions in Canadian family firms, which works with a small sample size (124 firms).
Its performance analysis (ROA) does not allow for sharp inference, since it does not con-
trol for firm characteristics and trends. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez’s (2006) work on the immediate
(days around the successions announcements, using stock prices) and long-run (using
differentials of three years performance averages around successions) performance im-
pact of inheriting control employs a rather broad definition of family firms (individuals
with at least five percent ownership) and thus examines rather large firms with an aver-
age market value of equity of between $1.1 and $1.7 billion. With regard to enterprise
size, Bennedsen et al.’s (2007) study on the impact of family characteristics in corporate
decision making and consequential firm performance (using differentials of three years
performance averages around successions) is most comparable to our study, but lacks
5In Japan adoptions of otherwise unrelated CEO successors are not uncommon.
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detailed ownership data.
To summarize it can be said that despite the large amount of literature on ownership
structure and control, surprisingly little research has been conducted to analyze their
impact on performance in small- and medium sized enterprises during succession phases.
We are aware of no comparable study which addresses the relationship of successor type
(origin and human capital) and enterprise performance in non-publicly traded small- and
medium-sized enterprises (between 30 to 1,000 employees) with strong concentrations
of ownership and control (ownership above 50%). Moreover, previous studies mainly
neglected small and medium sized enterprises. This omission is particularly astonishing
if one considers that the high ownership concentration amongst this group is likely to
lead to high agency costs borne by minority shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976,
Gompers et al., 2003, and Dyck and Zingales, 2004).6 In addition, this study uses an
unique data set, which allows us to investigate the human capital, the post-succession
decision pattern of each successor as well as further characteristics of the successions
and the firms involved at a detailed level. This opens a window for a closer investigation
of potential post-succession performance effects. In order to pursue this objective, our
analysis follows the techniques suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996) and the difference-
in-difference approach employed by Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2007).
III. Theoretical Section
A. A Contest-oriented Model of CEO Successions
There are good reasons to believe that family successions might be advantageous for
enterprise performance. Family CEOs arguably reduce agency conflicts because of better
monitoring and disciplining possibilities within families (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and
stronger family peer pressure (Kandel and Lazear, 1992). In addition, family CEOs
are argued to function as pro-organizational stewards of their firms who derive utility
from the success of their enterprise (Davis et al., 1997). Furthermore, they tend to be
long-term oriented and invest more in long-term projects relative to non-family firms (Le
Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006, and Block and Thams, 2007). Moreover, if talent was
inherited as efficiently as property and control rights, then the children of gifted founder
CEOs should perform better than average external CEOs and could be expected to be the
winners of succession contests.
However, there is evidence in the literature that inherited talents are subject to gravita-
tional forces which constantly drag them down towards the population’s mean, the son of
a great merchant is not necessarily a gifted merchant (Galton, 1886, Galton, 1890, Heck-
man, 1995, Mulligan, 1999, and Mehrotra et al., 2011). Even worse, it is argued that
inheriting large property possibly induces lethargic and contemplative behavior, dead-
ening the talents of the legatee (Carnegie, 1891 (reprint 1933), and Holtz-Eakin et al.,
1993). Carnegie (1889) writes: “[...] the thoughtful man must shortly say, “I would as
soon leave to my son a curse as the almighty dollar,” [...]”, since “[...] the parent who
6One example is the principal’s private benefit derived from seeing a heir steering the fortunes of his family business.
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leaves his son enormous wealth generally deadens the talents and energies of the son,
and tempts him to lead a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would, [...]”
(Carnegie, 1891 (reprint 1933), p.49). However, it is a fact that some companies are
steered over many generations by descendants of the founding family with quite remark-
able success.
Taking these considerations into account, this article focuses on a contest theoretical
model of successions where internal CEO-candidates are assumed to compete with exter-
nal candidates. In general, the design of a contest, its structure and its pool of contestants
are decisive for its intended outcome (Konrad, 2009). In CEO succession contests the
contest designer and ruler holds nearly always the controlling majority in votes, which
is, following La Porta et al. (1999), very often a family.7 However, powerful contest
rulers (exemplia gratia a departing CEO) are potentially capable of designing a contest
according to their preferences and favors (Baye et al., 1993, Chan, 1996, Welch, Jr. and
Byrne, 2001, Agrawal et al., 2006, and Tsoulouhas et al., 2007). However, a monopolis-
tic pursuit of majority preferences in the contest design potentially inflicts agency costs
on non-controlling shareholder minorities, which highlights links of the contest design
literature to the ownership and control (theory of the firm) literature strand (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Demsetz and Vil-
lalonga, 2001, and Villalonga and Amit, 2006). For example, a departing family CEO
might constrain the contest pool of potential succession candidates to his kinship or ac-
quaintances and thus install, due to the ownership structure, a second-best succession
candidate.
The above considerations lead to two general questions: (I.) Does the successor’s ori-
gin (family or external) matter for post-succession enterprise performance? (II.) What
are the contest rules (constrained vs. unconstrained)? These thoughts are summarized in
a theoretical model which is presented in figure 1 and serves as a starting point for the
derivation of the following propositions. The figure highlights that the succession contest
has access to two pools of CEO successor contestants: the family and the external labor
market. The contestants within the pools have independent ability attributes (f.e. 1 for
low ability and 10 for high ability). Furthermore, it indicates that the voting majority de-
signs the contest via its implicit rules and constraints. The contest winner is the chosen
and installed CEO successor whose attributes might have an effect on post-succession
enterprise performance.
B. Categorizations and Constructs
The aim of this article is to explicate the impact of imperfect succession decisions on
enterprise performance in enterprises with concentrated ownership control. For the pur-
poses of this article we begin with an explication of what we mean by an “enterprise with
concentrated ownership control”: An enterprise with concentrated ownership control is
present if a maximum of three natural persons own more than 50% of the enterprise and
at least one of these owners is a leading member of the executive board.
7In addition, La Porta et al. (1999) provide evidence that ownership concentration in medium sized publicly traded
companies is considerable from a global perspective: 45% of the observed enterprises are controlled by families.
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FIGURE 1. A SUCCESSION MODEL BASED ON CONTEST-THEORY
Regarding the origin of the successors, the observed successions can be categorized
into: family successions, for successors related by marriage or blood to at least one of
the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise; enterprise successions, for
unrelated successors who were previously employees of the enterprise; external succes-
sions, for successors with no previous ties to the enterprise and hybrid successions, for
multiple successors with differing backgrounds.
To assess the intensity of the human capital signaled by the CEO successors, we follow
Murphy and Za´bojnı´k (2004) who argue that general managerial skill became more im-
portant for CEOs over the last three decades due to the progress in management science,
corporate controlling and finance and other disciplines, which, if mastered by the CEO,
contribute substantially to the CEO’s ability to steer a company. Compared to earlier
decades, the computerization has made company specific knowledge more accessible to
managers, which is sometimes just a keyboard fingertip away. With regard to the general
managerial skills we argue that leadership experience, a degree in business studies and
the ability to apply this knowledge using advanced professional instruments, such as a
business plan (which includes a strategic plan, but also an earnings forecast and a finance-
and liquidity-plan), are acceptable proxies.8 In line with human capital theory, we argue
8One can also motivate the choice of these proxies using the small business, succession and signaling literature. An
investment in education in general management is costlier for less able individuals making it a valuable signal of higher
ability (Spence, 1973, Arrow, 1973, and Spence, 1974), while it is possible to use the business plan proxy to ensure
that the managerial skills acquired are being used as opposed to being only a signal. We focus on education in business
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that productivity-augmenting investments in human capital can also take place in the
post-education phase (Mincer, 1974, and Strober, 1990) and pick this thought to moti-
vate the inclusion of proxies regarding experience as measures for CEO relevant human
capital investment acquired through “on-the-job-training”. First of all, Mincer (1974)
shows that the time distribution of these investments leads to an age variation in earnings
resulting in a positive correlation between age and earnings (the age profile), which might
arguably be interpreted as remuneration for higher ability due to experience. Following
this thought, we employ age as a proxy for general experience and argue that this is also
relevant to the job of CEO.9 Further, we argue that one can also interpret leadership ex-
perience as an investment with respect to building up CEO relevant human capital. This
is also in line with findings of the succession literature which points out that the succes-
sor’s proven skills, such as previous leadership experience, generate credibility and are
helpful in successions (Barach et al., 1988, Barach and Ganitsky, 1995, Chrisman et al.,
1998, and Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). In addition to these general management skills,
we also include one company specific proxy. Here, we choose industry experience and
argue that this proxy mirrors the potential advantages due to learning the specific “tricks
of the trade” of the industry in which the accordant company operates.10 In addition,
in this article we try to capture the detrimental effects of the “Carnegie Conjecture” on
human capital (Carnegie, 1891 (reprint 1933), and Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993). In order
to depict this effect on motivation and commitment, we observe whether the successor
bought a share of the enterprise (as opposed to inheriting).
Following the above argumentation, we design a human capital score for each suc-
cessor which is composed of the sum of the following elements: (1) age above median
(of the successors in the sample, proxy for general experience); (2) industry experience
above median (proxy for industry specific experience); (3) leadership experience (proxy
for practical managerial skills); (4) merchant education, if the successor holds an univer-
sity degree in business studies (or strongly related field) or was educated at an university
of cooperative education (proxy for theoretical managerial skills); (5) use of a business
plan during the succession (proxy for professional managerial skills); and (6) bought a
share of the enterprise (used as a proxy for the “Carnegie Conjecture” effects).11 If the
overall score of the successor is equal to or above the median score of the sample, the
successor is assigned the attribute “HHC” for high human capital and “LHC” for low
studies, as this an education closely related to general managerial skills and potentially applicable and transferable across
all industries. In the same vein, the small business literature highlights the crucial role of education in business studies
and managerial skills (f.e. cash-flow management, which is a prerequisite for a business plan) for success (Ibrahim and
Goodwin, 1986), whilst arguments in favor of positive effects of successor education can also be found in the succession
literature (Morris et al., 1997, and Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004).
9We draw attention to the fact the positive marginal effect of age on earnings reduces with higher age and eventually
turns negative at high age (Mincer, 1974). In addition, there is evidence in the literature that seasoned CEOs may become
less effective and virtually “stale in the saddle” (Miller, 1991). This introduces a caveat to the age proxy. However, the
average age of the CEO successors observed here falls into the increasing section of the inverted u-shape observed by
Mincer (1974), and therefore we can neglect the diminishing marginal effect in this study.
10One could also choose the proxy “experience within the respective company” which is often pointed out in the
succession literature, but this would exclude external successors per definition. Thus, we refrain from this approach.
11In addition to human capital point of view, the use of the “Carnegie Conjecture” proxy might also be motivated from
an incentive theory point of view.
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human capital otherwise.12
In addition, we try to capture nepotistic tendencies and successions biased by fa-
voritism. In order to pursue this aim, we observe whether the predecessor considered
only and exclusively family heirs as potential successors. If this category was met, the
accordant succession was categorized into the “nepotism” category, as it excludes the
external labor market from having access to the succession contest.13
C. Derived Propositions
From a theoretical view, successors tested in an unconstrained pool are the winners in
the inter-firm CEO market whose competition exhibits a permanent pressure to perform,
evolve and to signal excellence (Fama, 1980). As a result, they can be expected to outper-
form the successor candidates of a restricted pool (Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006). Furthermore,
if some candidates are favored, they will be promoted more frequently without previ-
ous merits, hence in disregard of labor market signals (Arrow, 1973, Spence, 1973, and
Spence, 1974). It follows that labor market signals, such as the degree of education and
experience in industry and leadership, are expected to be of lower quality amongst the
favored CEOs. Overall, the result of a limited successor pool or of candidate favoritism
should be inferior post-succession enterprise performance. Assuming the candidate pool
is constrained in some family successions in family firms, this leads to the appointment
of candidates who might have been considered as inferior in an unconstrained contest,
which should decrease the average performance of family successions (Pe´rez-Gonza´lez,
2006).14 The above logic immediately suggests, that family successors can be expected
to be outperformed by enterprise and external successors, if some predecessors or family
firms restrict the successor candidate pool to family members or strongly favor family
candidates.15
PROPOSITION 1: Average performance of family successors underscores the perfor-
mance of external successors.
Thereby, we implicitly assume that the successor’s human capital is material for en-
terprise performance (Bru¨derl et al., 1992) and assume a positive relation between them.
Successors equipped with more experience and education might be expected to asses a
company’s situation more reliably and execute the “right” changes, while their past mer-
its might foster their credibility among the employees. As a result, successors with high
human capital should perform better as compared to successor’s with low human capital
12For a comparable approach using undergraduate college selectivity as proxy, we refer to Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006).
13Please note that this should not be confused with a definition of nepotism. Further, this is a very strict category for
nepotistic favoritism, as one could also think of weaker forms of favoritism which are not investigated in this article.
14We cannot expect that the enterprises have access to a fully transparent and perfect labor market. Hence, a bias
from the market imperfections remains. However, we argue that a larger, but still imperfect, pool of candidates should
on average outperform a limited pool of family successors, assuming that leadership attributes have influence on firm
performance.
15One could also argue that there might be a certain degree of constraints in favor of enterprise successors. However,
we assume that this is a less likely niche case and concentrate one the more obvious case of favoritism due to family
relations.
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in the post-succession period. In order to test this proposition, we employ the simple
high versus low human capital indicator derived in the previous section.
PROPOSITION 2: Higher human capital of the successor is positively related with en-
terprise performance.
Assuming that some successors are installed because of favoritism or family ties, then
this preference rule of the predecessor should have outweighed the labor market signals
of some successors. As a consequence of the omitted evaluation, we should observe
a lower performance of the preferred candidates as compared to the contrary when the
contest pool is unconstrained and embraces selection of the best in class. In the later
case the constant and self-selective pressure of the labor market should lead to a much
better selection resulting in a more able successor. Further, for successions in which
exclusively and only the pool of family members was considered as a source for succes-
sors (nepotism), we expect a strongly negative performance impact due to a small size of
the candidate pool, a strong reduction of the labor market contest and the most negative
effects of the “Carnegie conjecture”.
PROPOSITION 3: Strictly preferring family successors (nepotism) is particularly neg-
atively related with post-succession enterprise performance.
On the contrary, in successions, which are unplanned due to sudden death or disease
of the predecessor, it is more likely that no biased succession contest (by favoritism or
strong constraints) is carried out by the predecessor. This is because we find it very
unlikely that a predecessor suffering from a heavy disease or a deceased predecessor
still has a strong influence on the succession contest, which arguably leads to a less
constrained succession contest. Therefore, we suspect that unconstrained successions
contests occur more often in unplanned successions as compared to normal successions,
which should be reflected in a positive effect for post-succession enterprise performance
as successors with a true higher ability are installed more often in these cases.16
PROPOSITION 4: Unplanned successions are positively related with post-succession
enterprise performance.
Provided the rule of the predecessor lasts long enough, the gathered experience of
the organization’s history leads to the gradual formation of an internal equilibrium of
stable and established rules or norms, roles, processes, routines, tacit knowledge and a
distribution of power, as well as an external equilibrium of economic and sociological
embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985). Changing this stabilizing institutionalized fabric is
likely to spark opposition from organizational members (Coch and French, Jr., 1948) and
leads to costly disruptive processes as well as inertia stemming from structures and envi-
ronmental embeddedness (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, and Barnett and Carroll, 1995).
16Furthermore, if the predecessor is actively involved in the enterprise, he might be an impediment to post-succession
change and renewal. In unplanned successions this issue is resolved.
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Nonetheless, restructuring the organization might be a necessity. Since after a long reign-
ing period of a CEO companies run the risk of falling into a competency trap. When
optimal solutions to organizational challenges change over time, change may become
necessary. This is particularly true in old organization which respond more slowly to
necessary change. The older the organization, the stronger the inertial forces and the
more complex and hazardous becomes its reorganization (Hannan and Freeman, 1984,
and Amburgey et al., 1993). In this context the successor serves as a reset in the orga-
nizational learning process and must assess the contemporary fit of the organizational
equilibria.
However, if favored family successors were more strongly bound to firm traditions
and were more inclined to show respect for their predecessors’ achievements than their
counterparts from an unconstrained pool, then this should be reflected in a lower will-
ingness to implement changes due to lower propensity to realize the need for change
or because of lower self-confidence and more constrained behavior. Furthermore if the
operational influence of the predecessor is still considerable, then a neutral due diligence
of the organization is in some cases not desired. Thus less willingness to change the
status quo should be observable in such cases. We expect that successors with active
predecessors implement fewer post-succession changes compared to successors with no
active predecessor. As a consequence, a different pattern of post-succession managerial
decisions should be expected between the two groups of CEO successors. Less able or
inexperienced successors, in particular when they come from inside the family, should
be less successful in realizing the need for change as well as less successful in overcom-
ing resistance while implementing organizational changes and innovations. This lack
of ability, combined with stronger psychological ties to preserve the work of a family
predecessor, could result in a lower magnitude of organizational change among family
successors compared to external successors.
PROPOSITION 5: Family successors implement fewer post-succession changes com-
pared to external successors.
In line with Amburgey et al. (1993) we furthermore argue that organizational changes
have disruptive effects on organizational stability independent of their content and thus
increase the risk of default in the short run (Haveman, 1993). This should be reflected
in the credit rating score (default probability) of the company. After the first disruptive
phase of change there will be an adaptive phase of change taking place which can lead to
performance improvement above the original performance level (prior to organizational
change).
IV. Sample Selection
The collection of analyzable data for the purpose described above builds on several
databases: (1) the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP), (2) the Bureau van Dyjk Amadeus
database (Amadeus), (3) the Hoppenstedt database, (4) the Creditreform solvency index
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information, (5) the German Bundesbank database, (6) standardized computer aided tele-
phone interviews, (7) non-standardized direct interviews and (8) web-searches.17
As a first step, we filter out a population of owner controlled enterprises using the
MUP database. The enterprises are required to match the following criteria for the years
2002 to 2008:18
1) 30 to 1,000 employees, and
2) going concern, and
3) possessing the concentrated ownership control attribute.
In order to identify succession events within this population we employ a second filter,
see appendix A1. After applying both filters we arrive at a population of 14,250 succes-
sion candidates.
We gather financial data and impute missing values using the following hierarchy: 1.
MUP information, 2. Amadeus information, 3. Creditreform solvency index informa-
tion, 4. Hoppenstedt information and 5. web-searches. Apart from the sample group,
a control group of 187,388 company-year observations is drawn from the Amadeus
database.19 Using Bundesbank information, all data in the sample and control group
are adjusted and reported in 07/2009 euros.
The gross sample population is contacted and interviewed yielding a total of 804 ob-
servations on CEO successions. The interviewees are required to match the following
criteria:
1) the interviewee is a successor, and
2) the interviewee is a leading member of the executive board, and
3) the interviewee holds an ownership fraction of the enterprise, and
4) the succession took place between the years 2002 and 2008.20
Four main areas are covered in the interview: (1) succession type, (2) human capital
of the successor, (3) post-succession managerial decision pattern of the successor and
(4) enterprise performance. Concerning the succession type, the interview asks for the
successor’s origin, the operational activity of the predecessor and the perceived quality of
the predecessor’s succession planning. Furthermore, the successor indicates the way in
which he acquired (bought, inherited or else) his ownership share. The above information
permits a fine distinction of succession types.
17The Mannheim Enterprise Panel is an economic panel data set including over six million active and inactive enter-
prises and is maintained by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). About 90% of the enterprises listed in
this panel are enterprises with concentrated ownership control. The Creditreform solvency index information was used to
calculate default probabilities from ratings.
18MUP data from earlier than 2002 are less complete and reliable.
19The control group companies are required to be of a size between 30 up 1,000 employees. Financial data are
gathered for the years 2002 to 2009. Unconsolidated sister statements (Amadeus consolidation code U2) and duplicates
are excluded.
20We ask for the year when the successor became a leading member of the executive board.
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Within the second area information on the successor’s age, leadership experience, in-
dustry experience and highest degree or qualification is gathered amongst other variables.
This information on general and specific human capital allows us to test for succession
contest pool constraints. Furthermore, we ask for information on the successor’s con-
sumption of consulting and coaching services during the succession period.
In order to identify areas of the successor’s post-succession managerial decisions and
actions between the years 2002 and 2009, the data set includes changes in the following
corporate areas
(a) labor organization: top management, hierarchy, working-time policy and compen-
sation scheme;
(b) organizational structure: purchasing, production, marketing and sales, personnel
and corporate finance & controlling;
(c) products and innovations: product innovations, new methods of production, addi-
tional products, moderate sorting out of previous products, heavy sorting out of
previous products;
(d) business relations: new customers, new suppliers, new bank relations, new fi-
nanciers, loss of previous customers and dismissal of previous suppliers;
(e) geographical activity: regional market activity, national market activity, interna-
tional market activity.
This collection of strategic and operative measures assigns to each successor a corre-
sponding action pattern which facilitates interpretations of observable correlations, for
instance between succession type and enterprise performance.
The enterprise performance is measured using the difference in accounting variables
such as profit margin and by performance controls such as the number of employees and
credit rating score measured in the succession year and 2009. We flank these variables
by using additional indicators on the state of the company such as unexpected post-
succession financing requirements and perceived pre-succession investment delays. The
data set is analyzed using the STATA 12 software.
Parallel to the standardized interviews 20 additional successors and two experts re-
garding successions in family firms agreed to participate in non-standardized in-depth
interviews. The in-depth interviews cover areas inaccessible by the standardized inter-
views, such as: motivation for succession, the role and character of the predecessor and
his co-operation behavior, leadership style and the necessity of post-succession business
restructuring. The in-depth interview sample is not representative but serves as a source
of vital indications for the interpretation of the correlations within the data sample of the
standardized interviews. The in-depth interviews were transcribed and evaluated using
ATLAS.ti.
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V. Data Analysis
A. Summary Statistics
Table 1 gives an overview of the data set grouped by succession type per industry
cluster using aggregations of the International Standard Industry Classification of All
Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3.1) of the United Nations.21
TABLE 1—OBSERVED SUCCESSIONS BY TYPE AND INDUSTRY
Full Family Enterprise External Hybrid Difference in shares
Variable sample succession succession succession succession type (2) minus (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Manufacturing 322 198 55 54 15
(40.0) (43.5) (34.6) (37.5) (32.6) 6.0
[100.0] [61.5] [17.1] [16.8] [4.7] (4.7)
2. Construction 114 70 19 21 4
(14.2) (15.4) (12.0) (14.6) (8.7) 0.8
[100.0] [61.4] [16.7] [18.4] [3.5] (3.4)
3. Business services 139 45 49 37 8
(17.3) (9.9) (30.8) (25.7) (17.4) -15.8***
[100.0] [32.4] [35.3] [26.6] [5.8] (3.3)
4. Consumer services 72 36 16 16 4
(9.0) (7.9) (10.1) (11.1) (8.7) -3.1
[100.0] [50.0] [22.2] [22.2] [5.7] (2.6)
5. Wholesale & retail 127 87 17 11 12
(15.8) (19.1) (10.7) (7.6) (26.1) 11.5***
[100.0] [68.5] [13.4] [8.7] [9.5] (3.5)
6. Other 30 19 3 5 3
(3.7) (4.2) (1.9) (3.5) (6.5) 0.7
[100.0] [63.3] [10.0] [16.7] [10.0] (1.8)
Total 804 455 159 144 46
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
[100.0] [56.6] [19.8] [17.9] [5.7]
7. Difference in shares 29.1*** -18.1*** -9.8** -1.0
industry 1. minus 3. (5.0) (4.2) (4.0) (2.2)
8. Difference in shares 36.1*** -21.9*** -18.0*** 3.7
industry 5. minus 3. (6.1) (5.3) (4.7) (3.2)
Note: The total number of observed successions is reported in column 1. The successions are categorized into: Family,
if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise
(column 2); Enterprise, for unrelated successors who previously worked for the enterprise (column 3); External for suc-
cessors without previous ties to the enterprise (column 4); and Hybrid for multiple successors with differing backgrounds
(column 5). The industries are clustered using aggregated ISIC classifications, see appendix for a detailed classification
key. Standard errors are reported in italics. The fraction of successions as a percentage of the total number of observed
successions per succession type is displayed in parentheses. The fraction of successions as a percentage of the total
number of observed successions per industry cluster is displayed in square brackets.
Overall, 56.6% of the enterprises were handed over to family successors, while 37.7%
of the enterprises went to non-family successors and 5.7% were categorized as hybrid
successions. We observed the largest amount of successions within the manufacturing
21The industry classification key for the ISIC aggregation is given in the appendix A2.
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sector (322), second being business services (139) and third wholesale & retail (127).
Across some of the industry clusters highly significant differences in the family succes-
sion rates are perceivable. Whilst the manufacturing and the wholesale & retail sector
have strong rates of family successions (61.5% and 68.5% respectively), only a minority
of 32.4% of the enterprises in the business services sector was handed over to family
heirs, which is mirrored in the highly significant differences in succession type shares
reported in rows 7 and 8 (29.1 and 36.1 percentage points respectively, significant at the
one percent level). Furthermore, while 25.7% of all external successions took place in
the wholesale & retail sector, only 9.9% of all the family successors were located within
this industry (-15.8 percentage points, significant at the one percent level). The major-
ity of the family CEO successor population (43.5%) was observed in the manufacturing
sector.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the characteristics of the successions in the sam-
ple. An inspection of the average years passed since the succession event indicates that
successions in the sample were relatively evenly distributed with an average of 3.54 years
and an insignificant difference of 0.15 years between family and external successions.22
Overall, the significant differences between external and family successors (column 6) in
nearly all other succession characteristics are striking. Omitting a business plan during a
critical phase such as a succession is a questionable decision. It is surprising that family
heirs used this instrument 24.0 percentage points less often, although they were signifi-
cantly less experienced in their industry and in leadership. This might be explained by
the stronger familiarity of family heirs with their enterprise.
Furthermore, family successors relied 13.6 percentage points less often on the advice
of new consultants, however their predecessors remained active 8.6 percentage points
more often. This prolonged activity of the predecessor could be interpreted as a sign
of weakness, since the successor could act in a tributary manner and be dependent on
the predecessor’s knowledge. But this may not necessarily be the case, from a positive
point of view the predecessor’s activity could also explain the lower consumption of ad-
ditional consulting products by family heirs (fewer new consultants). However the strong
and significant differences in experience and education raise concerns whether the best
in class successor was chosen by the predecessor, or whether private benefits outweighed
these (labor market) signals. In this context, the highly significant difference in leader-
ship (executive board) experience is striking. Only 9.0% of the family successors benefit
from previous executive board experience, whereas the majority of external successors
are veterans, which is in line with the difference in age. Overall it must be stated that the
attributes of the successor types entail strong differences.
Table 3 presents the characteristics of the enterprises in the succession year. Panel
A gives an overview of the accounting data (panel A) which is flanked by additional
indicators (panel B) on the state of the company. Overall, the average enterprise in the
sample has 82 employees and is remarkably profitable, with a profit margin of 6.1% of
22The median for both groups is four years and the standard deviation for family successions is 1.07 and for external
successions 1.18.
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TABLE 2—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF OBSERVED SUCCESSION CHARACTERISTICS
Difference
Succession type of means
Variable All Family Enterprise External Hybrid (2) and (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations (number) 804 455 159 144 46 599
Acquired shares (%) 38.7 20.9 63.5 65.3 45.7 -44.4***
(1.7187) (1.9075) (3.8296) (3.9812) (7.4253) (4.4146)
Used business plan (%) 51.9 46.8 48.4 70.8 51.7 -24.0***
(1.7632) (2.3419) (3.9758) (3.8010) (7.4253) (4.4644)
Successor’s age (years) 41.9 39.27 44.9 45.9 43.9 -6.6***
(0.2420) (0.3007) (0.5042) (0.5499) (0.8014) (0.6267)
University degree (%) 41.2 35.6 43.4 46.5 71.7 -10.9**
(1.7367) (2.2473) (3.9429) (4.1711) (6.7121) (4.7380)
Merchant education (%) 37.4 38.0 31.4 39.6 45.7 -1.6
(1.7079) (2.2782) (3.6938) (4.0894) (7.4253) (4.6813)
Educated for succession (%) - 53.4 - - 41.3 -
- (2.3412) - - (7.3400) -
Industry experience (years) 15.8 14.4 19.0 17.0 15.4 -2.6***
(0.2668) (0.3398) (0.5587) (0.6939) (1.0101) (0.7726)
Leadership experience (%) 21.6 9.0 22.0 56.3 37.0 -47.2***
(1.4532) (1.3439) (3.2962) (4.1484) (7.1954) (4.3607)
Hired new consultants (%) 30.0 26.7 30.2 40.3 31.1 -13.6***
(1.6199) (2.0773) (3.6522) (4.1014) (6.9792) (4.5975)
Predecessor active (%) 45.6 47.5 48.4 38.9 39.1 8.6*
(1.7578) (2.3436) (3.9758) (4.0767) (7.2753) (4.7023)
Years since succession (years) 3.54 3.66 3.26 3.51 3.39 0.15
(0.0702) (0.0922) (0.1552) (0.1799) (0.2515) (0.2021)
Note: Successions are categorized into: Family, if successors are related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three
persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise (column 2); Enterprise, for unrelated successors who previously worked
for the enterprise (column 3); External, for successors with no previous ties to the enterprise (column 4) and Hybrid, for
multiple successors with differing backgrounds (column 5). Acquired shares indicates if the successors bought a share of
the enterprise or the entire enterprise. Used business plan is an indicator variable equal to one if a business plan is used.
Successor’s age is the age of the successor in the succession year. University degree is an indicator variable equal to one if
the successor holds an university degree. Merchant education is an indicator variable equal to one if the successor studied
business studies at university or attended an university of cooperative education. Educated for succession is an indicator
equal to one if the successor is a family successor with special company-relevant education. Industry experience describes
the years of industry experience of the successor in the succession year. Leadership experience is an indicator variable
equal to one if the successor benefits from previous executive board experience. Hired new consultants is an indicator
equal to one if the successor is supported by new external consultants. Predecessor active refers to an indicator equal
to one if the predecessor still holds shares and remains operatively active in a leading position. Years since succession
indicates the average time passed since the succession. The stars display significances (Welch-Satterthwaite test) at: * ten
percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. The values in parentheses display standard errors.
an operating revenue of 10.5 million euros in 07/2009 values.23 The majority of the
successions are well planned (77.1%) and in only 10.4% of the cases do considerable
financing requirements indicate severe post-succession difficulties.24
An inspection of the accounting variables reveals that the enterprises in the sample are
of nearly comparable size with regard to sales across the succession types. However, het-
23The median profit margin is 4.8% and the median operating revenue is 6.1 million euros in 07/2009 values, while
the the median number of employees is 58. The medians are not reported separately in table 3.
24The strong profitability may be a result of a survivor-bias, since this article does not include enterprises which are
not handed over to the next generation.
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TABLE 3—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF OBSERVED ENTERPRISE CONDITIONS IN THE SUCCESSION YEAR
Difference
Succession type of means
Variable All Family Enterprise External Hybrid (2) and (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Accounting variables
Operating revenue (in mil. euros) 10.5 10.5 10.1 9.7 15.0 0.8
(0.6548) (0.9730) (1.1650) (1.0346) (3.8512) (1.4203)
Profit margin (%) 6.1 6.8 5.6 4.9 6.2 1.8**
(0.3185) (0.4683) (0.5982) (0.5469) (1.8261) (0.7200)
Industry-adjusted 3.3 4.0 2.5 2.1 3.3 1.9***
profit margin (%) (0.3211) (0.4747) (0.6062) (0.5513) (1.7761) (0.7275)
Employees (number) 82.2 78.6 73.6 102.1 85.2 -23.5*
(3.1147) (3.6417) (4.7998) (11.3591) (10.1418) (11.9286)
Rating (score) 223.0 220.3 230.1 227.7 211.7 -7.4**
(1.3107) (1.6392) (3.3686) (3.1475) (4.7511) (3.5488)
Industry-adjusted 11.8 10.2 16.6 14.9 1.8 -4.7
rating (score) (1.2700) (1.5835) (3.2829) (3.0768) (4.9827) (3.4604)
B. Additional indicators
Good quality of predecessor’s 77.1 82.5 76.0 60.9 78.0 21.5***
succession planning (%) (1.6027) (1.9064) (3.8969) (4.3293) (6.5446) (4.7305)
Investment delay 20.6 12.5 30.2 36.0 18.6 -23.5***
(%) (1.4761) (1.6080) (3.7740) (4.1319) (6.0046) (4.4338)
Financing requirements 10.4 7.7 9.5 16.7 19.6 -8.9***
(%) (1.0362) (1.2559) (2.3394) (3.1164) (5.9136) (3.3600)
Note: Successions are categorized into: Family, if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the
three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise (column 2); Enterprise, for unrelated successors who previously
worked for the enterprise (column 3); External, for successors without previous ties to the enterprise (column 4) and
Hybrid, for multiple successors with differing backgrounds (column 5). The performance indicators presented are: Profit
margin (PM): earnings before taxes divided by operating revenue; Industry-adjusted PM: the subtraction of the median
PM of the according year and industry (two-digit ISIC) from PM; Employees the number of employees in the succession
year; Rating: based on the Creditreform solvency-index; and Industry-adjusted rating: the subtraction of the median
rating of the according year and industry (two-digit ISIC) from rating. The additional indicators signal: Good quality of
predecessor’s succession planning is an indicator equal to one if the succession planning was perceived by the successor
as good. Investment delay is an indicator equal to one if the successor believes that investments were delayed before
the succession. Financing requirements is an indicator equal to one if considerable unexpected financing requirements
occurred in the aftermath of the succession. All values are displayed in 07/2009 euros. The stars display (Welch-
Satterthwaite) significances at: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. The values in parentheses display the
standard errors.
erogeneity between the enterprises across the succession types is observable with regard
to all other parameters, including profitability (momentum) in the succession year.25
Overall, it must be stated that the more profitable enterprises are handed on to family
successors, whereas less profitable enterprises are passed to externals. In terms of profit
margin enterprises of family heirs are initially 1.9 percentage points (significant at the
one percent level) more profitable in terms of industry-adjusted profit margin, but also
4.0 percentage points more profitable than their industry peers. At this stage, we draw
attention to the fact that we exclude successions which went out of business during a
succession, which limits the applicability of these findings to the surviving succession
cases.
25We shall address this heterogeneity later using a propensity score matching procedure.
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External CEOs have to cope with more difficult starting positions: they face a signif-
icantly (at the five percent level) higher default probability and experience in 16.7% of
the cases severe and unexpected post-succession financing requirements, which is more
than twice the rate of family successors (significance of the difference is at the one per-
cent level).26 Furthermore, successions of external successors are drastically less well
prepared by their predecessors and even worse: predecessors seem to squeeze money out
before external successions far more often. 36.0% of external successors report a per-
ceived pre-succession investment delay, while only 12.5% of family successors report
such circumstances. One CEO interview partner (1) noted on this: “You have to pay
attention like hell. [...] You think the basics are being adhered to, but not a bit of it. You
have to examine every single segment!”
To summarize, more profitable enterprises tend to stay within family ranks, while less
profitable enterprises tend to be milked before they are sold to externals. From these
initial summary statistics the advice can be given, that a thorough due diligence is vital
in external successions. We will now test the propositions derived in the theory section
by using a differential abnormal performance methodology.
B. Differential Performance
In order to investigate the impact of CEO successions on subsequent firm performance
in firms with highly concentrated ownership structures we mainly employ accounting
based criteria. We are aware that this approach is second-best, since accounting values
predominantly mirror past values and thus fall short of future-oriented (market-based)
performance indicators. Furthermore, accounting values may be subject to over- and
understatement (Barber and Lyon, 1996). Thus, ideally one would wish to base an anal-
ysis on market-based data, for example market-to-book ratios, as well as on accounting
based data (e.g. Villalonga and Amit, 2006, and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006). However, this
approach is unavailable since the overwhelming majority of small and medium sized
enterprises is not traded publicly.27
Our analysis focuses on differential performance using profit margins (PM). The ratio
of earnings before tax and operating revenue is a straightforward indicator of operational
efficiency and a practical benchmark for comparisons of performance. One advantage of
using profit margin is that it matches values from the same time period, since both items,
earnings and operating revenue, stem from accruals of the same accounting period.28
However, the ratio of earnings before taxes over operating revenue potentially fluctu-
ates across industries. In order to address this concern we introduce industry adjustments.
Furthermore, employing a differential measure of performance automatically controls for
time-invariant firm attributes which might possibly affect performance. In addition we
26This finding is in line with findings in the literature, see Kerkhoff et al. (2004).
27In our sample there is not a single publicly traded company. Overall, in Germany only 460 companies out of 3,5
million companies are publicly traded.
28One alternative indicator of performance might be return on assets (ROA). However, assets are measured at historic
costs, while earnings is measured in current dollars. In addition, idle or recently acquired assets potentially influence
ROA. The drawback of using profit margin or return on sales is that the efficiency of assets employed is not measured
(Barber and Lyon, 1996).
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address concerns of possible mean reversion due to transitory components in accounting
data, but also possible performance trends by employing control-group-matched perfor-
mance adjustments (Barber and Lyon, 1996). In order to take into account general issues
with the profit margin measure, we also present additional differential performance prox-
ies, such as the percentage change in the number of employees, the change in credit rating
and the overall amount of organizational changes implemented.
Following the recent literature on firm performance and successions (Villalonga and
Amit, 2006, and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006) we include controls for typical firm character-
istics such as size (sales) and momentum (e.g. industry-adjusted profit margin), own-
ership structure and default probability in our regressions to increase the robustness of
the results. By tracking abnormal performance due to the appointment of a certain type
of successor we test our advanced propositions, but we implicitly also test for a null
relationship indicating managerial action in successions might be a ritual of symbolic
meaning having a null effect on performance (Gamson and Scotch, 1964, Pfeffer, 1981,
and Meindl and Ehrlich, 1987).
We begin our analysis by presenting differential performance for various types of suc-
cessors. The unadjusted difference in profit margins between the succession year and
the year 2009 is presented in the first row of table four. Profit margins are calculated by
dividing earnings before taxes (Amadeus item 33) by operating revenue (Amadeus item
24) and a multiplication by 100.
Addressing concerns of mean reversion in accounting data and with the intention of
minimizing the impact of industry trends or trends due to pre-succession performance,
we include industry-adjusted as well as industry- and performance-adjusted PM indi-
cators in panel A. Both industry and performance adjustments were calculated from a
control group of 187,388 company-year observations of the Amadeus database. Industry
adjustments are calculated by subtraction of the median profit margins of the accordant
year and industry (at the two-digit ISIC code level) from the Amadeus database.29 The
adjusted values indicate whether firms which go through a succession entail positive or
negative abnormal performance as compared to the median of their industry.
Following Barber and Lyon (1996) and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006), we design our con-
trol groups for performance adjustments by sorting the industry-adjusted values of the
Amadeus database enterprises into deciles. By matching the industry-adjusted variable
(e.g. profit margin) of each sample firm with the accordant Amadeus decile in the year
of the succession, the relevant control group is identified for each enterprise. The median
value of the relevant control group and year is then used as a control for the observations
of the sample group. Furthermore, in order to prevent our results from being biased by
extremes or outliers, the tails of the distribution of the unadjusted profit margin values
are winsorized at the 0.025 level.
To start with, the first item in column 1 in table 4 shows that the average gain in
profit margin between the succession year and the year 2009 is 0.21 percentage points,
29The industry clusters in the control group are required to include a minimum of five observations per year and
industry (at the two-digit ISIC code level), otherwise the control reports missing data. We use two-digit industry controls
because Clarke (1989) shows that the difference between two-digit and four-digit SIC controls is marginal.
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TABLE 4—DIFFERENTIAL PERFORMANCE OF SUCCESSORS
Differences
Succession type in differences
Family Family = 1 LHC = 1
vs. LHC vs. Family vs.
Variable All Family Enterprise External Hybrid External HHC Non-family
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Profit margin indicators
1 Profit margin 0.21 -0.32 0.61 0.97 0.77 -1.28** -1.90** -2.01
(0.25) (0.36) (0.50) (0.50) (1.27) (0.62) (0.74) (1.22)
1 Industry-adjusted 0.39 -0.05 0.90 0.99 0.33 -1.04 -1.84** -1.42
profit margin (0.25) (0.38) (0.51) (0.51) (0.66) (0.64) (0.78) (1.15)
1 Industry- and per- 1.54 1.37 1.75 1.89 0.97 -0.52 -1.59** -1.59
formance-adjusted (0.23) (0.33) (0.50) (0.49) (0.63) (0.59) (0.68) (1.00)
profit margin
B. Changes implemented score
Changes (amount) 8.36 8.01 8.07 9.59 9.05 -1.58*** -1.68*** -0.33
(0.15) (0.20) (0.34) (0.33) (0.52) (0.38) (0.40) (0.72)
C. Additional performance indicators
1 Rating (score) 3.17 5.44 -0.97 1.01 0.38 4.43 -1.67 10.31**
(1.27) (1.72) (2.59) (3.20) (4.13) (2.62) (3.38) (4.66)
1 Industry-adjusted 1.96 3.67 -0.52 -0.50 0.15 4.16 -1.05 7.95*
rating (score) (1.27) (1.73) (2.59) (3.21) (4.40) (3.64) (3.40) (4.66)
1 Employees 20.7 14.0 14.0 48.1 23.2 -34.0** -5.5* -6.2
(%) (3.27) (2.09) (2.20) (16.48) (8.28) (16.58) (3.83) (4.87)
1 Industry-adjusted 36.7 29.9 30.3 64.3 37.7 -34.3** -5.5 -9.2
employees (%) (3.42) (2.30) (2.52) (16.78) (9.53) (16.91) (4.33) (6.16)
D. Profit margin indicators -single successors only
1 Profit margin 0.28 -0.15 0.48 1.15 - -1.30** -1.76** -0.87
(0.30) (0.41) (0.60) (0.59) - (0.72) (0.89) (2.19)
1 Industry-adjusted 0.55 0.11 0.92 1.27 - -1.16 -1.74* -0.90
profit margin (0.31) (0.43) (0.63) (0.59) - (0.73) (0.93) (2.03)
1 Industry- and per- 1.71 1.50 1.76 2.18 - -0.68 -1.30 -1.14
formance-adjusted (0.28) (0.39) (0.63) (0.56) - (0.68) (0.83) (1.75)
profit margin
E. Changes implemented score - single successors only
Changes (number) 8.37 8.03 7.68 9.58 - -1.55*** -2.71*** -0.32
(0.27) (0.44) (0.57) (0.68) - (0.55) (0.85) (1.01)
Note: The table presents the mean development between the succession year and the year 2009. Successions are cat-
egorized into: Family, if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more
than 50% of the enterprise (column 2); Enterprise, for unrelated successors who previously worked for the enterprise
(column 3); External, for successors without previous ties to the enterprise (column 4) and Hybrid, for multiple succes-
sors with differing backgrounds (column 5). The human capital of successors is distinguished by Low human capital
(LHC) and High human capital (HHC) depending on the successors’ score on a human capital proxy score including the
elements: (1) age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant education, (5) professionalism, and
(6) motivation. The performance indicators presented are calculated via: (a) profit margin: earnings before taxes divided
by operating revenue, (b) industry-adjusted variables: the subtraction of the median of the variable of the according year
and industry (two-digit ISIC) from the variable, (c) industry- and performance-adjusted variables: industry-adjusted vari-
ables less the median industry-adjusted variable of the relevant control group, (d) changes implemented score: the sum of
observed changes per enterprise (Score ranges from 0 to 25), (e) rating: based on the Creditreform solvency-index, and
(f) number of employees: the growth of the firm’s employees in percent. Control groups for performance are designed by
sorting the industry-adjusted values of the variables of the Amadeus database enterprises into deciles and matching the
industry-adjusted values of the variable in the sample with the accordant Amadeus decile in the year of the succession.
The median of the relevant variable in the respective decile and year is then employed as a control. The stars display
(Huber-White) significances at: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. Huber-White robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
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but if industry- and performance-adjustments are applied, the overall average gain is 1.54
percentage points and statistically significant. However firms handed over to family heirs
experience a decline of -0.32 percentage points.30
A comparison of the differences in means approach allows us to test for the propo-
sitions advanced in the propositions section. In column 6 of table 4 proposition 1 is
explored. The difference-in-difference of family versus external successors is -1.28 per-
centage points and statistically significant, thus family heirs seem to underperform. From
an economic point of view this means that family heirs lose five percent while externals
gain 16% in enterprise performance (PM) as compared to the succession year. This trend
is robust with respect to direction, but when adjustments are introduced the significance
vanishes, while the overall pattern remains.31 Thus, from these first results alone, propo-
sition 1 cannot be rejected.
To continue, proposition 2 postulates that human capital is decisive for performance.
This idea is advanced in column 7 of table 4 which displays the difference in means
of performance between lower human capital (LHC) family successors and higher hu-
man capital (HHC) family successors. LHC family heirs seem to be responsible for the
negative trend in performance of the family group with a highly significant performance
gap of -1.90 percentage points, which remains robust up even after including all con-
trols. Their performance declines by -1.42 percentage points, which in economic terms
is equivalent to a decline of 20.9% of profit margin, while HHC family heirs manage to
gain 7.1% PM.32 Again, from these first results proposition 2 should not be rejected. One
CEO successor interview partner (15) noted on this: “One issue is that in an enterprise
of this size the CEO has to be capable to understand and do virtually everything.”
In addition, companies which carefully and thoughtfully select a successor from an
unconstrained candidate pool including various signals should be able to reduce the like-
lihood of selecting a “lemon” as compared to successor contest using a limited pool.
Following this line of thought, we should expect that if these companies still picked an
LHC candidate, then it is due to outstanding other merits of these candidates. As a result
we should expect to detect a performance difference between family LHC successors
and external LHC successors, which is evaluated in column 8 of table 4. The results
are less clear, the observable difference is not significant. However the overall negative
difference remains robust up to the inclusion of all controls: on average non-family LHC
CEOs seem to perform 2.01 percentage points better than family LHC CEOs. Interest-
ingly however, the company rating indicator highlights significant differences in column
8, which hints that relaxed selection processes for family CEOs might be the driving
force for these results.
Furthermore, panel B inspects the overall amount of changes and thus allows us to
advance proposition 5. In the interview 25 possible fields of changes are covered. The
overall score of implemented changes is 8.36, which indicates substantial restructuring
30For comparable results for large enterprises with lower levels of ownership concentration, we refer to Pe´rez-Gonza´lez
(2006) who also finds that family successors perform worse as compared to non-family successors.
31We suspect that the significance might vanish due to differences in enterprise attributes in the succession year, which
we address later using a propensity score matching.
32This result is not shown separately in table 4.
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processes in most successions.33 The general pattern observed for PM also holds robust
for the changes implemented. Family successors implement significantly fewer changes
(-1.58) than external successors. LHC family CEOs underscore HHC family CEOs by a
highly significant difference of -1.68 changes and thus account for the general negative
difference of the family group relative to the group of external successors. However,
these results must be treated with caution, as the enterprises in the sample differ in their
state at the time of the succession and the quality and adequacy of implemented changes
in the business structure is not clear from this table alone. Nevertheless, proposition 5
should not be rejected from these results. One CEO successor interview partner (22)
noted on post-succession changes: “It does not help to refrain from tackling things. And
that is a point where we all have learned. I mean I have learned, but also here in our
enterprise: we had to learn this. The reason is that the topics and issues which have
not been changed and been there for years are first which spring to ones mind when one
asks oneself: where can I optimize? Here, you also have to be honest with yourself ask
the question: why haven’t we changed this in the last five years? We would have been
so much more successful by now!” Another CEO successor (10) noted: “The internal
organization was 30 to 40 years old and it was really time to overhaul it.”
In order to check the above results from further perspectives, panel C presents al-
ternative performance indicators such as the development of the credit rating and the
percentage change of the number of employees. On average we observe that enterprises
where a succession has taken place grow substantially in terms of employees with an
average increase of 20.7% and 36.7% above the industry trend, significant at the one per-
cent level.34 However, the difference-in-differences regarding the growth of the number
of employees is -34.0 percentage points for family firms against externals, significant at
the five percent level, while companies steered by LHC family successors seem to grow
even more slowly.
In addition, the rating is particularly interesting, as it is the only forward oriented indi-
cator available.35 On average, the default probability rises in all enterprises, measured by
an increase in the rating score by 3.17 score points. However it rose particularly strongly
for family successions (5.44 points), while companies of external successors experienced
only a slight deterioration of their solvency by 1.01 score points. When compared with
the control group, we find that the industry-adjusted rating score rises for family succes-
sions by 3.67 score points on average, while external successors manage to improve their
industry-adjusted rating by -0.50 score points on average. Considering the fact that exter-
nal successors implement more organizational changes after the succession than family
successors, external successors seem to cope with the amount of changes fairly well with
respect to their company rating. As changes can increase default probability in the short
33We left out the change product innovation due to low observations in this score.
34At this point we stress that our sample excludes enterprises which went out of business during a succession and is
thus subject to a survivor bias.
35The Creditreform solvency-index scale reaches from 100, representing an excellent rating, to 600, indicating in-
dicating severe threats to solvency. We draw attention to the fact that various caveats lurk in the interpretation of the
rating score, such as lagging-effects and a relation with the implemented changes for instance (Haveman, 1993). These
reservations in mind, we emphasize these results with caution.
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run (Amburgey et al., 1993, and Haveman, 1993), companies with a low changes score,
such as family LHC firms, experience a lower increase in their rating as compared to
firms with a higher change score, such as HHC family firms.36
One concern in interpreting the results of panel A to C of table 4 is that these succes-
sions consist of teams and single successors and that the heterogeneous constellations
alone might drive the differences in performance. Panel D and E addresses these con-
cerns and the results highlight that nearly identical values are reached for single succes-
sors and team successions, which leads us to reject the articulated concern.
In addition, it has been argued that family directors steer their firms with a long-run
orientation (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006, and Block and Thams, 2007). Possibly
the long-run orientations of family members leads to a trade-off of present profits for
higher profits in later periods.37 To test this theory, we examine successions which took
place between 2002 and 2005 and investigate the development between the year of the
succession and the year 2009 to take a long run perspective.38 Hence, the successors had
four to seven years of time to actively influence the performances of the firms. However,
a performance gap between family and non-family successions comparable to our previ-
ous findings is observable for the older successions as well. The results are presented in
the table A2 of the appendix A2. We thus reject this argument in this context.
Another concern might be that the heterogeneity of the sample companies in the suc-
cession year might have driven these results. To address this concern, we employ a
propensity score matching procedure (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to level the im-
pact of differences in profitability (momentum) and sales (size) in the succession year.
The treatment effect of the treatment (here: a family succession) on that which is treated
(here: the succession enterprises) is then investigated (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). Heck-
man et al. (1997, 1998) investigate the performance of matching estimators. Amongst
other things, results are best when data sources and definitions are similar and compara-
ble for both the treated and the non-treated and when the propensity score can be esti-
mated using many variables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Our quasi-experiment meets
these criteria and the results of the matching procedure using the STATA 12 psmatch2
nearest neighbor routine are presented in table 5. There remains a difference in dif-
ferences in industry- and performance-adjusted PM of 1.607 percentage points between
external and family CEO successors after the matching procedure, or in economic terms:
family heirs manage to increase PM after controlling for industry- and performance-
trends by 20% (between the succession year and the year 2009), while external succes-
sors manage to increase PM after controlling for industry- and performance-trends by
61% (between the succession year and the year 2009). This check reinforces and un-
derlines the results of table 4, family successors seem to perform worse than external
successors. However, regarding the previously strong differences in differences concern-
ing the development of the number of employees in table 4, we see that the result of table
36At a first glance, this may seem contradictory to the positive development concerning PM, but can be explained by
the argument that productive change may entail a disruptive (and default risk increasing) effect in the short-run.
37This argument seems to be backed by the observation that family heirs introduce innovative products more often
than externals (13.1 percentage points more than external CEOs at a statistically significant level, table 6).
38We excluded successions in the years 2006 to 2008.
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TABLE 5—PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING - NEAREST NEIGHBOR
Difference in industry- Difference in industry-
and performance-adjusted PM adjusted employees
Control = Succession type Control = Succession type
All except All except
Variable Family External family Family External family
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations (number) 175 78 162 203 88 182
Average years 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.3
A. Matched (ATT)
Ind.& perf.-adj.1 PM 1.385 2.991 1.941 16.217 25.924 27.603
Treatment difference - -1.607 -0.557 - -9.707 -11.387
Standard error - (0.859) (0.657) - (6.646) (4.524)
B. Remaining bias in percent
Lnsales - 4.3 -5.9 - -3.5 -10.7
(=size) - [47.2] [9.1] - [38.7] [-111.4]
Ind.-adj. PM - -0.6 -9.4 - 3.3 -6.3
(=momentum) - [98.3] [67.4] - [89.1] [74.9]
Note: The variables of interest are the difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (PM) and the dif-
ference in industry-adjusted number of employees between the succession year and the year 2009. The industry-adjusted
variables are calculated by subtracting the median of the accordant year and industry (two-digit ISIC) of the control
group from the variable of the sample. Industry- and performance-adjusted PM is industry-adjusted PM less the median
industry-adjusted variable of the relevant control group, which are designed by sorting the industry-adjusted values of
the Amadeus database enterprises (control group) into deciles and matching industry-adjusted PM of the sample group
with the according control group decile in the year of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant
control group and year then serves as a control for performance. Successions are categorized by succession type: Family,
if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise,
otherwise External, for successors with no previous ties to the enterprise; The values in square brackets display | bias
| reduction in percent, using the psmatch2 STATA routine. The probit model for treatment included the following pre-
dictors: Lnsales (1), industry-adjusted profit margin in the successor year (2), industry- and performance-adjusted profit
margin in the succession year (3), interaction (1)*(2), interaction (1)*(3), interaction (2)*(3), and interaction (1)*(2)*(3).
The values in parentheses display standard errors, assuming the propensity score is a precise estimate.
4 is to some extent driven by the heterogeneity, the remaining differences in differences
in industry-adjusted employee growth rates are far less drastic, but still present.
But what drives these results? As we have seen in table 4, there exists a considerable
difference in the number of changes implemented in the succession phase, which might
indicate differences in managerial style or differences in the focus of actions. Following
this thought, table 6 presents the observed changes during the successions.
It is striking to observe the high rates of changes in the core organizational structure,
which indicate substantial reorganizational processes during successions. All core or-
ganizational functions (panel B of table 6) are changed at high rates, the lowest being
production with 47.5%, while the marketing and sales department is even subject to
changes in 65.3 of all cases. Furthermore, external successors implement substantially
more changes in the core functional areas of the enterprises, as nearly all core organiza-
tional structures show statistically significant differences in change intensity. Externals
also have a higher tendency to dismiss top managers or to renegotiate business contacts
such as relations to suppliers, banks and financiers, while it is worth noting that they
seem to create more jobs in terms of employee growth (table 4) and lose fewer previous
customers as compared to family CEOs.
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TABLE 6—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF OBSERVED MANAGERIAL ACTIONS AND CHANGES
Difference
Succession type of means
Variable All Family Enterprise External Hybrid (2) and (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observed Changes (number) 8.4 8.0 8.1 9.6 9.0 -1.6***
(0.15) (0.20) (0.34) (0.33) (0.52) (0.38)
A. Labour organization (%)
New executive directors 49.4 46.6 50.9 53.5 58.7 -6.9
Dropped executive directors 24.6 22.1 22.6 31.2 34.8 -9.2**
Flattened hierarchy 28.6 26.9 28.5 39.4 11.1 -12.5***
Steepened hierarchy 13.5 13.3 13.3 11.3 22.2 2.0
Working time policy 34.7 34.9 32.1 34.7 41.3 0.2
Compensation scheme 34.7 33.6 35.8 38.9 30.4 -5.3
B. Organizational structure (%)
Purchasing 48.3 46.9 41.8 59.0 50.0 -12.1**
Production 47.5 44.2 44.2 59.9 53.3 -15.7***
Marketing and sales 65.3 61.7 63.9 76.9 68.9 -15.2***
Personnel 50.6 49.8 46.5 54.9 58.7 -5.1
Corporate finance & controlling 53.7 50.4 51.9 63.2 63.0 -12.8***
C. Products and innovations (%)
Product innovation 40.6 45.2 37.1 32.1 34.5 13.1**
Additional products 59.1 58.3 61.0 58.3 63.0 0.0
Additional methods of production 50.8 50.8 47.8 52.8 54.3 -2.0
Sorting out of products (moderate) 30.0 30.1 26.6 33.0 30.4 -2.9
Sorting out of products (heavy) 2.9 2.2 2.5 4.9 4.3 -2.7
D. Business relations (%)
New customers 84.8 83.3 85.5 86.7 91.3 -3.4
Loss of previous customers 24.4 27.0 20.9 20.8 21.7 6.2
New suppliers 54.8 54.6 52.2 58.7 52.2 -4.0
Dismissal of previous suppliers 34.3 32.4 28.7 43.0 44.4 -10.5**
New bank relations 16.0 13.6 16.4 23.6 13.0 -10.0**
New financiers 16.9 14.2 18.4 23.0 19.6 -8.9**
E. Geographical activity (%)
1 Regional markets -2.8 -0.9 -1.9 -9.7 -4.3 8.8***
1 National markets 2.7 1.5 0.6 9.0 2.2 -7.5**
1 International markets 5.7 4.8 7.5 7.6 2.2 -2.8
Note: Successions are categorized into: Family, if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three
persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise (column 2); Enterprise, for unrelated successors who previously worked
for the enterprise (column 3); External, for successors with no previous ties to the enterprise (column 4) and Hybrid,
for multiple successors with differing backgrounds (column 5). Interviewees were asked to indicate post-succession
changes of their enterprise in each of the subcategories from A to D. Each indicator variable is equal to 1 if a change
was indicated and 0 otherwise. The geographical activity of the enterprise in the year of the succession and of the year
2009 were recorded in the interview. Category E presents the change per geographical subcategory. The stars display
(Welch-Satterthwaite) significances at: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. The values in parentheses
display the standard errors.
It is interesting to observe that family successors prefer a steeper hierarchy more than
external successors, while externals successors seem to choose a different management
approach by flattening hierarchies more often. Observe furthermore, that family succes-
sors have a higher tendency to innovate (product innovation) than externals. 45.2% of all
family successions were flanked by innovations, which is significantly more compared
to external successors. On average the companies in the sample tended to increasingly
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serve national and international markets instead of local markets. This tendency is most
pronounced amongst external successors, while family successors keep their focus more
often on regional markets. The stronger appearance on these new markets could be re-
flected by the heavy rate of changes in the marketing and sales department by external
successors, which implement changes in 76.9% of all cases.
Overall, this table shows that family successors implement fewer changes than the
average of unrelated successors, which is in line with proposition 5.39 Interestingly, en-
terprise successors accumulate the same number of changes as family successors, while
external successors entail the highest number of overall changes.
C. Differential Performance - Regression Analysis
By performing a regression analysis including various controls we investigate what
drives the results of the difference in difference analysis in more detail. The regressions
are presented in table 7.
The dependent variables are the difference in industry-adjusted profit margin (PM) for
columns 1 to 4 and the difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin
(PM) for columns 5 to 8. Our controls include firm size measured by the natural log-
arithm of sales in 07/2009 euros and momentum measured by industry-adjusted PM in
the year of the succession for column 1 to 4 and by industry-adjusted PM plus industry-
and performance-adjusted PM in the year of the succession for columns 5 to 8. Further
firm controls include ownership, which is measured as an indicator variable of whether
the successor owned shares of the enterprise in the year of the succession, and default
probability which was measured by the score of the Creditreform solvency-index in the
year of the succession.40
To account for further heterogeneity in the sample we introduce further controls with
regard to the succession characteristics. These include: sudden and unexpected financing
requirements and perceived investment delays to account for problematic starting condi-
tions, the influence of the successor having an university degree and the activity of the
predecessor. Furthermore, we decide to exclude roughly one percent of the observations
to eliminate the influence of heavy outliers.41
Overall, we observe that the family successor indicator variable has limited and in-
significant influence on performance. However, this variable must be interpreted in uni-
son with the influence of the changes implemented and the human capital of the succes-
sors. Both variables entail a strong and highly significant influence: low human capital
-1.23 (respectively -1.21 for columns 1 to 4) and ln changes 0.93 (1.15). Since family
heirs implemented fewer changes and were equipped with lower human capital scores,
the performance gap is thus also observable indirectly in the regressions. Thus proposi-
tion 1 cannot be rejected from these results.
39At this point of the analysis, we do not want to overemphasize this result, because family heirs might have been
equipped with better starting positions, thus less change might have been required.
40Note that all sample firms already have highly concentrated ownership structures due to the sample selection.
41We decide to exclude four observations due to high values using studentized residuals, Cook’s D, DFITS and leverage
to residuals squared plot inspections.
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TABLE 7—REGRESSION ANALYSIS - DIFFERENTIAL ABNORMAL ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE
Differential profit margin (PM)
Ind.-adj.1PM Ind.& perf.-adj.1PM
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Family -0.16 0.13 0.31 0.05 -0.21 0.06 0.32 0.01
(0.451) (0.443) (0.602) (0.462) (0.440) (0.465) (0.617) (0.468)
Ln changes 1.15*** - 0.95** - 0.93** - 0.71* -
(0.417) - (0.391) - (0.424) - (0.401) -
LHC - -1.21*** -0.70 - - -1.23*** -0.63 -
- (0.455) (0.685) - - (0.460) (0.730) -
Family * LHC - - -0.68 - - - -0.86 -
- - (0.914) - - - (0.971) -
Nepotism - - - -1.74** - - - -1.95**
- - - (0.835) - - - (0.863)
Unplanned - - - 1.93* - - - 1.91*
- - - (1.051) - - - (1.094)
Unplanned * - - - -0.05 - - - -0.33
family - - - (1.567) - - - (1.594)
Ln sales -0.14 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.15 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07
(0.246) (0.236) (0.245) (0.238) (0.254) (0.240) (0.253) (0.241)
Ind.- and perf.- - - - - -0.31** -0.26* -0.31** -0.25*
adj. PM - - - - (0.150) (0.142) (0.142) (0.140)
Ind.-adj. PM -0.30*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.29*** 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.060)
Ownership 0.40 0.27 0.34 0.23 0.49 0.37 0.43 0.34
(0.437) (0.427) (0.438) (0.433) (0.448) (0.430) (0.452) (0.435)
Default prob. 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09
(0.087) (0.062) (0.091) (0.070) (0.087) (0.069) (0.087) (0.066)
Financing 0.14 0.43 0.15 0.38 -0.16 0.02 -0.14 -0.05
requirements (0.557) (0.549) (0.556) (0.550) (0.568) (0.554) (0.568) (0.557)
Investment 0.10 -0.07 0.13 -0.10 0.14 -0.02 0.17 -0.05
delay (0.448) (0.440) (0.453) (0.439) (0.454) (0.431) (0.456) (0.435)
University 0.07 0.05 -0.11 0.23 -0.01 -0.10 -0.20 0.09
(0.495) (0.477) (0.492) (0.476) (0.504) (0.481) (0.503) (0.478)
Predecessor 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.59 0.54
active (0.475) (0.443) (0.478) (0.446) (0.484) (0.447) (0.486) (0.450)
Years -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 -0.08 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.13
(0.110) (0.106) (0.111) (0.105) (0.112) (0.108) (0.114) (0.108)
Observations 290 309 290 309 290 309 290 309
R-squared 0.2286 0.2214 0.2429 0.2259 0.0448 0.0503 0.0647 0.0564
Note: The dependent variables are the differences in industry-adjusted profit margin (PM) in columns 1 to 4 and dif-
ferences in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (PM) in columns 5 to 8. The differences are calculated
via: industry- (and performance-) adjusted PM of the year 2009 less industry- (and performance-) adjusted PM of the
succession year. Control groups for performance were designed by sorting the industry-adjusted values of the Amadeus
database enterprises (control group) into deciles and matching the industry-adjusted PM values of the sample with the
accordant Amadeus decile in the year of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control group
and year then serves as a control. Successions variables are: Family indicates if a successor is related by marriage or
blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise; Ln changes is the natural logarithm of
the sum of observed changes during the succession; Low human capital (LHC) indicates if the successor’s human capital
score (derived from the elements (1) age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant education,
(5) professionalism, and (6) motivation) is below the median score; Nepotism if the predecessor did only consider family
members as successors; and Unplanned indicates if the succession was unplanned. Enterprise controls are: Ln sales (size)
is the natural logarithm of sales in the year of the succession; Industry-adjusted PM (momentum) is PM in the succession
year less the median PM of the accordant year and industry (two-digit ISIC); Industry- and performance-adjusted PM
(momentum) is the industry-adjusted PM in the succession year less the median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant con-
trol group; Ownership is an indicator equal to one if the successor owned a share of the enterprise in the succession year;
Default probability represents probability of default based on the Creditreform solvency-index score of the enterprise in
the year of the succession. Further controls are: Financing requirements is an indicator variable equal to one if severe
unexpected financing requirements were encountered during the succession; Investment delay is an indicator variable
equal to one if an investment delay is observed; University is an indicator variable equal to one if the successor holds an
university degree; Predecessor active is an indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor remains operatively active in
a leading position and holds an ownership share; and Years is the time elapsed since the succession in years. Interactions
between variables are marked via stars *. The values in parentheses display Huber-White robust standard errors.
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Regressions 2 and 6 in table 7 advance proposition 2. The pattern mirrors the results
reached by the difference-in-difference analysis section: Low human capital of the suc-
cessor is significantly negatively (-1.23, respectively -1.21) related to performance. Fur-
thermore, the underperformance is more pronounced amongst LHC family successors as
compared to unrelated successors: the significance of the LHC variable in regression 3
and 7 vanishes, while the interaction term LHC*family is negative and of greater magni-
tude than the LHC variable alone (column 7). In turn, low human capital of a non-family
successor seems to be far less detrimental to performance. To sum up, these results sup-
port proposition 2 and show that the negative impact of the human capital proxy is driven
by LHC family heirs.
Regressions 4 and 8 in table 7 test propositions 3 and 4. The results are striking.
Even with the inclusion of all controls, companies which strictly prefer family succes-
sors (nepotism) and thereby heavily limit the pool of candidates experience a significant
decline in performance of -1.95 (respectively -1.74) percentage points in industry- and
performance-adjusted PM (respectively industry-adjusted PM). In economic terms, this
is equivalent to a decline of -48.75% of industry-adjusted PM compared to the succession
year. This result mirrors the damaging effects of nepotism or, from another perspective,
it mirrors the value of private benefits from seeing a family member steering ones family
enterprise. It seems obvious, that in this case the succession contest rules embraced more
than just picking the best in class.
Interestingly, unplanned successions are positively related to performance. This result
is in line with the literature (Slovin and Sushka, 1993, and Hillier and McColgan, 2009)
and with proposition 4. We suspect that this result is explained by the circumstance that
less biased succession contests could be carried out in cases of unplanned successions.
Furthermore we must keep in mind, that our sample is infected with a survivorship bias.
Some unplanned successions might have resulted in complete shut-downs, which was
not observed here.
Regressions 4 and 8 are thus supportive of propositions 3 and 4. Strongly concentrated
ownership structures can thus lead to a limited CEO labor market competition due to
favoritism which in turn damages firm performance.
The results furthermore show that firm characteristics, apart from momentum (industry-
and performance-adjusted PM), do not predict differences in performance. Size (ln
sales), ownership, and default probability are statistically insignificant. Furthermore, mo-
mentum is significantly negatively related to differential performance, which is a finding
in line with the arguments for mean reversion or regression to mean.
Having arrived at these results, the next question that springs to mind is which at-
tributes of the successors are especially beneficial for enterprise performance? This ques-
tion might be most relevant for enterprises seeking to install quality criteria for successor
selections. We approach this question by running regressions with the decomposed ele-
ments of the human capital score and other CEO attributes. The results are presented in
table 8.
According to these results, it is significantly helpful for a successor to have studied in
a management related field or, in the case of family successor, to have been prepared and
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TABLE 8—REGRESSION ANALYSIS - HUMAN CAPITAL AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE
Difference in industry- & performance-adjusted profit margin (PM)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Family 0.07 -0.08 -0.17 -0.10 -0.29 -0.77 -0.12 -0.22 -0.35 -0.43
(0.445) (0.484) (0.424) (0.405) (0.427) (0.469) (0.430) (0.408) (0.547) (0.648)
HHC 1.22*** - - - - - - - - 0.74
(0.456) - - - - - - - - (0.676)
HHC * - - - - - - - - - 0.68
family - - - - - - - - - (0.914)
Acquired - 0.51 - - - - - - 0.64 -
shares - (0.501) - - - - - - (0.508) -
Business plan - - 0.82* - - - - - 0.64 -
- - (0.426) - - - - - (0.440) -
Age - - - 0.54 - - - - 0.21 -
- - - (0.448) - - - - (0.629) -
Merchant - - - - 0.61 - - - 0.85* -
education - - - - 0.437 - - - (0.450) -
Educated for - - - - - 1.07* - - 1.08* -
succession - - - - - (0.610) - - (0.616) -
Industry - - - - - - 0.82 - 0.89 -
experience - - - - - - (0.504) - (0.681) -
Exec. board - - - - - - - 0.20 -1.23 -
experience - - - - - - - (0.611) (1.787) -
Exec. bd. exp.* - - - - - - - - 1.18 -
family - - - - - - - - (1.915) -
Exec. bd. exp.* - - - - - - - - 1.47 -
external - - - - - - - - (1.859) -
Ln sales -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 -0.04
(0.227) (0.228) (0.227) (0.233) (0.230) (0.228) (0.238) (0.233) (0.232) (0.227)
Ind.- and perf.- -0.26* -0.25* -0.29** -0.25* -0.27* -0.25* -0.24 -0.26* -0.24* -0.26*
adj. PM (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) (0.143) (0.142) (0.143) (0.144) (0.140) (0.141)
Ind.-adj. 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
PM (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Ownership 0.37 0.32 0.49 0.42 0.55 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.37 0.39
(0.425) (0.435) (0.424) (0.429) (0.446) (0.428) (0.425) (0.429) (0.449) (0.428)
Default prob. -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04
(0.069) (0.071) (0.069) (0.065) (0.074) (0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.071) (0.070)
Financing 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.06
requirements (0.554) (0.550) (0.552) (0.558) (0.548) (0.561) (0.560) (0.557) (0.563) (0.554)
Investment -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
delay (0.431) (0.421) (0.428) (0.432) (0.430) (0.427) (0.429) (0.429) (0.432) (0.430)
Predecessor 0.54 0.51 0.63 0.52 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.50 0.60 0.51
active (0.445) (0.447) (0.446) (0.444) (0.447) (0.446) (0.446) (0.446) (0.440) (0.447)
Years 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11
(0.107) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106) (0.108)
Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309 309
R-squared 0.0502 0.0340 0.0412 0.0350 0.0365 0.0412 0.0411 0.0309 0.0793 0.0515
Note: The dependent variable is the difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (PM). The difference
is calculated via: industry- and performance-adjusted PM of the year 2009 less industry- and performance-adjusted PM
of the succession year. Control groups for performance were designed by sorting the industry-adjusted values of the
Amadeus database enterprises (control group) into deciles and matching the industry-adjusted PM of the sample with the
accordant Amadeus decile in the year of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control group
and year then serves as a control. Successions variables are: Family, indicates if a successor is related by marriage or
blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise; High human capital (HHC), indicates if
the successor’s human capital score (derived from (1) age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant
education, (5) professionalism, and (6) motivation) is above or equal to the median score of the sample; Acquired shares,
indicates if the successor bought a share of the enterprise; Business plan, indicates the use of a business plan during the
succession; Age is an indicator equal to zero if the age of the successor is below the median age; Merchant education
is equal to one if the successor holds an university degree in business studies (or similar) or a degree of an university
of cooperative education; Educated for succession is equal to one if the successor is a family successor with special
company-relevant education; Industry experience is equal to zero if the successor’s industry experience is below the
median; Executive board experience is an indicator equal to one if the successor benefits from previous executive board
experience. Enterprise controls and further controls are identical to table 7. Interactions between variables are marked
via stars *. The values in parentheses display Huber-White robust standard errors.
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educated as family successor (including a special company relevant education). Further-
more, if this knowledge is transferred into professional management practice (we use
the proxy business plan, which is an advanced instrument including financial and liq-
uidity plans, as well as strategic components) an additional significantly positive effect
is observable. Remarkably, the above named success factors stay significant even after
introducing various controls. Industry experience, successor ownership in the succes-
sion year and a high age are positive on average, but not significant and could thus be
classified as weaker drivers for enterprise performance.
It is worth noting, as column 8 in table 8 shows that on average executive board expe-
rience is not strongly positively related to performance. However, the positive effect of
this variable is dampened by the poor performance of enterprise successors. Family and
external CEO successors perform better with respect to this variable as the interactions
in column 9 in table 8 show. This may be indicative, that board experience in exter-
nal companies is more beneficial than previous board membership in the predecessor’s
enterprise.
In addition, we may draw the attention of the reader to the regression results in column
10 in table 8. A post-estimation joint test for the variable HHC and the interaction term
HHC * family is significant at the five percent level, while the sum of the coefficients of
HHC and the interaction term HHC * family is 1.42, which is even greater than the HHC
coefficient (1.22, significant at the one percent level) alone. This result is in line with
the agency and the stewardship theories advanced in the theory section of this article and
not astonishing at a second glance. This furthermore indicates that the overall under-
performance of family successors must be attributed to the LHC successors, who appear
more often in family succession due to relaxed selection criteria (favoritism). In line
with this result we find that the difference-in-difference in industry- and performance-
adjusted PM of family high human capital successors versus non-family high human
capital successors is positive: 0.33 (standard error: 0.534), with a constant of 1.72 (stan-
dard error: 0.350). Moreover, high human capital family successors introduce nearly
as many overall changes compared to non-family high human capital successors: -0.42
(standard error: 0.359), with a constant of 9.16 (standard error: 0.241).42
D. Discussion
The analysis above suggests that enterprises which promote weak family successors
suffer from substantial declines in performance, which overshadow the potential bene-
fits of the stewardship of family members. However, the results also show that family
successors are not inferior per se, but reinforce the hypothesis that the concentrated own-
ership structures can lead to a limited scope of the CEO labor market contests (due to
favoritism) which is potentially damaging to enterprise performance as “lemons” are
picked more often. The damaging impact of favoritism became most evident, when we
examined the performance of cases which only considered or allowed family members
as successors. This danger to performance can be reduced if the selection of the suc-
42These results are not shown in a separate table.
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cessor follows qualitative criteria which could for instance be embedded in a company’s
governance codex or the family codex of a family firm.
Regarding this interpretation, one concern might be that firms of small size were forced
to limit their successor candidate pool, since they might be unable to find an external
successor. This concern is covered by the interview data directly: when asked why the
enterprise was kept in the family only six of the 455 family successors answered that
they were unable to find an adequate buyer. Another six successors answered that no
agreement could be made on the price with potential buyers. Thus, only 2.6% of all
family successions were strongly influenced by this argument. Hence, we reject this
concern as minor.
Furthermore, unplanned successions could have led to time restrictions on finding
other successors than family heirs. 37 of the 455 family successions were unplanned,
which corresponds to 8.13% of the family successions within the limits of our sample.
Here in three cases no buyer was found and in six cases no price agreement could be set-
tled, which corresponds to 24.32% of all unplanned family successions. Thus unplanned
successions introduce substantial difficulties to the transition process if no investor can
be found for an executive-buy-out in time. But again, the fraction of family successions
for which this was the case (2.0%) is negligible and cannot be made accountable on a
holistic basis for the limitations of the candidate pool.
In addition, the summary statistics section indicates that more profitable enterprises
tend to stay within family ranks, while difficult and doubtful investments tend to be
passed to externals like a cuckoo’s egg. From these findings the advice can be given that
a thorough due diligence can play a very positive role in external successions.
VI. Conclusion
Our results highlight that in enterprises with concentrated ownership control reduced
selectivity and lower competition levels in CEO succession contests diminish post-suc-
cession enterprise performance. Overall, family successors achieve inferior results with
respect to profit margin, number of employees, rating, human capital and the rate of
change.
In detail, we find that high human capital and the rate of change are positively re-
lated to enterprise performance in successions. Furthermore, our results highlight that an
university degree in business studies or a related field, the ability to put this knowledge
into professional practice using a business plan, industry experience and experience as
a member of the board in an external company are important performance drivers. Fur-
thermore, for family CEOs a succession-relevant education including company specific
knowledge is beneficial. In addition, the results indicate that management decisions are
material for performance in this context. These results are robust to the inclusion of
controls for industry effects, performance trends and company characteristics.
In addition, for family successors with high human capital no performance gap was
observable. However, potential advantages of family successions, as discussed in agency
and stewardship theories, are blurred and overshadowed by firms which promote family
heirs with low human capital, leading to a general underperformance of family succes-
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sors. Since lower human capital successors appear more frequently in family successions
and the general lower performance of the family successors is due to low human capital
successors, these findings reflect and are in line with nepotism theories. Moreover, and
even with the inclusion of all controls, companies which strictly prefer family successors
(nepotism) and thereby heavily limit the pool of CEO candidates experience a sharp de-
cline in performance of -1.95** percentage points in industry- and performance-adjusted
profit margin.
These results highlight the necessity of a thoughtful choice of successors, it may be vi-
tal for performance to accept external managers if the ability of family heirs is currently
insufficient. Otherwise the human tradition of passing possessions and positions to the
next generation, including the ownership and CEO position of a company, may endanger
the performance or even the existence of the family firm. When asked why they became
CEO, some CEOs answered in this fashion: “It was definitely a family tradition” (Inter-
view partner 4, family CEO successor). But can this be immoral? On this, we refer to
the words of the famous Roman statesman and constitutionalist Marcus Tullius Cicero
in the opening quote of this article.
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APPENDIX
A1. Detailed Sample Selection Information
The second filter employed in the Mannheim Enterprise Panel is designed as follows.
A succession is likely if between 2002 and 2008:
1) a leading member of the executive board resigned, or
2) a new leading member of the executive board was appointed, or
3) a previous owner reduced his share, or
4) a new or previous owner (a natural person) increased his share, and
5) one of the previous owners and leading members of the executive board was at
least 55 or older.
Due to the age restriction, this filter raises the chance of observing normal successions
caused by high age, in contrast to successions caused by poor enterprise performance
(John C. Coates IV and Reinier Kraakman, 2007). At the same time the filter serves
as an upper boundary, since not all firms within the remaining population must neces-
sarily have experienced a succession. Various motivations for changes in the ownership
and management structure are imaginable. As a result a gross sample of 14,250 enter-
prises is extracted from the MUP database, which is then classified using the Interna-
tional Standard Industry Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3.1) of
the United Nations. The ISIC industry sections (A) agriculture, hunting and forestry,
(B) fishing, (C) mining, quarrying and (E) electricity gas and water supply, (L) public
administration and defense & compulsory social security, (P) activities of households,
(Q) extra-territorial organizations and bodies as well as activities of membership organi-
zations (division 91) are not included. Furthermore enterprises for which no telephone
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number is available in the MUP database are dropped (less than one percent). The fil-
ter also excludes take-overs by other enterprises (legal entities) during a succession, so
that the observed population remains a population of enterprises with the concentrated
ownership control attribute. Also unobserved are enterprises which went out of business
or went through a re-foundation during a succession. The sample is thus infected by a
survivorship bias. Hence, the results of this article are limited to the selected sample
of surviving enterprises and are of limited holistic representativeness. However, these
spatial boundaries of the selected sample do not seriously endanger the pursuit of the re-
search objective of this article. The gross sample of 14,250 enterprises is contacted by the
Center for Evaluation and Methods (CEM) using computer aided interview techniques
(ZEW-Unternehmensbefragung “Generationenwechsel Mittelstand”, 2010).
A2. Additional Tables
The industry classification key for the industry aggregation employed is shown in table
A1. The results of the long-run perspective for CEO successions and enterprise perfor-
mance are presented in table A2.
TABLE A1—INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION KEY
ISIC ISIC
Rev. 3.1 Rev. 3.1
ZEW industry key code industry description
(1) (2)
1. Manufacturing D Manufacturing
2. Construction F Construction
3. Business services K Real estate, renting and business activities
(without ISIC 70: real estate activities)
O Other community, social and personal service activities
(only ISIC 90: sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and
similar activities)
4. Consumer services H Hotels and restaurants
K Real estate, renting and business activities
(only ISIC 70: real estate activities)
M Education
N Health and social work
O Other community, social and personal service activities
(only ISIC 92: recreational, cultural and sporting activities
and ISIC 93: other service activities)
5. Wholesale & retail G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motor-
cycles and personal and household goods
6. Other I Transport, storage and communication
J Financial intermediation
Note: For each aggregated industry cluster the key in form of the ISIC Rev. 3.1 code (column 1) and its description
(column 2) is reported. The ISIC industry sections (A) agriculture, hunting and forestry, (B) fishing, (C) mining, quar-
rying and (E) electricity gas and water supply, (L) public administration and defense & compulsory social security, (P)
activities of households, (Q) extra-territorial organizations and bodies as well as division (91) activities of membership
organizations are not included. ISIC industry categories with no observations are not displayed.
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TABLE A2—LONG-RUN DIFFERENTIAL PERFORMANCE OF SUCCESSORS
Succession type Difference in difference
Variable All Family Enterprise External Hybrid Family versus External
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Profit margin indicators
Observations 166 90 26 44 6 134
1 Profit margin 0.28 -0.57 0.65 1.27 4.00 -1.84*
(0.41) (0.54) (0.67) (0.80) (4.28) (0.97)
1 Industry-adjusted -0.09 -0.71 0.25 0.89 0.65 -1.60
profit margin (0.40) (0.59) (0.67) (0.82) (1.03) (1.01)
1 Industry- and performance- 1.47 1.11 1.49 2.21 1.20 -1.10
adjusted profit margin (0.36) (0.51) (0.67) (0.76) 0.62) (0.92)
B. Changes implemented score
Observations 398 236 68 74 20 310
Changes (number) 8.87 8.47 9.05 9.81 9.50 -1.35**
(0.21) (0.27) (0.53) (0.46) (0.88) (0.54)
C. Additional performance indicators
Observations 370 228 61 65 16 293
1 Rating (score) 4.77 9.30 1.21 -4.20 -9.69 13.50**
(2.15) (2.75) (5.15) (5.44) (6.34) (6.07)
1 Industry-adjusted 0.13 3.86 -0.79 -8.90 -13.00 12.75**
rating (score) (2.15) (2.75) (5.20) (5.33) (6.61) (5.98)
Observations 398 236 68 74 20 310
1 Employees 21.52 12.31 17.69 54.38 21.65 -42.06**
(%) (4.22) (2.01) (4.16) (21.05) (7.62) (21.07)
1 Industry-adjusted 27.66 24.94 33.56 32.14 23.34 -7.21
employees (%) (1.69) (1.95) (4.09) (5.18) (5.44) (5.52)
Note: The table presents the development between the succession year and the year 2009 and includes only successions
between the years 2002 and 2005. Successions are categorized into: Family, if a successor is related by marriage or
blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise (column 2); Enterprise, for unrelated
successors who previously worked for the enterprise (column 3); External, for successors with no previous ties to the
enterprise (column 4) and Hybrid, for multiple successors with differing backgrounds (column 5). The performance
indicators presented are calculated via: (a) profit margin: earnings before taxes divided by operating revenue, (b) industry-
adjusted variables: the subtraction of the median of the variable of the accordant year and industry (two-digit ISIC)
from the variable, (c) industry- and performance-adjusted variables: industry-adjusted variables less the median industry-
adjusted variable of the relevant control group, (d) changes implemented score: the mean of the sums of observed changes
per enterprise (Score ranges from 0 to 25), (e) rating: based on the Creditreform solvency-index, and (f) number of
employees: the growth of the firm’s employees in percent. Control groups for performance are designed by sorting the
industry-adjusted values of the variables of the Amadeus database enterprises (control group) into deciles and matching
the industry-adjusted values of the variable in the sample with the according Amadeus decile in the year of the succession.
The median of the relevant variable in the respective decile and year is then employed as a control. The stars display
(Huber-White) significances at: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. Huber-White robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
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Inside CEO Successions in Family Firms:
Should Predecessors Stay Active or Cultivate Roses?
By JAN-PHILIPP AHRENS, MICHAEL WOYWODE, AND JAN ZYBURA ∗
Employing an unique data set on CEO successions, we analyze the cir-
cumstances under which departing CEOs stay active within their enter-
prise subsequent to a CEO succession and highlight enterprise perfor-
mance implications. We find that the likelihood of predecessor activity
is increased by family succession, nepotism and tacit knowledge, but
reduced by the successor’s human capital, successor’s ownership and
corporate age. The performance impact of prolonged predecessor activ-
ity is positive for successors with low human capital, but turns negative
with increased successor human capital, while this negative impact is
amplified by the degree of influence of the preceding CEO.
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“All looked upon the throne, and heard and saw
Nothing but Jemshı´d, he alone was king,[...]
Then proudly to his nobles he spoke,[...]:
“I am unequalled,[...] the universal voice
Declares the splendor of my government,[...]
And me the only monarch of the world.”
-Soon as these words had parted from his lips,-[...]
His early grandeur faded:-[...] The day of Jemshı´d
Passed into gloom, his brightness all obscured.”
The Sha´h Na´meh (the book of kings), 997-1010 A.D., Firdausı´1
I. Introduction
Organizations are often attuned to various aspects of their leaders ranging from be-
havior, norms and traditions to their strategy and performance (Miller and Dro¨ge, 1986,
Sonnenfeld and Spence, 1989, Miller, 1990, Miller, 1993, Bigley and Wiersema, 2002,
and Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). This attunement is arguably strongest when the voting
majority and operative leadership are unified in one reign which is very often observable
within the ranks of family firms. The class of family firms is consequently a particu-
larly interesting object of research in the ownership concentration literature (La Porta et
al., 1999, and Anderson and Reeb, 2003).2 Changes in organizational leadership, par-
ticularly CEO successions, have received enormous attention from various scholars. In
a remarkable way, CEO successions unify manifold aspects of several strands of eco-
nomic, psychological, anthropological and management research. This is possibly be-
cause a succession can have a big potential impact on a company’s performance and
future prospects.
Previous research on firm performance in successions predominantly focuses on the
role of the successor. Various successor characteristics and influences, exempli gratia the
successor’s human capital, his origin (family versus external) and the effects of inheriting
wealth and favoritism, have been explored (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999, Morck et al.,
2000, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez,2006, Bennedsen et al., 2007, Mehrotra et al., 2011, and Ahrens
et al., 2012). The findings highlight the crucial role of a thorough, honest and fair assess-
ment of a successor’s leadership abilities. Despite these advances, there are astonishingly
few investigations into the role of the departing CEO, while further engagement of a de-
parted CEO within the company is indeed a common phenomenon (Handler, 1990, Dyck
et al., 2002, and Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). However, the circumstances under which
a predecessor remains active subsequent to a CEO succession and the respective impli-
cations for enterprise performance are relatively uncharted territories. Furthermore, this
omission is surprising in the light of the growing literature on tacit knowledge (of the
1Translated by Atkinson (1832).
2For a theoretical model of a constellation with a large shareholder and atomically scattered minority shareholders
we refer to Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
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predecessor), but also astonishing with respect to the organizational inertia and change
management literature (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, and Osterloh and Frey, 2000).
Predecessor activity often entails a reciprocal relation, a company may benefit from a
former CEO, but also vice versa: to some CEOs the concept of retirement is threatening.
Family business leaders are likely to develop a strong psychological attachment to the
organization they have shaped and grown, especially if they are the company founders
(Wasserman, 2003, and Adams et al., 2009). Just like the existence of an orchestra is
a necessary condition for a conductor to create a fine piece of art, some CEOs need
their business as a testimony of their virtuosity, and they become intertwined with the
organization’s identity.
The resulting wish of the departing CEOs to prolong their career and to maintain sub-
stantial influence in the firm (arguably private benefit maximization) may be pursued and
realized given a concentrated ownership and control structure, which in family firms has
often been held by the departing CEO. However, when private benefits are claimed too
rigorously, this behavior can hurt enterprise performance and thereby the smoothness of
the change of control (Johnson et al., 2000, Dyck and Zingales, 2004, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez,
2006, Villalonga and Amit, 2006, and Ahrens et al., 2012).3
The other side of the coin is that departing CEOs may possess an agglomeration of
specific knowledge and unique status, which may be difficult to transfer and replace
within a short period of time, especially family businesses are often highly idiosyncratic
and their knowledge is in parts person-centric rather than institutionalized (Lee et al.,
2003).4 In line with this argument it has been argued that knowledge transfer is a central
challenge in ensuring competent leadership succession (Cabrera-Sua´rez et al., 2001, and
Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). From such a knowledge transfer perspective, it may prove
beneficial if predecessors prolong their stay on board rather than enjoying their sunset
years by cultivating roses.
These clashing views on the merit of predecessor activity demonstrate a strong need
to investigate the performance impact of the role of the CEO predecessors in CEO suc-
cessions. Furthermore, to address a possible heterogeneity of predecessor roles, it is
important to distinguish whether predecessors are still holding a title solely de jure, or
whether they actively drive success while their designated successor is playing only mi-
nor walk-ons.
With these aims in mind, our article evaluates corporate performance following a suc-
cession by considering a matchless data set. We have information on 807 CEO succes-
sions in non-publicly traded medium sized enterprises with high ownership concentra-
tion and ownership control, including observations on various successor & predecessor
attributes and enterprise performance. Employing approaches suggested by the firm per-
formance literature strand (Barber and Lyon, 1996), we refine the performance data with
3Exempli gratia, a CEO with an incomplete late life agenda could curb enterprise performance by pursuing a capital-
intensive pet project, or a CEO with a pronounced desire to prolong his rule or status might want to install a tributary
and powerless younger successor. After all, there are accounts of wrathful aging leaders heavily entrenching their control
positions due to exuberant mistrust in the managerial capabilities of potential successors.
4In this vein, Smith and White (1987) show that corporations seem to select succession candidates who seem to be
similar to the previous CEO and who understand and fit the current strategy best.
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industry-adjustments and performance-matched adjustments to minimize the effects of
industry and time trends, and to prevent potential mean reversion influence, but we also
include arrays of often-employed controls for corporate attributes such as size, momen-
tum, default probability and ownership structure in our analysis. In order to capture
causalities and motivations not addressed by the quantitative empirical analysis, we fur-
thermore carry out 22 qualitative in-depth interviews with CEO successors and experts.
This article offers empirical evidence that the likelihood of predecessor activity seem
to be significantly positively influenced by a family origin of the successor, the pres-
ence of children of the predecessor, and nepotism. Furthermore, we find that industries
with high levels of tacit knowledge (we use the intangibles-sales ratio as a proxy) seem
to significantly positively influence the likelihood of predecessor activity. In contrast,
successor ownership, high levels of successor human capital and time elapsed since the
succession seem to be significantly negatively related with the likelihood of prolonged
predecessor ability.
The results of Huber-White robust ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions high-
light that the performance impact of predecessor activity, measured in industry- and
performance-adjusted profit margin (PM), is significantly positive for successors with
low human capital, but turns significantly negative with increased successor human cap-
ital, while this significant negative impact is amplified by the degree of influence of the
preceding CEO. These findings are robust to the inclusion of an array of industry- and
company-level controls. A two stage least squares instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) re-
gression furthermore indicates that the OLS results are underestimated by roughly one
percentage point in industry- and performance-adjusted PM, but that the pattern reported
above remains. The results are relevant for entrepreneurs, banks, rating agencies, family
business owners and successors. In addition, our results provide empirical support for
knowledge which has so far only been based on anecdotal or case study related evidence.
The article is structured as follows: Section II provides a literature overview, while
in section III the main propositions and hypotheses are derived. Section IV provides
information on the sample selection. Further, section V comprises the underlying data
analysis, which is then discussed in section VI. Section VII is dedicated to a brief con-
clusion.
II. Related Literature
Successions are covered in manifold strands of literature. This review focuses on the
research related to the activity of the predecessor. In large companies a replaced CEO
often leaves the company for good, whereas there are reports that it is quite common for
CEOs of family businesses to stay active within the company in a different role for some
time after succession, particularly, if they are the founder of the business (Wasserman,
2003).5 This prolonged activity may be regarded as a period of adjustment and mentoring
(Vancil, 1987, Handler, 1990, Dyck et al., 2002, and Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004).
5Interestingly, many corporate governance codices often recommend a cooling-off period of more or less two years
before taking another board position within the same company.
CHAPTER 2: CULTIVATING ROSES? 53
However, Dyck et al. (2002) develop propositions that challenge what they refer to as an
“accepted mantra” that overlap between incumbent and successor is always good.
Prolonged activity of the predecessor may be helpful, because there are accounts that
not always the most suitable successor is chosen (Dawson, 2011).6 Accordingly, a cat-
egorization of successors by Levinson (1974) also includes types such as the “loyal ser-
vant” or “the false prophet”. The “loyal servant” leaves the old leader in charge and
follows suit and reveals incompetent leadership, whereas the “false prophet” does not
display the competence required to rise to the challenges of the role as CEO. In such
circumstances a prolonged predecessor activity might mitigate potential negative impli-
cations for enterprise performance due to inferior ability of the successor.
By contrast, among the Levinson (1974) categories one can also find the “watchful
waiter” successor. The “watchful waiter” is an external star performer, who might even
be in charge “de jure”, but who is not granted full decision-making power and responsi-
bility, while the predecessor still has the say in the company. Founders in particular often
have difficulty giving up what they have built up (Levinson, 1971, Churchill and Lewis,
1983, and Kets de Vries, 1985). Accordingly, the literature highlights that for some
family enterprise CEOs barriers to retirement and succession include a substantial loss
in terms of heroic stature, mission or even identity and life-task (Barnes and Hershon,
1976, Sonnenfeld, 1988, Handler, 1990).7 However, in the long-run it is not sufficient for
a shift of power and authority to occur pro forma only, but de facto. In addition, in such
conditions a prolonged activity of the predecessor might even be an impediment to vital
change and enterprise performance, as openness and responsiveness to change stimuli
are potentially diminished under the incumbents CEO’s prolonged reign (Hambrick and
Fukutomi, 1991).
Successions, if they are not unplanned due to sudden death or illness of the predeces-
sor, are not usually a static event but an evolutionary process in which the old executive
phases out and his successor phases in (Vancil, 1987, and Handler, 1990). In a system-
atic literature review of successions in family-owned businesses, Le Breton-Miller et al.
(2004) provide a synthesis of common predictors of successful successions. Following
6A key question when determining potential successors in the realm of succession planning is whether to decide
for or against a family member as a successor (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). For family firms this question possesses
strong theoretical links to ownership and control related issues that are embedded in the literature strand of theory of
the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Demsetz and Villalonga,
2001, and Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Ownership structure and agency problems can be regarded as focal (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976, Fama, 1980, and Schulze et al., 2001), as in small to medium-sized enterprises with a usually rather
strong ownership concentration, CEOs and owners can install successors almost omnipotently. The successor’s ability to
signal his skills in an inter-firm CEO labor market (Fama, 1980) can be considered as a career ladder contest in the manner
of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986), which makes signaling theory (Arrow, 1973, and Spence, 1973 and 1974)
and the contest literature important theoretical foundations. In family firms especially the extent to which a contest takes
place to recruit the best talent is not that clear-cut. Some family successors are chosen on the basis of nepotism, gender, or
birth order rather than on economic criteria based on the future firm performance such as skill, experience and education
(Dyer, 2003, and Dawson, 2011). Due to nepotism, family firms may select unqualified successors from a restricted
successor pool, which in return leads to detrimental firm performance (Burkart et al., 2003, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006, Hillier
and McColgan, 2009, and Ahrens et al., 2012).
7In this vein, studies of retirements have highlighted the role of internal and external continuity for aging individ-
uals. Individuals seek internal continuity through ongoing reinforcement of their personal identity, self-esteem, and
ego strength, whereas external continuity is fostered through predictable social responsibilities, relationships, and roles
(Atchley 1989).
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their analysis, key characteristics are successor and incumbent-centric factors, a shared
vision, succession planning, hand-over of power, the development of successors, family
relationships, and the presence of outside directors on the board (Le Breton-Miller et al.
(2004).
From a more holistic perspective there are two central aspects to succession processes
in family-owned businesses: the transition of leadership and the transition of ownership
(Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Firstly and referring to transition of leadership, Sharma
et al. (2003) put forward that if the incumbent does not reveal a propensity to step aside
and does not effectively formulate and convey a succession plan and respective transition
of leadership, a potential successor could lose interest in the firm. Handler (1990) points
out that the predecessor should gradually reduce his influence and the manifest habits of
his old leadership paradigm. If there are no clearly defined roles (Handler, 1990) and the
independence of the successor’s actions are not ensured, this may result in frustration of
the successor leading to inferior performance (Lansberg, 1988, Dyck et al., 2002, and Le
Breton-Miller et al., 2004).
Secondly, the transition of ownership is further complicated by the often concentrated
ownership structures in many family firms. From a theory of the firm perspective (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976), strong ownership safeguards incumbents from potential intrusion
by outside managers competing for their position. Thus, Boeker and Karichalil (2002)
argue that ownership increases the incumbents’ ability to remain in place and lowers
the likelihood of their departure. Furthermore, it is argued that ownership is a driver of
long-term orientation and status endowment (amenity potential) of family CEOs (Dem-
setz and Lehn, 1985, and Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006), while some CEOs might
be reluctant to relinquish their status (Sonnenfeld, 1988). A smooth phase-out may be
facilitated when the predecessor finds other ways of satisfying his personal and psycho-
logical needs with a activities or a plan of a future outside the enterprise (Sharma et al.,
2001).
Furthermore, a period of parallel activity might be favorable from a knowledge man-
agement perspective. The predecessor’s knowledge of doing business in his particular
enterprise is of idiosyncratic nature. The literature indicates that a close relationship and
mutual respect between the successor and the predecessor may promote knowledge ex-
change and be vital in successions (Handler, 1990, Morris et al., 1997, Cabrera-Sua´rez
et al., 2001, Dyck et al., 2002, and Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Furthermore and
regarded from a resource-based and dynamic capabilities perspective, specialization of
managerial skills to firm-specific needs may constitute an unique capability and a hard
to imitate resource, which may be a source of competitive advantage which allows the
respective firm to outperform its competitors (Barney, 1991, Castanias and Helfat, 1991,
Teece et al., 1997, Helfat, 2000, Cabrera-Sua´rez et al., 2001, and Boeker and Karichalil,
2002).
Although there exists a large body of literature on successions, remarkably little re-
search has been conducted (no study to our knowledge) explicitly on the activity of the
departing CEO and the resulting performance impact. As this question is arguably very
important for older practitioners seeking empirically supported advice for their family
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enterprise, this omission becomes even more astonishing. This article addresses this gap
in the literature by asking two main questions: What drives prolonged predecessor ac-
tivity and what is the respective enterprise performance impact of prolonged predecessor
activity?
III. Theoretical Considerations and Derived Propositions
A. Categories and Definitions
In the following, we shall briefly discuss the terminology and categories employed
in the article, which, in general, follows the terminology and classifications employed
in Ahrens and Woywode (2012) and Ahrens et al. (2012,b). To start with, this article
focuses on owner-controlled family firms, thus firms with a “concentrated ownership
control” attribute, which we take to be present if a maximum of three natural persons
own more than 50% of the respective enterprise and at least one of these owners is a
leading member of the executive board. Furthermore, we create the dimensions of the
“role” of the predecessor, “human capital” of the successor, “origin” of the successors,
and “nepotism”, which serve as succession categories in the analysis to follow.
To be more specific, we categorize and distinguish between the following roles of
the predecessors within their respective companies after the succession: active & re-
sponsible owner, for predecessors who hold shares and exercise leadership functions;
passive owner, for predecessors who hold shares but exercise no leadership functions;
board member, for supervisory board membership; coach & consultant, for a coaching
or consulting role; key account holder, indicating the management of a special group
of key customers; special tasks, for predecessors who support their expertise in special
tasks (or/and manage them); common employee, for predecessors who adopt the role of
a common employee; and finally, other role, if the role of the predecessor does not fall
into the other categories. Furthermore, as some predecessors fulfill some roles simulta-
neously, a score of the predecessor’s degree of influence is created, which sums up all the
roles of the predecessor, but weights active & responsible owner by three, board member
by two and all other roles by one.
Within the “origin” dimension we differentiate between the following successor back-
grounds: family, for successors related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three
persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise; enterprise, for unrelated successors
who were previously employees of the enterprise; external, for successors with no previ-
ous ties to the enterprise, and hybrid, for multiple successors with differing backgrounds.
The “human capital” dimension is mainly covered through the creation of a human
capital score which serves as a proxy of the successor’s true ability (see also Ahrens and
Woywode, 2012, and Ahrens et al., 2012,b). In detail, the human capital score for each
successor is derived from the sum of five elements, which includes the following indica-
tor variables: (1) age above median (of the successors in the sample, proxy for general
experience); (2) industry experience above median (proxy for industry related experi-
ence); (3) leadership experience (proxy for practical managerial skills); (4) merchant
education, if the successor holds an university degree in business studies (or strongly
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related field) or was educated at an university of cooperative education (proxy for theo-
retical managerial skills); and (5) use of a business plan during the succession (proxy for
professional managerial skills).
Following Murphy and Za´bojnı´k (2004), the choice of proxies reflects the idea that
general managerial skills became more important for CEOs over the last three decades
due to the progress in management science, corporate controlling and finance and other
arts, which, if mastered by the CEO, contribute substantially to the CEO’s ability to steer
a company. Furthermore, Murphy and Za´bojnı´k (2004) argue that company specific
knowledge has become more accessible to managers due to the progress of the digital
age over the last 30 years, when compared to earlier decades. We argue that leadership
experience, a degree in business studies and the ability to apply this knowledge using ad-
vanced professional instruments, such as a business plan (which includes a strategic plan,
but also an earnings forecast and a finance- and liquidity-plan), are acceptable proxies for
such general managerial skills. An investment in “education in general management” is
easier to obtain for more gifted and able individuals making it a valuable signal of higher
ability (Spence, 1973, Arrow, 1973, and Spence, 1974), while we use the business plan
indicator variable to ensure that the general managerial skills acquired are being used as
opposed to being a signal only. Furthermore, the small business literature highlights the
crucial role education in business studies and managerial skills for the success of small
businesses (Ibrahim and Goodwin, 1986). This argumentation regarding education is in
line with findings in the succession literature (Morris et al., 1997, and Le Breton-Miller
et al., 2004).
In line with human capital theory we argue that productivity-augmenting investments
in human capital can also take place in the post-education phase (Mincer, 1974, and
Strober, 1990). Following this thought, we include three forms of experience as measures
for CEO relevant human capital investments acquired through “on-the-job-training”. To
begin with, Mincer (1974) highlights that the time distribution of these investments cre-
ates an age variation in earnings (known as the age profile) resulting in a positive corre-
lation between age and earnings, which can arguably be seen as remuneration for higher
ability due to experience. In this vein, we use age as a proxy for general experience
which may in parts be relevant for the job of CEO.8
Arguably, a very relevant investment with respect to building up CEO relevant human
capital is leadership experience. The succession literature highlights that proven skills,
such as previous leadership experience, generate credibility and are vital in successions
(Barach et al., 1988, Barach and Ganitsky, 1995, Chrisman et al., 1998, and Le Breton-
Miller et al., 2004). In addition, we also include a company specific proxy for industry
experience, which approximates potential advantages due to learning the specific “tricks
of the trade” of the industry in which the respective enterprise operates. This allows us
also to include external CEO successors into the company specific knowledge measure,
which would not be possible by definition if we measured the experience within a re-
8Mincer (1974) shows that this effect diminishes with higher age and eventually becomes negative, similar to an
inverted u-shape. Furthermore, Miller (1991) highlights that seasoned CEOs may become “stale in the saddle” and less
effective. However, the average age of the CEO successor falls into the increasing section of this inverted u-shape, which
is why we neglect diminishing marginal effects in the higher ages.
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spective enterprise. Finally, we work with a sum of the above five elements, because
many combinations of the above proxies may lead to “Rome”, id est a true higher ability
as a CEO successor.
As nepotistic tendencies might lead to a prolonged activity by the predecessor, we also
include a dimension which covers nepotism. In detail, we follow the measure derived
in Ahrens et al. (20012,b) and distinguish between strong nepotism and weak nepotism.
Strong nepotism refers to succession in which the predecessor only considers family
members as successors. Furthermore, weak nepotism, is employed as a category for
succession in which the predecessor also considers non-family members as successors,
but decides to install a family member with a lower human capital score than the “average
achievable” human capital score of managers available in the respective industry of his
enterprise.
Put differently, this category measures the lack of favorable attributes of the successor,
which the predecessor has accepted in the case of a family succession. Here, the term
“average achievable” human capital score serves as a benchmark. It is created by making
the assumption that there are no effects of nepotism when the enterprise is handed over
to a non-family successor and by inferring that on average this level of human capital is
achievable by all firms in this industry within the limits of a normal search for a non-
family CEO successor.9
B. Propositions: The Activity of the Predecessor
Many family entrepreneurs wish to see family heirs steering the fortunes of their busi-
ness and that the family wealth is secured and procured when they retire (Kerkhoff et al.,
2004). In line with stewardship theories, if a family heir takes the new lead, then a pre-
decessor may be intrinsically motivated to remain active in the enterprise as he derives
utility or amenity potential from staying on board (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, and Davis
et al., 1997). Furthermore, it is well known that ensuring family leadership across gener-
ations is a central challenge that many family-owned businesses fail to overcome due to
poorly managed successions (Morris et al., 1997, and Miller et al., 2003). Morris et al.
(1997) argue that among the core triggering events, which are capable to destabilize an
otherwise stable family enterprise system, are the decision to bring a family member into
a senior position, to pass on the position as CEO and the founder’s decision to disengage
completely. Therefore, in order to ensure the prosperity of the business and a smooth
succession, we suspect that predecessors tend to stay active more often in family succes-
sions as compared to external successions in which the predecessor is not intrinsically
motivated.
PROPOSITION 1: The likelihood of post-succession activity by the predecessor is high-
er in family successions as compared to external successions.
Another angle of consideration is to ask whether the predecessor has children or not.
Apart from the argument that a predecessor may be intrinsically motivated to guide and
9For calculating the industry benchmarks we employ an aggregated version of ISIC industry classifications consisting
of 6 categories (Appendix A2) as we only have 807 observations.
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accompany his children into his footsteps, there are two further theoretical aspects which
may lead to a prolonged activity by predecessors with children: Firstly, when compared
to retirement, keeping an active role within the enterprise may ensure more income sta-
bility for the predecessor, which might be more important for predecessors which raise
children as compared to predecessors with no children. Secondly, predecessors with
younger children might possibly install interim managements, which they guide actively
until the next family heir is old enough and experienced enough to become the new CEO.
For these three reasons we argue that predecessors with children are more likely to retain
an active role compared to predecessors with no children.
PROPOSITION 2: The likelihood of post-succession activity by the predecessor is high-
er for predecessors with children compared to predecessors without children.
Among many others, one of the reasons why families hand over their firm to their
kin is nepotistic preferences (Levinson, 1971, Beckhard and Dyer, 1983, and Barach et
al., 1988). In turn, nepotistic predecessors, apart from the private benefits of seeing a
family heir steering the fortunes of the former enterprise, might also derive utility from
prolonging their activity within a family-steered enterprise. We therefore suspect that
nepotistic successions positively increase the predecessor decision to stay on board.
PROPOSITION 3: The likelihood of post-succession activity by the predecessor is high-
er for nepotistic successions compared to successions without nepotistic traits.
In a pioneer essay on the implications of knowledge distribution for economic theory
Hayek (1945) argues that practically every individual is endowed with certain specific
knowledge that he can make beneficial use of in gaining some advantage over all others.
As a consequence certain decisions are thus left to this individual or require this individ-
ual’s cooperation in order to access the specific knowledge. Translated to the family firm
succession context, the predecessor’s knowledge is intangible and often hard if not im-
possible to access, in other words tacit. However, for successors a transfer of knowledge,
especially of tacit knowledge, is critical, because quite often the new CEO enters of-
fice at a disadvantage with regard to facts, trends, contacts, procedures and task-specific
knowledge (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Murphy and Za´bojnı´k (2004) argue that the
computer age has made firm specific knowledge more accessible, but we hypothesize that
this argument does not hold for tacit knowledge. In businesses with a high degree of tac-
itness in terms of idiosyncratic knowledge, we hypothesize an implication of prolonged
activity by the predecessor to transfer this knowledge in order to keep it accessible. As
a proxy for high idiosyncratic and tacit knowledge, we employ the intangibles-to-sales
ratio of the respective industry (at the two-digit ISIC level) as an indicator.
PROPOSITION 4: The likelihood of a post-succession activity of the predecessor is
higher in industries with high tacitness as compared to industries with low tacitness.
Furthermore, we suspect that the successor’s human capital plays a major role in pre-
decessor activity as the human capital of the successor is found to be positively related
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to a smooth leadership transition and post-succession performance (Morris et al., 1997,
Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006, and Ahrens et al., 2012). Strong
successors equipped with a high level of human capital possibly strive for independence,
which results in calls for a clearly defined or reduced role of the predecessor (Handler,
1990) to prevent potential frustration (Dyck et al., 2002, and Le Breton-Miller et al.,
2004). However, there are accounts that the most suitable and capable candidate is not
chosen in all cases (Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006, Dawson, 2011, and Ahrens et al., 2012).
When the ability of the successor is limited, a prolonged activity by the predecessor can
be regarded as a mediating period of adjustment and mentoring (Handler, 1990, Dyck
et al., 2002, and Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Reflecting the above considerations, we
suspect that higher human capital of the successor is negatively related to the likelihood
of the predecessor to remain active.
PROPOSITION 5: The likelihood of post-succession activity by the predecessor is neg-
atively related to the successor’s human capital level.
Arguably, there are two central aspects to succession processes in family-owned busi-
nesses: the transition of leadership and the transition of ownership (Le Breton-Miller et
al., 2004). The transition of ownership has received substantial attention in the litera-
ture (Boeker and Karichalil, 2002). In line with an agency-theory perspective (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976) it could be argued that strong ownership has an insulating effect
on managers and their positions within firms. Ownership endows family CEOs with sta-
tus and a long-term orientation (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006), while the barriers
to retirement for a departing CEO may include a substantial loss in terms of status or
mission (Sonnenfeld, 1988, and Handler, 1990). Furthermore, Boeker and Karichalil
(2002) argue that ownership increases incumbents’ ability to remain in place and lowers
the likelihood of their departure.10 Reflecting the above theoretical argument, we suspect
that if ownership is transferred to the successor this lowers the barriers to retirement of
the predecessor and lowers the likelihood of post-succession activity by the predecessor.
PROPOSITION 6: The likelihood of post-succession activity by the predecessor is neg-
atively related with enterprise ownership of the successor.
We suspect that prolonged activity by the predecessor will reduce over time. More
explicitly, if successions are not unplanned due to sudden death or illness of the prede-
cessor, successions are usually not a static event but an evolutionary process in which the
old executive phases out and his successor phases in (Handler, 1990). In addition to ob-
vious biological reasons for a reduced role of the predecessor, it can be argued that once
the predecessor steps aside he may become increasingly less connected to the beat of
the market and the organization due to his reduced degree of involvement. Furthermore,
there is evidence that a CEO’s effectiveness may deteriorate over time, they may become
“stale in the saddle” and their performance over time may follow an inverted u-shape,
10The research of Boeker and Karichalil (2002) concentrates on founder CEOs in new ventures. We argue that there
may be an analogy with our context.
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thus some CEOs may even become impediments to change after they have passed the
prime of their career (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991, Miller, 1991, and Virany et al.,
1992, Henderson et al., 2006).
PROPOSITION 7: The likelihood of post-succession activity by the predecessor is neg-
atively related to the time passed since the succession.
C. Propositions: The Performance Impact of the Activity of the Predecessor
The proposed reasons and circumstances which prevent the predecessor from “growing
roses” and induce them to remain active are of manifold nature. Therefore, we also
expect the effect of prolonged activity by the predecessor on enterprise performance to
be related to diverse contingencies, especially the human capital and the origin of the
successor.
From a theoretical perspective, it might be argued that a period of guidance and men-
toring is generally in the first place helpful in many successions. From a resource-
based perspective, the predecessor’s firm-specific managerial skills and his tacit knowl-
edge may constitute a source of competitive advantage (Castanias and Helfat, 1991, and
Boeker and Karichalil, 2002). We argue that an information or skill gap between the pre-
decessor and the successor may be gradually bridged in a phase of parallel activity and
specific idiosyncratic knowledge or management techniques may be transferred, which
could lead to a subsequent performance impact.
PROPOSITION 8: The performance impact of a post-succession activity of the prede-
cessor is positive.
However, we suspect that this primary effect is subject to diverse relations and contin-
gencies. For example, if the human capital of the successor is low, then the predecessor’s
activity might compensate for the successor’s shortages in management ability leading to
a positive performance impact. For a strong and experienced successor an information or
skill gap may be non-existent. Furthermore, successors often spark vital organizational
change (Miller, 1993) and successors with high human capital have been reported as un-
leashing higher levels of change compared to successors with low human capital (Ahrens
and Woywode, 2012). There may be many reasons why profound organizational change
may spark resistance from the predecessor and lead to internal conflicts.11 Furthermore,
there are accounts in the literature that older CEOs may become impediments to change
after the prime of their career (Virany et al., 1992). Furthermore, if the predecessor
does not convey readiness to step aside in such conflicts and if the role definition (Lans-
berg, 1988, and Handler, 1990) is not clearly cut, then the successor might suffer from
frustration and lower motivation, which may result in inferior enterprise performance
(Dyck et al., 2002, Sharma et al., 2001, Sharma et al., 2003, and Le Breton-Miller et al.,
11Among the reasons for resistance to change (Coch and French Jr., 1948) might be in this case differences in vision,
leadership style, responsibility and emotional ties and past experiences, which may be supported by organizational inertial
forces of structural and environmental embeddedness (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, and Hannan and Freeman, 1984).
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2004). Collecting the above arguments into a proposition, we suspect that the interac-
tion between high human capital and predecessor activity entails a negative performance
impact.
PROPOSITION 9: The interaction between a high human capital successor and prede-
cessor activity entails a negative performance impact.
Arguably, enterprise successors who previously served under the reign of the prede-
cessor are in the weakest position to emancipate themselves in order to act as a catalyst
for change and to manage potential conflicts with the predecessor effectively. Arguably,
they may even have learned their key managerial skills within this enterprise and they
potentially may be subject to emotional and organizational ties. Furthermore, their past
subordinate position may involve them suffering deficits in respect from the predeces-
sor, while a lack of mutual respect is known to be detrimental in successions (Handler,
1990, and Morris et al., 1997). By contrast, high human capital family successors may
be capable of shielding the enterprise from conflicts by discussing them in conversations
“over the kitchen table” within the ranks of the family12, whereas high human capital
external successors have no constraints due to ties to the organizational past or organiza-
tional relations, plus they might be equipped with superior knowledge and solutions from
outside the realm of the enterprise. We therefore suspect that if the change, which high
human capital successors are highly likely to spark, leads to conflicts with the predeces-
sor, then these conflicts will be largest among high human capital enterprise successors,
as compared to family or external successors.
PROPOSITION 10: The triple interaction between family successor, high human capi-
tal successor and predecessor activity entails a positive performance impact.
PROPOSITION 11: The triple interaction between external successor, high human cap-
ital successor and predecessor activity entails a positive performance impact.
IV. Sample Selection
Our data set is built on several pillars: (1) the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP),
(2) the Bureau van Dyjk Amadeus database (Amadeus), (3) the Hoppenstedt database,
(4) the Creditreform solvency index information, (5) the German Bundesbank database,
(6) standardized computer aided telephone interviews, (7) non-standardized direct inter-
views, and (8) web-searches.13
Our sample selection begins with an extraction of a population of owner-controlled
enterprises from the MUP database. In detail, in order to extract the corporations we
employ the following filter for the years 2002 to 2008:14
12For example, Le Breton-Miller et al. (2004) provide a synthesis of predictors of successful successions which
include, among others, a shared vision (Lansberg, 1999) and a close family relationship (Lansberg, 1988), which may
also be a favorable surrounding for conveying knowledge (Cabrera-Sua´rez et al., 2001).
13The Mannheim Enterprise Panel is maintained by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) and includes
over 6 million enterprises. The Creditreform solvency index information is employed to approximate default probabilities
from company ratings, while the German Bundesbank data are used to adjust for inflation. The data set was also employed
in Ahrens et al. (2012), Ahrens and Woywode (2012), and Ahrens et al. (2012,b).
14We exclude earlier years because MUP data from earlier than 2002 are less complete and reliable.
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1) 30 to 1,000 employees, and
2) going concern, and
3) possessing the concentrated ownership control attribute.
A second filter is applied to identify and extract succession events.15
We gather financial data and impute missing values using the following hierarchy: 1.
MUP information, 2. Amadeus information, 3. Creditreform solvency index informa-
tion, 4. Hoppenstedt information, and 5. web-searches. In addition to the sample group,
a control group of 187,388 company-year observations is employed using the Amadeus
database.16 By employing Bundesbank information on inflation we adjust and harmonize
all euro values in the sample and control group to 07/2009 euros.
The sample companies are contacted devising a standardized computer-aided tele-
phone interview. Furthermore, we required each interviewee to suit the following cri-
teria:
1) the interviewee is a successor, and
2) the interviewee is a leading member of the executive board, and
3) the interviewee holds an ownership fraction of the enterprise, and
4) the succession took place between the years 2002 and 2008.17
This procedure yields a total sample of 804 observations of CEO successions. The in-
terview includes the following information nexi for our research objective: (a) succession
type, (b) human capital of the successor, and (c) enterprise performance. The succession
type nexus delivers information on prolonged activity by the predecessor, which includes
his new role (e.g. active & responsible owner, passive owner, board member, coach &
consultant, key account holder, special tasks, employee, or other) and the successor’s
origin (e.g. family, enterprise or external).
The successor’s human capital is measured using proxies derived from the second
information nexus of the interview which includes information on the successor’s (1)
age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant education, and (5)
professionalism.
Information on the enterprise performance are derived by employing classical account-
ing indicators such as profit margin (PM), number of employees and credit rating score
measured in the succession year and 2009. We flank these accounting variables with
additional information on the state of the company, which include unexpected post-
succession financing requirements and perceived pre-succession investment delays. The
data set is analyzed using the STATA 12 software.
15We refer to appendix A1 for specific information.
16The control group enterprises are required to be of a size between 30 up 1,000 employees and the accounting
data cover the same time horizon (2002 to 2009) as the sample group. Furthermore, we excluded unconsolidated sister
statements (Amadeus consolidation code U2) and duplicates.
17In detail, the year in which the successor was appointed as a leading member of the executive board.
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Besides the 804 standardized interviews, we also record 20 successors and two experts
using non-standardized in-depth interviews. These in-depth interviews are unrepresen-
tative, but provide an additional source for the interpretation of the empirical findings,
which may be difficult to install using only standardized interviews.18 The in-depth in-
terviews were transcribed and evaluated employing ATLAS.ti.
V. Data Analysis
A. Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides a summary of the observed successions which we categorize via
predecessor activity and via industry clusters.19
To start with, an initial observation of the cross table 1 reveals the fact that a prolonged
predecessor activity in the aftermath of a CEO succession is indeed a very common phe-
nomenon in enterprises with concentrated ownership and control. In 510 successions,
comprising 63.2% of the observed 807 successions, the former CEO stays active in a
minor or major role. The lowest activity rate can be observed in the wholesale & re-
tail industry where a majority of 58.7% of the predecessors still keep a role within their
enterprise. Interestingly, in 55.4% of the observed successions the predecessor is re-
ported to be among the owners of the enterprise. By contrast, only in 26.6% (or in 215)
of the successions the predecessor withdraws completely from the enterprise and is re-
ported to be retired. The highest predecessor retirement rate of 29.1% can be found in
the business services industry. We count 82 successions or 10.2% where the predeces-
sor has deceased. Overall, we track 323 successions in the manufacturing sector, 141 in
the business services sector, 126 in the wholesale & retail industry, 114 in the construc-
tion industry, 73 in the consumer services areas and only 30 successions in other, not
generally classifiable, industries.20
The roles a preceding CEO can fulfill after a CEO succession are highly diverse. In
this respect it seems important to differentiate between roles with high impact and in-
volvement and minor roles more related to soft advisory positions. Table 2 serves as
an outlook in this respect and presents the several predecessor roles across the industry
clusters.
Overall, it is striking to observe that in 72.4% or 369 of 510 successions, the major-
ity of the predecessors who remain active fulfill a leading role which includes keeping
an ownership share while exercising leadership functions.21 Interestingly, in the busi-
ness service sector even 80.0% of the active predecessors are observable in this category,
18For example, these interviews cover and explore motivations, expectations and visions, but also discuss post-
succession corporate changes and the co-operation and role of the predecessor. Furthermore these interviews cover
aspects such as the influence of the leadership style, and the successor’s relations to the second-row management and
employees in the transition phase.
19To create the industry clusters, we employ aggregations of the International Standard Industry Classification of All
Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3.1) of the United Nations. We present a detailed industry classification key for the ISIC
aggregation in the appendix A2.
20For further initial descriptive statistics on the data set we refer to Ahrens et al. (2012).
21For the interested reader, this category is also included as a control in the regressions of Ahrens et al. (2012).
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TABLE 1—CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE PREDECESSORS’ ROLES
Net Predecessor
sample of General role of predecessor is
Industry successions Deceased Retired Stays active shareholder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Manufacturing 323 33 86 204 173
(40.0) (40.2) (40.0) (40.0) (38.7)
[100.0] [10.2] [26.6] [63.2] [53.6]
2. Construction 114 15 32 67 59
(14.1) (18.3) (14.9) (13.1) (13.2)
[100.0] [13.2] [28.1] [58.8] [51.8]
3. Business services 141 5 41 95 85
(17.5) (6.1) (19.1) (18.6) (19.0)
[100.0] [3.5] [29.1] [67.4] [60.3]
4. Consumer services 73 8 18 47 43
(9.0) (9.8) (8.4) (9.2) (9.6)
[100.0] [11.0] [24.7] [64.4] [58.9]
5. Wholesale & retail 126 18 34 74 68
(15.6) (22.0 ) (15.8) (14.5) (15.2)
[100.0] [14.3] [27.0] [58.7] [54.0]
6. Other 30 3 4 23 19
(3.7) (3.7) (1.9) (4.5) (4.3)
[100.0] [10.0] [13.3] [76.7] [63.3]
Total 807 82 215 510 447
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
[100.0] [10.2] [26.6] [63.2] [55.4]
Note: The net sample of observed successions is reported in column 1. Columns 2 to 4 display the general role of
the preceding CEO. The role of the predecessor is categorized into: Deceased, for predecessors who died (column 2);
Retired, if the predecessor has retired (column 3); and Stays active, for predecessors who remain active in a leading or
minor position within their company (column 4). Column 5 displays whether the predecessor is reported to be an owner
or to hold shares after the succession. The industries are clustered using aggregated ISIC Rev. 3.1 classifications. For
a detailed overview of the aggregation key, we refer to the appendix. The fraction of respective predecessors’ roles as
a percentage of the absolute amount of the net sample of observed successions (column 1) or of the absolute amount
of observed predecessors’ roles per predecessor’s role type (columns 2-5) is displayed in parentheses. The fraction of
respective predecessors’ roles as a percentage of the absolute amount of observed successions per industry cluster is
displayed in square brackets.
whilst in the manufacturing industry only one third stay active in this role. The second
most prominent category is a prolonged membership of the supervisory board, which
is an activity pursued by 30.6% (or 156) of the predecessors after a succession and is
especially popular with 37.3% of the observed successions being within the construction
industry. Furthermore, predecessors who take the position of a key account holder or
manager appear, compared to the other industries, also more often within the construc-
tion industry. In general, the position of a key account manager receives a notable degree
of popularity among the preceding CEOs, as 15.5% (or 79 cases) of the predecessors are
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TABLE 2—CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE PREDECESSORS’ ROLES
Role of the active predecessor within his enterprise
Active & Coach & Key
Active responsible Passive Board consul- account Special Common Other
Industry total owner owner member tant holder tasks employee role
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1. Manufacturing
204 136 37 61 10 31 46 13 32
(40.0) (36.9) (47.4) (39.1) (45.5) (39.2) (44.2) (43.3) (42.1)
[100.0] [66.7] [18.1] [29.9] [4.9] [15.2] [22.5] [6.4] [15.7]
2. Construction
67 46 13 25 0 18 17 6 6
(13.1) (12.5) (16.7) (16.0) (0.0) (22.8) (16.3) (20.0) (7.9)
[100.0] [68.7] [19.4] [37.3] [0.0] [26.9] [25.4] [9.0] [9.0]
3. Business services
95 76 9 27 6 13 15 4 16
(18.6) (20.6) (11.5) (17.3) (27.3) (16.5) (14.4) (13.3) (21.1)
[100.0] [80.0] [9.5] [28.4] [6.3] [13.7] [15.8] [4.2] [16.8]
4. Consumer services
47 35 8 15 2 5 7 3 9
(9.2) (9.5) (10.3) (9.6) (9.1) (6.3) (6.7) (10.0) (11.8)
[100.0] [74.5] [17.0] [31.9] [4.3] [10.6] [14.9] [6.4] [19.1]
5. Wholesale & retail
74 58 10 24 4 10 14 2 12
(14.5) (15.7) (12.8) (15.4) (18.2) (12.7) (13.5) (6.7) (15.8)
[100.0] [78.4] [13.5] [32.4] [5.4] [13.5] [18.9] [2.7] [16.2]
6. Other
23 18 1 4 0 2 5 2 1
(4.5) (4.9) (1.3) (2.6) (0.0) (2.5) (4.8) (6.7) (1.3)
[100.0] [78.3] [4.3] [17.4] [0.0] [8.7] [21.7] [8.7] [4.3]
Total 510 369 78 156 22 79 104 30 76
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
[100.0] [72.4] [15.3] [30.6] [4.3] [15.5] [20.4] [5.9] [14.9]
Note: The number of observations of predecessors (the previous CEO) who remain active per industry is reported in
column 1. Columns 2 to 9 display the specific roles of the predecessors within their respective companies after the
succession. The roles of the predecessor are categorized into: Active & responsible owner, for predecessors who hold
shares and exercise leadership functions (column 2); Passive owner, for predecessors who hold shares but exercise no
leadership functions (column 3); Board member, if the predecessor remains a member of the supervisory board (column
4); Coach & consultant, if the predecessor serves in a coaching or consulting role (column 5); Key account holder, for
predecessors who manage a special group of key customers (column 6); Special tasks, if the predecessor supports the
enterprise with his expertise in special tasks or manages them (column 7); Common employee, for predecessors who
take the role of a common employee (column 8); and Other role, if the role of the predecessor can not be categorized
and is reported as “other” (column 9). Multiple indications are allowed. The industries are clustered using aggregated
ISIC Rev. 3.1 classifications. For a detailed presentation of the aggregation key, we refer to the appendix. The fraction of
respective predecessors’ roles as a percentage of the absolute amount of observed active predecessors (column 1) or of the
absolute amount of observed predecessors’ roles per predecessors’ role type (columns 2-9) is displayed in parentheses.
The fraction of respective predecessors’ roles as a percentage of the absolute amount of observed active predecessors per
industry cluster is displayed in square brackets.
reported to serve in similar positions within their enterprises. In this vein, but from an in-
ternal perspective, 20.4% of the predecessors fulfill special tasks within the organization
they formerly headed.
Most notably, a fraction of 15.3% keep ownership shares in their enterprise without
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fulfilling any role within their enterprise. However, such a passive role is only observable
in 9.5% of the predecessors within the business service sector. Interestingly, at 4.3% we
observe surprisingly low rates of a coaching and consulting role of the predecessor, which
is even lower than the role as a common employee (5.9%). Furthermore, 14.9% or 76
cases report serving in functions or roles unsuited to the categorization offered.
B. Proposition Testing: The Activity of the Predecessor
Following these initial cross tables, the next question that springs to mind concerns
the factors which drive a prolonged predecessor activity. With regard to this question we
shall carefully advance the ideas brought forward in propositions 1 to 7, which circu-
late around the potential drivers of post-succession predecessor activity, by employing a
simple maximum likelihood probit regression. In detail, the devised index model reads:
(1) Y = δci + X iβ + εi Probit models (table 3)
Y denotes the dependent variable which is the indicator variable for the activity of the
predecessor, δ is an array of coefficients of interest according to propositions 1 to 7, X i is
an array of controls and εi denotes the error term.
22 The variables of interest are oriented
towards the propositions and embrace the successor’s origin, the children structure of
the predecessor, nepotism, tacitness, the successor’s human capital, ownership by the
successor and the years passed since the succession.
In detail, the controls include: (a.) company characteristics, id est enterprise scale
(measured by the natural logarithm of the number of employees), enterprise performance
in the succession year (we use default probability measured via the Creditreform sol-
vency index), the number of executives reported to be steering the company, and the
company age (used as a proxy for tradition); and (b.) industry controls. We offer an
overview of the results in table 3.
22This notation is an abbreviation and used in this article for the reader’s convenience. We draw attention to the fact
that the probit model requires the effects of x to go through the index of xβ, id est: Pr(Y = 1|X) = Pr(Y ∗ > 0) =
8(Xβ), where 8 is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. In the following we use the
abbreviation index model and simply refer to probit.
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TABLE 3—SUCCESSION CHARACTERISTICS AND ACTIVITY OF PREDECESSOR
Probit regression dependent variable: active predecessor
Panel
A. Successor attributes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family CEO 0.36*** 0.38**
(0.123) (0.177)
Enterprise CEO 0.31** 0.14
(0.151) (0.213)
Ownership -0.58*** -0.57*** -0.59*** -0.71*** -0.72***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.151) (0.153)
Human capital (score) -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.07 -0.16*** -0.12**
B. Children structure (0.044) (0.044) (0.051) (0.059) (0.062)
Son(s) only 0.26
(0.175)
Daughter(s) only 0.36*
(0.200)
Mixed children 0.33**
C. Nepotism (0.165)
Strong nepotism 0.03
(0.195)
Weak nepotism 0.25**
D. Knowledge transfer proxies (0.124)
Dynamism -0.04 -0.04
(0.087) (0.087)
Capital intensity 0.09 0.10
(0.190) (0.191)
Knowledge intensity 0.06 0.07
(0.123) (0.124)
Tacitness (intangibles-sales ratio) 0.47** 0.45**
E. Company controls (0.189) (0.190)
Ln employees (number) 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01
(0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.119) (0.120)
Default probability -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09* -0.09*
(0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.048) (0.049)
Executives (number) 0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02
(0.088) (0.095) (0.096) (0.098) (0.129) (0.133)
Company age (years) -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F. Industry controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Years since succession -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034)
Observations 747 747 747 747 465 465
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.13
Note: A legend is presented separately.
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Legend table 3: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the predecessor remains active after the succes-
sion within his company and zero otherwise.
In detail, successor variables denote: Family CEO, for successors related by marriage or blood to at least one of the
three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise; Enterprise CEO, for unrelated successors who previously worked
for the enterprise; Ownership is an indicator equal to one if the successor owned a share of the enterprise in the succession
year; and Human capital (score) is the successor’s human capital score derived from the sum of five proxy elements: (1)
age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant education, and (5) professionalism.
The predecessor’s children structure variables embrace: Son(s) only is an indicator equal to one if the predecessor’s
children are male only; Daughter(s) only is an indicator equal to one if the predecessor’s children are female only; and
Mixed children is an indicator equal to one if among the predecessor’s children include both daughter(s) and son(s).
The nepotism variables describe: Strong nepotism is an indicator equal to one if the predecessor did not consider
non-family members as successors; and Weak nepotism is an indicator equal to one if the succession is not categorized in
the strong nepotism category and a family successor with lower human capital, compared to the average human capital
of non-family successors within the industry of the company, is installed as successor.
The variables addressing knowledge transfer are designed as follows: Dynamism is the sum of three elements, which
includes: (1) an indicator for the absolute number of new firms in the respective industry and year (using Eurostat data
for 2008 and 2009 for Germany); (2) an indicator for the start-up ratio of the respective industry and year (using Eurostat
data for 2008 and 2009 for Germany); (3) and an indicator for the employee (per company) growth per industry and year
(using Amadeus data for 2002 until 2009 for Germany). If the respective industry value (at the two-digit ISIC level)
is equal to or above the overall median, the respective indicator equals one; Capital intensity is an indicator equal to
one if the total assets over operating revenue ratio per industry (using Amadeus Data from 2002-2009 for Germany at
the two-digit ISIC level) is equal to or above the overall median value; Knowledge intensity is composed of the sum of
three elements including: (1) an indicator for employee costs per employee at the industry level (using Eurostat data
from 2002-2008 for Germany); (2) an indicator for the research and development expenditure over operating revenue
ratio (using COMPUSTAT data for EU 15 countries from 2002 to 2009); and (3) an indicator for the average non-family
supply of CEO human capital per industry (using the sample data). If the respective value of the industry (at the two-digit
ISIC level) is equal to or above the overall median, the respective indicator equals one; Tacitness (intangibles-sales ratio)
is an indicator equal to one if the average intangibles over operating revenue ratio per industry (using COMPUSTAT data
for EU 15 countries from 2002 to 2009) is equal to or above the overall median.
Company level controls include: Ln employees refers to the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the
succession year; Executives displays the number of executives in the succession year; and Default probability is default
probability in the succession year derived from the Creditreform solvency index. Company age is the age of the company
in the succession year. Industry level controls are indicators equal to one if the respective category according to the ZEW
industry classification (see Appendix) is met. Years is the number of years passed since the succession. All values are
displayed in 07/2009 euros. The table presents estimated changes in probabilities devising a maximum-likelihood probit
model. The stars display significances at: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. The values in parentheses
display the standard errors.
The results of table 3 reveal several clear patterns. To begin with, column 1 highlights
that family and enterprise successions significantly increase the likelihood of observing
prolonged activity by the preceding CEO (family coefficient 0.36, significant at the one
percent level; enterprise coefficient 0.31, significant at the five percent level) as compared
to external and hybrid successions and robust to the inclusion of an array of firm and
industry controls.23 We interpret this finding as supportive of proposition 1 and suspect
that the predecessor derives utility from staying active in the case of family or enterprise
successions and that he also might be motivated intrinsically to ensure the success of a
family or enterprise succession. From the evidence in column 1 (and 6) we conclude that
we cannot reject proposition 1 on the basis of these results.
Column 2 of table 3 advances propositions 5 and 6, which address the ownership and
the human capital dimensions. Both successor ownership (coefficient -0.12, significant
at the one percent level) and the human capital of the successor (coefficient -0.58, signifi-
cant at the one percent level) significantly lower the likelihood of prolonged predecessor
activity even after controlling for firm and industry effects. Regarding the ownership
structure we interpret this result as evidence that successor ownership lowers the barriers
23The significance vanishes for the case of enterprise succession when including further variables, as can be observed
in column 6 of table 3.
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to retirement for the predecessor. Concerning the human capital we read the results as
follows: High human capital successors may become involved into conflicts with the pre-
decessor since they induce more corporate changes (Ahrens and Woywode, 2012) which
may lead to a reduced likelihood of predecessor activity. In addition, the predecessor
may have more trust in an able successor which may foster his decision to step aside. By
contrast, low human capital successors may welcome prolonged activity as a period of
mentoring and adjustment. Furthermore, these findings remain robust to the inclusion of
various other variables as can be seen in the regressions 2 to 6. We infer that proposi-
tions 5 and 6 cannot be rejected on the basis of these results and interpret these findings
as strong evidence in favor of propositions 5 and 6.
Column 3 of table 3 is dedicated to test proposition 2 which postulated that predeces-
sors with children are more likely to prolong their activity. We split the children structure
and find some evidence in favor of this proposition, but find that this relationship is most
pronounced when the predecessor has daughters (coefficient 0.33, significant at the five
percent level). For mixed children the coefficient is 0.36 and significant at the 10% level,
while the coefficient is insignificantly positive for predecessors with male children as
compared to no children. We speculate that the reasons for the prolonged activity may
be the need to ensure income stability when having children, the guidance of interim
management until the children are old and experienced enough to take over the lead. In
addition, we suspect that the peculiar prolonged activity which occurs when the predeces-
sor has female children may be explained by sociological biases towards male successors
which induce a longer (possibly unnecessary) guidance of female family CEO successors
by the predecessor (see also Ahrens et al., 2012,b). In general, we find that the results
are weakly supportive of proposition 3 and that proposition 3 cannot be rejected on the
basis of these results.
In proposition 3 we argued that nepotistic traits may also possibly drive longer activity
by the preceding CEO. We subject this proposition to a closer look in column 4 of table
3. We employ a twofold approach and differentiate between strong nepotism and weak
nepotism. We find that in successions which can be characterized as weakly nepotistic
prolonged predecessor activity is significantly more likely (coefficient 0.25, significant
at the five percent level) compared to successions without nepotistic traits, whereas only
an extremely weak (coefficient 0.03, insignificant) relationship is observable for strongly
nepotistic successions compared to successions without nepotistic traits. This leads us to
reject and refine proposition 3: “The likelihood of a post-succession activity of the pre-
decessor is higher for weakly nepotistic successions as compared to successions without
nepotistic traits.” We conclude that our results in column 4 of table 3 are in line with the
refined version of proposition 3.
We furthermore argue that one reason for predecessor activity might be the need for
knowledge transfers between the successor and the predecessor, which might be espe-
cially relevant when tacit knowledge has to be transferred (proposition 4). As we lack
detailed data on the degree of need for knowledge transfers on the enterprise level, we
advance this idea at the two-digit ISIC industry level with four proxies which are reported
in column 5 of table 3.
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Dynamism, the first knowledge transfer proxy explores the idea that if the industry
entails a lot of start-ups in absolute and relative terms, but also high growth (in terms
of employees) then it is likely that the knowledge needed to start a business within this
sector is easily transferable and possibly also subject to frequent updates. In turn, this
might make prolonged predecessor activity less necessary when regarded from a knowl-
edge transfer perspective, as the preceding CEO quickly becomes less effective due to
the high dynamism (Henderson et al., 2006). However, such a relation is not observable
at significant levels from our data and the proxies we use: the coefficient of dynamism
is weakly negative and highly insignificant. We further explore the idea that the Capital
intensity proxy might lead to a higher likelihood of prolonged predecessor activity due to
the potential specific knowledge related to capital intense assets.24 Again, the direction
of the coefficient seems to be correct, but is insignificant, which leads us to reject this
speculation. In addition, we pursue the thought that in highly knowledge intense indus-
tries prolonged predecessor activity is more likely because enterprises and processes tend
to be more complicated and difficult to explain and transfer.25 However, the coefficient
of Knowledge intensity, as measured by our proxies, points in the right direction, but
remains insignificant.26
The last knowledge transfer proxy refers to cases where the knowledge transfer is
likely to entail an idiosyncratic or tacit component, which might make predecessor activ-
ity necessary in order to keep this knowledge accessible and transferable. We suspect that
intangible assets are a source of such tacit and difficult to transfer knowledge, thus we
employ the intangibles over operating revenue ratio per industry as a proxy for Tacitness.
As the regressions 5 and 6 show, we observe that a high intangibles to operating revenue
ratio at the industry level is significantly positively related (coefficients are 0.47 and 0.45
respectively, significant at the five percent level) to the likelihood of the predecessor re-
maining active. We interpret this result as evidence that in these cases the prolonged
predecessor activity is driven by knowledge transfer and accessibility motivations. We
conclude that proposition 4 cannot be rejected on the basis of these results.
The final aspect with respect to a prolonged preceding CEO activity which we would
like to highlight is our observation that activity reduces significantly (coefficient -0.09,
at the one percent level) with time passed since the succession event. We suspect that, in
addition to obvious biological constraints, this observation is driven by the tendency of
the CEO to become increasing less informed and connected to the beat of the market and
organization when they step aside, whilst the new CEO becomes increasingly self-reliant.
Furthermore, this result is in line with the argument for the “phasing-in and phasing-out
process” described in the literature (Handler, 1990). To sum up, it can be said that this is
evidence in favor of proposition 7 and that we cannot reject proposition 7 on the basis of
these results.
24We calculate an industry’s capital intensity in the following way: total assets over operating revenue per enterprise.
25To approximate the knowledge intensity of an industry we used the following proxies: educational and training costs
per employee, employee costs per employee, research and development expenditure over operating revenue ratio, and the
average human capital of non-family CEO successors.
26We also present the above proxies in a deconstructed form in the appendix A2 in table A2, thus without aggregating
them to the “dynamism” and “knowledge intensity” constructs, but the individual proxies also remain insignificant.
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The next question that springs to mind is whether there are pronounced differences
with regard to these results across the different roles the predecessors take. To address
this question, we devise maximum likelihood probit regressions using the model of re-
gression 6 of table 3, but change the dependent variable according to the respective role.
The results are presented in table 4.
Columns 1 to 3 of table 4 address the likelihood of prolonged ownership by the pre-
decessor. The likelihood of predecessor ownership combined with an executive role is
significantly reduced by successor ownership, the successor’s human capital, company
age and time passed since the succession, mirroring the results of table 3, whereas inter-
estingly capital intensity drives this likelihood. We suspect that capital intense firms are
more difficult for successors to acquire while capital intensity also might go along with
the need for knowledge transfers due to complicated assets, leading to prolonged prede-
cessor activity. Remarkably, column 3 highlights that starkly different drivers are at work
for the likelihood of passive ownership by the predecessor. A high default probability
leads to a significant and considerably lower likelihood of passive predecessor owner-
ship (coefficient -0.57, significant at the five percent level), whilst higher human capital
is positively related to the likelihood of observing passive predecessor ownership. These
findings are in line with the interpretation that the predecessors try to avoid uncertainty
with regard to the future value of their investment, while they could also explain why
high industry dynamism leads to significantly lower likelihood (-0.23, significant at the
five percent level) of passive ownership by the predecessor.
Furthermore, we observe that family CEO successions significantly (at the five percent
level) drive the likelihood of supervisory board membership (coefficient 0.45), and the
roles key account holder (coefficient 0.56) and special tasks (coefficient 0.52). Supervi-
sory board membership is significantly more likely in enterprises larger with respect to
the number of employees (coefficient is 0.38, significant at the one percent level) and ex-
ecutives (coefficient is 0.32, significant at the five percent level), which is in line with our
previous findings. Interestingly, high dynamism goes along with a significantly reduced
likelihood of supervisory board membership (-0.18, significant at the 10% level) and the
key account holder role (-0.28, significant at the five percent level). This is possibly be-
cause the knowledge of the preceding CEO loses value more quickly in a highly dynamic
context. To sum up, the results are generally in line with our previous findings from table
3, although we observe some heterogeneity between the diverse roles a predecessor can
take. However, we draw attention to the fact that the interview allowed multiple prede-
cessor roles to one predecessor, therefore we refrain from putting too much emphasis on
the results of table 4.
Now that there is some light shed on the drivers of predecessor activity in general and
also with respect to some of the prominent roles a predecessor can take after a succession,
the next obvious question that stems directly from these findings is: what is the enterprise
performance impact of prolonged predecessor activity? This is possibly most relevant to
practitioners when they have to ask themselves: “Should I stay on board?” We shall
address this question and the propositions 8 to 11 which revolve around the performance
impact of prolonged predecessor activity in the next section.
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TABLE 4—SUCCESSION CHARACTERISTICS AND PREDECESSOR’S ROLES
Role of the active predecessor within his enterprise
Owner Active & Key
(share- responsible Passive Board account Special
holder) owner owner member holder tasks
A. Successor attributes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family 0.19 0.17 0.07 0.45** 0.56** 0.52**
(0.173) (0.172) (0.230) (0.203) (0.277) (0.240)
Enterprise 0.10 0.11 -0.01 -0.06 0.20 0.09
(0.208) (0.203) (0.278) (0.248) (0.340) (0.293)
Ownership -0.59*** -0.50*** -0.05 -0.13 -0.08 -0.31*
(0.141) (0.136) (0.181) (0.151) (0.191) (0.165)
Human capital (score) -0.09 -0.16*** 0.16* 0.11* 0.05 0.05
B. Knowledge transfer proxies (0.060) (0.059) (0.081) (0.068) (0.085) (0.075)
Dynamism -0.04 0.09 -0.23** -0.18* -0.28** -0.02
(0.084) (0.084) (0.115) (0.093) (0.119) (0.113)
Capital intensity 0.21 0.36** -0.32 0.35* -0.25 -0.47**
(0.179) (0.174) (0.227) (0.195) (0.235) (0.212)
Knowledge intensity 0.04 -0.11 0.20 0.04 0.10 0.13
(0.118) (0.117) (0.151) (0.129) (0.161) (0.143)
Tacitness (intangibles-sales ratio) 0.34* 0.10 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.23
C. Company controls (0.182) (0.177) (0.228) (0.193) (0.244) (0.224)
Ln employees (number) 0.09 -0.05 0.24 0.38*** -0.12 0.15
(0.116) (0.114) (0.148) (0.124) (0.176) (0.144)
Default probability -0.17** -0.10 -0.57** -0.12 0.04 0.02
(0.082) (0.063) (0.259) (0.121) (0.051) (0.051)
Executives (number) -0.10 -0.18 0.20 0.32** 0.10 0.27*
(0.125) (0.122) (0.168) (0.133) (0.180) (0.144)
Company age (years) -0.00** -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D. Industry controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Years since successions -0.08*** -0.06* -0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.01
(0.032) (0.032) (0.044) (0.036) (0.046) (0.041)
Observations 465 465 465 465 465 465
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.07
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the respective predecessor role is met and zero otherwise. In
detail, successor variables denote: Family CEO, for successors related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three
persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise; Enterprise CEO, for unrelated successors who previously worked for
the enterprise; Ownership is an indicator equal to one if the successor owned a share of the enterprise in the succession
year; and Human capital (score) is the successor’s human capital score derived from the sum of five proxy elements: (1)
age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant education, and (5) professionalism. The variables
addressing knowledge transfer are designed as follows: Dynamism is the sum of three elements, which includes: (1) an
indicator for the absolute number of new firms in the respective industry and year (using Eurostat data for 2008 and 2009
for Germany); (2) an indicator for the start-up ratio of the respective industry and year (using Eurostat data for 2008 and
2009 for Germany); (3) and an indicator for the employee (per company) growth per industry and year (using Amadeus
data for 2002 until 2009 for Germany). If the respective industry value (at the two-digit ISIC level) is equal or above the
overall median, the respective indicator equals one.; Capital intensity is an indicator equal to one if the total assets over
operating revenue ratio per industry (using Amadeus Data from 2002-2009 for Germany at the two-digit ISIC level) is
equal to or above the overall median value.; Knowledge intensity which is composed of the sum three elements including:
(1) an indicator for employee costs per employee at the industry level (using Eurostat data from 2002-2008 for Germany);
(2) an indicator for the research and development expenditure over operating revenue ratio (using COMPUSTAT data for
EU 15 countries from 2002 to 2009); and (3) an indicator for the for the average non-family supply of CEO human capital
per industry (using the sample data). If the respective value of the industry (at the two-digit ISIC level) is equal to or
above the overall median, the respective indicator equals one; Tacitness (intangibles-sales ratio) is an indicator equal to
one if the average intangibles over operating revenue ratio per industry (using COMPUSTAT data for EU 15 countries
from 2002 to 2009) is equal to or above the overall median. Company level controls include: Ln employees refers to the
natural logarithm of the number of employees in the succession year; Executives displays the number of executives in
the succession year; and Default probability is default probability in the succession year derived from the Creditreform
solvency index. Company age is the age of the company in the succession year. Industry level controls are indicators
equal to one if the respective category according to the ZEW industry classification (see Appendix) is met. Years is the
number of years passed since the succession. All values are displayed in 07/2009 euros. The table presents estimated
changes in probabilities devising a maximum-likelihood probit model. The stars display significances at: * ten percent,
** five percent and *** one percent. The values in parentheses display the standard errors.
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C. Proposition Testing: The Performance Impact of Predecessor Activity
We begin our performance analysis by presenting a picture of the status quo of the
enterprise performance in the succession year. It is a matter of fact that many of the
enterprises we observe are not traded publicly, thus our analysis lacks market-based per-
formance data such as market-to-book rations. Therefore, we predominantly rely on
accounting variables, which are arguably more backward-orientated than market based
performance evaluations. We are aware that our performance measurement can thus only
be second-best compared to approaches using both market- and accounting-based vari-
ables. To take into account these issues, we flank the traditional accounting values with
further information on the state of the company, exempli gratia financing requirements
and perceived investment delays, such that we argue that the performance measurement
is sufficient for the demand with regard to our research objective.
Our performance analysis relies on the use of profit margins (PM). We argue that
profit margin is a simple and straightforward performance indicator and a very practical
benchmark when comparing efficiency. In addition, PM by definition pairs values from
the same time horizons: the numerator (earnings before taxes - Amadeus item 33) and the
denominator (operating revenue - Amadeus item 24) refer to accruals from the same time
horizon. One disadvantage of PM is that the efficiency of assets in use is not reported
(Barber and Lyon, 1996).27 We are also interested in how the companies perform relative
to their industry peers (at the two digit-ISIC level) in the succession year. To pursue this
idea, we employ industry adjustments using a control group of 187,388 company-year
observations of enterprises of the same size drawn from the Amadeus database. In detail,
the industry adjustments are created by a subtraction of the median PM of the accordant
year and industry (at the two digit-ISIC level) from the PM value of the respective sample
enterprise. Thus, the industry-adjusted PM is indicative of how the succession company
performs relative to its respective industry median in the succession year. Furthermore,
in order to prevent our regressions and results being influenced by extremes (or outliers),
we winsorize the PM values at the 0.025 level. Apart from PM, we also visualize the
size of the enterprises in the succession year by presenting the number of employees and
sales. The result, a picture of the performance of the enterprises in the succession year,
is presented in table 5.
Interestingly, table 5 gives rise to the conjecture that there are only very few significant
differences between enterprises in which the preceding CEO remains active compared to
the average succession. In the succession year the average succession of the data set
investigated has a sales umbrella of 10.4 million euros, a profit margin of 5.7%, and
approximately 80 employees, while the average enterprise in which the predecessor re-
mains active earns 11.5 million euros with a profit margin of 5.9% and counts roughly 81
employees in the succession year. It is in line with intuition that the resulting differences,
as reported in column 7 of table 5, are not anywhere near significant levels. However,
with one exception: with respect to the investment delay indicator, which equals one if
27In this respect return on assets (ROA) is an interesting alternative proxy. But it does not come without its own draw-
backs: assets are normally measured at historic costs, whereas earnings refers to the present time horizon. Furthermore,
one might argue that idle or recently acquired assets may blur the accuracy of performance measurement via ROA.
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TABLE 5—ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE IN THE SUCCESSION YEAR AND PREDECESSOR ACTIVITY
Predecessor roles Mean comparison
Active & Key Difference
Active responsible Passive Board account in means
All total owner owner member holder (2)-(1) (4)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Operating revenue 10.4 11.5 11.4 15.8 15.8 8.8 1.1 4.4
(in mil. euros) (0.61) (0.89) (0.76) (4.33) ( 2.43) (1.25) (1.08) (4.39)
Profit margin 5.7 5.9 6.2 4.3 6.2 6.7 0.2 -1.9**
(PM) (%) (0.27) (0.35) (0.43) (0.77) (0.68) (0.94) (0.45) (0.88)
Industry-adjusted 2.9 3.0 3.3 1.4 3.5 3.6 0.1 -1.9**
PM (%) (0.27) (0.36) (0.43) (0.78) (0.70) (0.93) (0.45) (0.89)
Employees 80.3 81.2 80.8 96.1 93.9 64.8 0.9 15.3
(number) (2.89) (3.53) (4.34) (9.68) (6.64) (3.86) (4.56) (10.61)
Investment delay 20.5 13.4 10.9 22.7 12.7 15.8 -7.1*** 11.8**
(%) (1.47) (1.55) (1.67) (4.88) (2.72) (4.21) (2.13) (5.15)
Hidden financing 10.3 8.9 6.8 16.9 7.1 13.9 -1.5 10.1**
requirement (%) (1.07) (1.26) (1.31) (4.30) (2.06) (3.92) (1.66) (4.49)
Note: The performance indicators presented are: Operating revenue: operating revenue in the succession year; Profit
margin (PM): earnings before taxes divided by operating revenue in the succession year; Industry-adjusted PM: the
subtraction of the control group median PM (drawn from the Amadeus database) of the respective year and industry
(two-digit ISIC) from the sample PM value; and Employees: the number of employees in the succession year. The
additional indicators signal: Investment delay is an indicator equal to one if the successor believes that investments were
delayed before the succession; Hidden financing requirements is an indicator equal to one if considerable unexpected
financing requirements occurred in the aftermath of the succession. All values are displayed in 07/2009 euros. The
stars display (Welch-Satterthwaite) significances at: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. The values in
parentheses display the standard errors.
the successor believes that investments were delayed before the succession, we observe
a highly significant difference suggesting that investment delays occur 7.1 percentage
points more often in average successions as compared to successions in which the pre-
decessor still fulfills a role. We interpret this observation in the following way: firstly,
we suspect that this difference is driven by cash-in and milking behavior before the pre-
decessor sells his share and retires, but secondly this is also sociologically driven, as the
successor might for various reasons not want to blame the predecessor in a pronounced
way for potential omissions while he is still active in the enterprise.
Predecessor activity in the supervisory board occurs more often in larger enterprises,
i.e. with 15.8 million euros sales, 6.2% profit margin and approximately 94 employees
on average, as compared to the average of observed successions. We can also com-
pare cases where predecessors just keep an ownership share (passive owner) with cases
where the preceding CEO still fulfills an executive plus a shareholding role (active &
responsible owner). We find it remarkable to observe pronounced differences between
them, as is reported in column 8 of table 5. While enterprises in the passive owner pre-
decessor category are bigger (4.4 million euros and around 15 employees on average)
than enterprises in the active & responsible owner predecessor category, we observe
that the passive owner category entails -1.9 percentage points lower industry-adjusted
profit margins (significant at the five percent level) and is infected by a 11.8 percentage
points higher rate of investment delays (significant at the five percent level) and a 10.1
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percentage points higher indication rate of (hidden) financing requirements (significant
at the five percent level) in the successions year as compared to enterprises where the
predecessor remains active in an executive and shareholding role. These results seem to
indicate that a predecessor with an active & responsible role seems to go along with well
managed succession cases. Note furthermore, that compared to the overall sample en-
terprises where the predecessor remains active in a key account holding role are smaller
with only 8.8 million euros sales and 65 employees. We speculate that these enterprises
because of their size might have an increased need for the prolonged predecessor ac-
tivity as they might be not as capable and efficient in replacing all of the former CEOs
functions when compared to larger enterprises.
We now move forward to investigate performance development using a differential
performance methodology and a Huber-White robust ordinary least squares regression
(OLS) in order to address propositions 8 to 11 which are directed at the performance
impact of prolonged CEO activity. The data at hand allows us to measure performance
twice, in the succession year and in the year 2009 and we focus on profit margin as our
main indicator for efficiency and enterprise performance. To start with, PM is potentially
influenced by various trends and firm attributes. However, since we employ a differential
measure, we by construction control for all time-invariant firm attributes which could
drive enterprise performance. We also address fears that our performance measure, earn-
ings before taxes divided by operating revenue multiplied by 100 (PM), is affected by
trends due to the decline and growth of industries by using industry-adjusted differential
performance (Barber and Lyon, 1996). Furthermore, we also introduce control-group-
matched performance adjustments of the industry-adjusted PM, in order to pay attention
to potential mean reversion due to transitory components in accounting values and to
prevent our measure capturing general performance trends due to pre-succession perfor-
mance (Barber and Lyon, 1996). In addition and inspired by the recent literature on suc-
cessions and corporate performance (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez,
2006), we incorporate a set of control variables for enterprise attributes in our regres-
sions, i.e.: size (sales), momentum (e.g. industry-adjusted profit margin), default proba-
bility and ownership. In addition, we excluded roughly 1% (4 observations) as outliers
due to high values using studentized residuals, Cook’s D, DFITS and leverage to residu-
als squared plot inspections.
Differential industry-adjusted PM and differential industry- and performance-adjusted
PM are calculated with adjustments derived from a control group of 187,388 company-
year observations of enterprises of the same size in the Amadeus database. Following the
methodological literature of Barber and Lyon (1996) and the article of Pe´rez-Gonza´lez
(2006) on successions, we create the performance-adjustments by arranging the industry-
adjusted PM of the control group companies into deciles in each year. By matching the
industry-adjusted PM of each sample firm with the according control group decile in the
year of the succession, the relevant control decile of peers with the same performance
level is identified for each enterprise in the sample group. The median industry-adjusted
PM of enterprises in the matched decile and year is then subtracted from the industry-
adjusted PM of the sample group enterprise yielding industry- and performance-adjusted
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PM (abnormal performance).
We present the results of this procedure applied in an OLS regression with differen-
tial abnormal performance as a dependent variable in table 6, which directly addresses
propositions 8 to 11.
Legend table 6: The dependent variables are the differences in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (PM)
in columns 1 to 4 and differences in industry-adjusted profit margin (PM) in columns 5 to 8. The differences are calculated
via: industry- (and performance-) adjusted PM of the year 2009 less industry- (and performance-) adjusted PM of the
succession year. Industry-adjusted PM is PM less the median PM of the accordant year and industry (two-digit ISIC)
of a control group (from the Amadeus database); Performance-adjustments are designed by sorting the industry-adjusted
values of a control group into deciles and matching the individual industry-adjusted PM values of the sample with the
accordant control group decile in the year of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control
group decile and year then serves as a control.
Independent variables are: Active indicates post-succession predecessor activity; Company age is the age of the com-
pany in years; Family indicates if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning
more than 50% of the enterprise; External indicates if a successor had no previous ties to the enterprise; Human capital
score (HCS) is derived from the sum of five proxy elements: (1) age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience,
(4) merchant education, and (5) professionalism; Nepotism strong indicates if the predecessor only considered family
members as successors; and Nepotism weak indicates if the succession is not categorized into the strong nepotism cate-
gory and a family successor with lower human capital, compared to the average human capital of non-family successors
within the industry of the company, is installed as a successor.
Controls are: Ln sales (size) is the natural logarithm of sales in the year of the succession; Ind.-adj. PM (momentum)
is the industry-adjusted ratio earnings before taxes divided by operating revenue in the succession year; Ind.- & perf.-adj.
PM (momentum) is industry- and performance-adjusted PM in the succession year; Ownership is an indicator equal to
one if the successor owned a share of the enterprise in the succession year; Default probability represents probability
of default based on the Creditreform solvency-index score of the enterprise in the year of the succession; Executives
displays the number of executives in the succession year; Working relation is an indicator equal to one if the successor
perceives the working relations with the predecessor as good; Investment delay is an indicator variable equal to one if an
investment delay is perceived; Financing requirements is an indicator variable equal to one if severe unexpected financing
requirements were encountered during the succession; and Years is the time elapsed in years since the succession.
Interactions between variables are marked via stars *. Significances are displayed within the table via: * ten percent,
** five percent and *** one percent. The values in parentheses display Huber-White robust standard errors.
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TABLE 6—OLS-REGRESSION ANALYSIS - PREDECESSOR ACTIVITY AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE
1 Ind.- & perf.-adj. PM 1 Ind.-adj. PM
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Active -0.29 2.22** 3.25*** 3.15*** -0.20 2.31** 3.31*** 3.20***
predecessor (0.503) (0.992) (1.233) (1.204) (0.497) (0.977) (1.212) (1.192)
Company age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Company age* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02* -0.02 -0.02* -0.02*
active (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Human capital 0.84*** 0.82*** 0.78*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 0.78***
score (HCS) (0.260) (0.284) (0.295) (0.261) (0.283) (0.294)
Human capital* -0.83** -1.90*** -1.87*** -0.80** -1.82*** -1.78***
active (0.336) (0.506) (0.510) (0.332) (0.484) (0.489)
Family -0.59 0.33 -0.55 0.35
(0.877) (1.346) (0.854) (1.309)
External -0.74 -0.72 -0.58 -0.56
(0.891) (0.898) (0.882) (0.888)
Family*active -1.20 -4.39* -1.19 -4.43*
(1.342) (2.391) (1.338) (2.352)
External*active -1.03 -1.04 -1.17 -1.18
(2.040) (2.060) (2.063) (2.080)
Family*HCS* 1.25** 1.75*** 1.23** 1.73***
active (0.515) (0.608) (0.496) (0.590)
External*HCS* 1.42** 1.42** 1.36** 1.36**
active (0.677) (0.681) (0.681) (0.685)
Nepotism -3.92* -3.66*
strong (2.074) (1.983)
Nepotism -0.53 -0.58
weak (1.485) (1.413)
Nepotism 4.59* 4.50*
strong*active (2.488) (2.381)
Nepotism 2.58 2.67
weak*active (2.068) (2.001)
Ln sales -0.23 -0.14 -0.17 -0.10 -0.22 -0.15 -0.17 -0.11
(0.245) (0.251) (0.251) (0.254) (0.238) (0.245) (0.245) (0.248)
Ind.-adj. 0.13** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.22***
PM (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038)
Ind.- & perf.- -0.34* -0.33* -0.31 -0.30 - - - -
adj. PM (0.193) (0.189) (0.185) (0.181) - - - -
Ownership 0.14 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.08 0.21 0.19 0.27
(0.433) (0.439) (0.430) (0.435) (0.430) (0.436) (0.430) (0.435)
Default -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03
probability (0.070) (0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.066) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078)
Executives -0.15 0.06 -0.13 -0.20 -0.18 0.07 -0.10 -0.17
(0.329) (0.358) (0.367) (0.376) (0.330) (0.363) (0.378) (0.388)
Working 0.32 0.07 0.10 0.27 0.24 -0.01 0.02 0.18
relations (0.548) (0.532) (0.566) (0.546) (0.544) (0.524) (0.554) (0.538)
Investment 0.44 0.33 0.28 0.35 0.42 0.30 0.27 0.34
delay (0.442) (0.449) (0.459) (0.457) (0.430) (0.438) (0.443) (0.442)
Financing 0.59 0.39 0.46 0.40 0.88 0.66 0.72 0.67
requirements (0.689) (0.710) (0.718) (0.724) (0.690) (0.709) (0.720) (0.725)
Years 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.07
(0.112) (0.116) (0.116) (0.112) (0.108) (0.111) (0.111) (0.107)
Observations 391 383 383 383 391 383 383 383
R2 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.17
Note: A legend is presented separately.
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The results are striking. What is obvious in the first place, is that the performance
impact of prolonged predecessor activity is highly heterogeneous and contingency de-
pendent, which is mirrored in the insignificant single coefficient of Active in column 1
and 5 of table 6. Remarkably, as soon as we introduce the relevant contingencies, the
coefficient turns positive and becomes highly significant as can be seen in columns 2 to 4
(and columns 6 to 8 for industry-adjusted performance only) of table 6. As all coefficients
of the active variable are positive, ranging between 2.22 (column 2) and 3.25 (column 3)
percentage points higher industry- and performance-adjusted PM, and significant even
after controlling for industry- and performance trends and including an array of several
firm level controls, we interpret this as evidence in favor of proposition 8 which postu-
lates a positive impact of predecessor activity on enterprise. However, we stress that this
finding is highly context-specific and only valid under certain contingencies, especially
regarding the human capital (proposition 9) of the successor. One of the CEO successors
(13) interviewed in-depth noted: “But for the time being I still have to make use of it [the
activity of the predecessor] and I also need it. It relieves you of incredible amounts of the
burden one bears as a successor if you know there is somebody watching over you, who
does not say anything, but who would get involved at the right moment. This helps me
hugely and so I could manage these mergers in a very relaxed and laid-back fashion.”
The contextuality of the impact of prolonged predecessor activity with respect to hu-
man capital can be seen most clearly in columns 2 and 6 of table 6. Here the coefficient
of active is 2.22 and significant at the five percent level, while the interaction term human
capital score*active is -0.83 and significant at the five percent level, which we take as
evidence in favor of proposition 9. Roughly speaking, we interpret this in the following
way: the impact of prolonged predecessor activity is 2.22 percentage points increased
differential industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin, which then decreases by
-0.83 percentage points of differential industry- and performance-adjusted PM per hu-
man capital score point. Thus if we take the average successor who has a human capital
score of 1.81, the sum performance impact of prolonged predecessor activity is 0.72 in-
creased difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin. We assume that
this finding might be explained in the following way: for successors with lower levels of
human capital there is a higher demand for knowledge transfer from and support of the
predecessor leading to positive performance effects of predecessor activity in these cases.
One of the CEOs (4) who took part in the in-depth interviews noted on: “My father re-
mained active for 2 or 3 more years and we shared our office. Actually, I have learned
a lot from him during this time.” Another CEO (7) interviewed said: “This is why I am
very grateful: for many years I could gain experience by being in office together with
him [father], the experience which I have today.” On the contrary, successors with high
human capital have a lower need for knowledge transfer and the preceding CEO may
even become a barrier to change, leading to internal conflicts and a reduced performance
impact of prolonged predecessor activity. Again we quote a CEO successor (23) who
took part in an in-depth interview: “I say this very openly, and at first I thought it [the
prolonged activity of the predecessor] was a great help, but it turned out to be a great
obstacle. [...] If you change the things that he [the predecessor] introduced, he feels
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as if you are stepping on his toes. And these issues are there.” From a more general
point of view, column 2 and 6 of table 6 indicate that proposition 9, which postulates a
negative interaction between prolonged predecessor activity and high human capital of
the successor, cannot be rejected on the basis of these results.
Furthermore, we speculated in propositions 10 and 11, that when high human capi-
tal successors initiate change processes, the external and family successor have the best
cards to buffer conflicts with the predecessor, either by superior family access and rela-
tions or due to their superior external point of view and outside knowledge. In contrast,
enterprise successors who potentially learned and served under the reign of the previous
CEO might be in the most difficult position to master potential conflicts and to emanci-
pate themselves. This idea is explored in the regressions 3 and 7 of table 6. Here both
triple interaction terms family*human capital score*active and external*human capi-
tal score*active have positive and significant coefficients (1.25 and 1.42 respectively),
which are however smaller in absolute terms than the coefficient of the human capital
score*active interaction (-1.90).28 This shows that high human capital family and high
human capital enterprise successors seem to be capable in shielding some of the negative
influences of the human capital score*active interaction. We conclude that propositions
10 and 11 cannot be rejected on the basis of these results. Employing regressions 2 and 3
of table 6, we furthermore present a visualization of the cumulative performance effects
of prolonged predecessor activity along the human capital dimension and differentiated
across the successor’s origin dimension in figure 1. The figure highlights the general
effect, but also casts light on the heterogeneity across the successor’s origin dimension
with respect to subsequent post-succession performance impact.
The pattern observable in figure 1 can be seen as a justification of the “phasing-in”
and “phasing-out” argumentation (Handler, 1990), because as the successor increasingly
acquires key knowledge and human capital, the preceding CEO increasingly becomes
obsolete (Miller, 1991, and Henderson et al., 2006) or even an obstacle (Hambrick and
Fukutomi, 1991) with respect to abnormal performance.
In column 4 and 8 of table 6 we furthermore address the idea that prolonged prede-
cessor activity might also buffer a potential negative performance impact due to lower
successor human capital in nepotistic successions. Mirroring results reached by Ahrens
et al. (2012), we find that strong nepotism (strictly limiting the successor pool to fam-
ily members) is highly detrimental to firm performance, leading to a -3.92 reduced and
significant difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin, but very in-
terestingly, in cases of strong nepotism in which the predecessor still accompanies the
successor, the performance impact is buffered as the positive and significant interaction
nepotism strong*active highlights (coefficient 4.59). For weak forms of nepotism how-
ever, we do not observe a significant relationship. Furthermore, it is very interesting
to observe that once we control for nepotism, the family*active interaction term wildly
jumps to a significant negative coefficient of -4.39. We interpret this such that in many
family successions a prolonged predecessor activity buffers potential deficits of the suc-
cessor’s abilities, but that in family successions where this is not necessary a prolonged
28All interaction terms have sufficient observations.
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FIGURE 1. SUCCESSOR’S HUMAN CAPITAL AND PERFORMANCE IMPACT OF PREDECESSOR ACTIVITY
predecessor activity entails a strongly harmful effect with respect to firm performance.
Here continuing incumbency of the predecessor is dysfunctional for the organization, be-
cause openness and responsiveness to change stimuli are potentially diminished (Ham-
brick and Fukutomi, 1991) or in the phrase coined by Kets de Vries (1985): “Sometimes
the same creative energy that drives an entrepreneur has its source in destructive internal
needs that can ruin a career or a company.” In the same vein, Schulze et al. (2001) point
out that a too heartfelt concern for the enterprise’s prospects may cause some CEOs to
remain in office long after they have ceased to be effective, harming firm performance.
For family successions, our results above are clear support for the advice that once the
successor has an adequate level of human capital or ability, the predecessor should step
aside and decrease his activity and influence inside the family firm. One of the inter-
viewed CEO successors (3) noted: “I think, in the end one very important point was the
ability to relinquish. I believe my predecessor thought about this aspect very intensively,
[...], and when the time had come, he simply let go.”, while another CEO successor men-
tioned: “It was often the case that I said: “I will change this and that and this is the way
I am planning to do it.” He [the predecessor] often replied that he used to know one or
two things about this, but that it was high time for him to have a guided tour through the
company to know again what is going on. And that is how it was, but he realized it.”
Furthermore, we also address concerns that the active variable might be endogenous
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(Murphy and Zimmermann, 1993), i.e. that the difference in enterprise performance
might have an effect on the prolonged predecessor activity, by employing a two stage
least squares instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) methodology. To be more specific, our
OLS model of table 6 may be supposed to suit the class of endogenous indicator variable
models (Heckman, 1978) and reads:
(2) Y = δα + Xβ + ε Endogenous indicator variable model
Here, Y denotes the dependent variable which is the difference in industry- and perfor-
mance-adjusted profit margin, δ is the coefficient of the endogenous indicator variable
for activity α of the predecessor, X is an array of controls with population parameters β,
and ε denotes the error term, while Cov (α, ε) 6= 0. The idea is that if, for example, a neg-
ative relationship between the difference in enterprise performance and preceding CEO
activity exists, id est the predecessor is more likely to leave when he sees that the perfor-
mance of his enterprise is secured and good, then the OLS estimator will underestimate
the true effect of prolonged predecessor activity on enterprise performance, because the
effects in both directions (activity leading to performance versus performance leading to
inactivity) are confused with each other. This is not too far-fetched, as there is evidence
in the literature which suggests that founder-CEOs are more likely to leave when perfor-
mance is good, thus they may want to leave their companies in “good shape” (Adams et
al., 2009). If this is the case, a factoring out of the effect of differential performance on
prolonged CEO activity via an IV methodology should yield a larger positive effect of
prolonged predecessor activity as estimated through OLS.
As an instrument for the predecessor activity we employ an indicator variable death
which is equal to one if the succession occurred due to the death or serious disease of
the predecessor. The intuition for this instrument is straightforward, as it can be assumed
in successions which occur for these reasons that the predecessors are inactive. Fur-
thermore, the instrument should be uncorrelated with differential performance, except
through the independent variables in the first stage. It seems very unlikely that the death
or disease of the predecessor is influenced by differential performance. Death or disease
of the predecessor should be exogenous. In the other causal direction, the sudden death
of a manager in control could lead to turbulence in the succession year and thereby affect
differential performance. However, because our regressions control for the succession
year performance, we argue that this issue is still acceptable. Furthermore, we point out
that the death of the predecessor may be correlated with the corporate age and thereby
affect firm performance through the current evolutionary stage of the firm. But again,
since we include the corporate age variable in the following regressions, we find that
this issue has limited importance. Overall, we argue that our instrument is of acceptable,
but not perfect quality. Furthermore, we also need instruments for the interaction terms
of the active variable. Therefore, we generate artificial additional instruments by inter-
acting the death variable with counterparts of the interaction terms of the active variable,
for example death*human capital score or death*corporate age and include them in the
first stage regressions. In table 7 we present the results of the second stage of a 2SLS-IV
82 DISSERTATION JAN-PHILIPP AHRENS DECEMBER 2012
using the above described instruments.
TABLE 7—IV-2SLS-REGRESSIONS - PREDECESSOR ACTIVITY AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE
1 Ind.- & perf.-adj. PM 1 Ind.-adj. PM
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Active(IV:Death) 0.68 3.68** 4.53** 0.77 4.16** 4.98***
(predecessor) (0.760) (1.589) (1.839) (0.696) (1.632) (1.916)
Company age 0.02* 0.02 0.03** 0.02*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Company age*Active(IV:Death) -0.03** -0.03* -0.04** -0.04**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Human capital score (HCS) 0.94** 0.94** 0.98** 0.98**
(0.459) (0.454) (0.453) (0.450)
Human capital*Active(IV:Death) -0.93 -0.99 -0.93 -0.97
(0.713) (0.700) (0.695) (0.685)
Family 0.79 0.76
(1.227) (1.211)
External 0.41 0.37
(0.648) (0.648)
Family*Active(IV:Death) -1.20 -1.16
(1.773) (1.757)
Controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 391 383 383 391 383 383
R2 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.12
Note: The table displays a Huber-White robust instrumental variables two stage least squares regression (IV-2SLS). The
dependent variables are the difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (PM) in columns 1 to 3 and
the difference in industry-adjusted profit margin (PM) in columns 4 to 6. The differences are calculated via: industry-
(and performance-) adjusted PM of the year 2009 less industry- (and performance-) adjusted PM of the succession year.
Industry-adjusted PM is PM less the median PM of the accordant year and industry (two-digit ISIC) of a control group
(from the Amadeus database); Performance-adjustments are designed by sorting the industry-adjusted values of a control
group into deciles and matching the individual industry-adjusted PM values of the sample with the accordant control
group decile in the year of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control group decile and
year then serves as a control. Independent variables are: Active(IV:Death) refers to the activity of the predecessor which
is instrumented in the first stage regression using Death of the predecessor as an exogenous instrument; Company age
is the age of the company in years; Family indicates if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of
the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise; External indicates if a successor had no previous ties to
the enterprise; and Human capital score (HCS) is derived from the sum of five proxy elements: (1) age, (2) industry
experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant education, and (5) professionalism. Controls are: Ln sales (size) is
the natural logarithm of sales in the year of the succession; Industry-adjusted PM (momentum) is the industry-adjusted
ratio earnings before taxes divided by operating revenue in the succession year; Industry- and performance-adjusted PM
(momentum) is industry- and performance-adjusted PM in the succession year (only in the regression in columns 1 to 3);
Ownership is an indicator equal to one if the successor owned a share of the enterprise in the succession year; Default
probability represents probability of default based on the Creditreform solvency-index score of the enterprise in the year
of the succession; Executives displays the number of executives in the succession year; Investment delay is an indicator
variable equal to one if an investment delay is perceived; Financing requirements is an indicator variable equal to one if
severe unexpected financing requirements were encountered during the succession; and Years is the time elapsed in years
since the succession. Interactions between variables are marked via stars *. Significances are displayed within the table
via: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. The values in parentheses display Huber-White robust standard
errors.
It is remarkable to observe that after factoring out the effect of performance on activity
via a 2SLS-IV, we find that the effect of prolonged predecessor activity seems to be
roughly one percentage point of differential industry- and performance-adjusted profit
margin higher compared to the OLS regressions in table 6. Furthermore, it is interesting
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to observe that the coefficients of Active(IV:Death) (column 2 of table 7: 3.68) remain
significant at the five percent level even after including various controls, while the same
pattern regarding the heterogeneity of the performance effect of prolonged predecessor
activity with respect to the successor’s human capital becomes visible. Unfortunately, we
do not have enough different instruments to replicate column 3 of table 6, so our analysis
mainly builds on a comparison of column 2 of table 6 and 7 respectively. We visualize
this comparison in figure 2.
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FIGURE 2. COMPARISON OF OLS (TABLE 6) AND 2SLS-IV (TABLE 7) RESULTS
As can be seen in figure 2, the 2SLS-IV results suggest that the true effect of prede-
cessor activity is slightly more positive as suggested by OLS results, thus we take this
indication into account when interpreting the OLS results.
Furthermore, we address reservations that a general indicator for prolonged predeces-
sor activity is not sufficient to cover all of the relevant heterogeneity, especially with
respect to the specific role a predecessor can fulfill. However, as highlighted before,
within some of the role categories our observations run pretty low and furthermore, the
indication of multiple roles is possible, which blurs and smudges the potential perfor-
mance differences of a differentiation of the predecessors’ roles. Nevertheless, we shall
still address this idea in the appendix table A3, but we refrain from putting too much
emphasis on any results we reach due to the limitations highlighted. In order to over-
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come the issues regarding the number of observations and the indication of multiple
roles in table A3, we weighted the predecessor’s roles and by summing up the weighted
roles for each predecessor we create a degree of influence score for each predecessor.
By pursuing this approach, we dramatically increase the number of observations for our
regressions and approximately capture the (formal) intensity of the activity of the prede-
cessor instead of just his activity. The degree of influence score is then employed within
Huber-White robust OLS models similar to columns 1 to 4 of table 6. The regression
results are presented in table 8.
Column 1 of table 8 shows that no significant effect of the degree of influence of a
prolonged predecessor activity is visible without controlling for its highly heterogeneous
and context-dependent nature, which is a very similar result to the general predecessor
activity in table 6. But as soon as we interact the degree of influence with other vari-
ables, especially the successor’s human capital score, a positive and significant effect
per degree of influence (coefficient 0.58, significant at the five percent level) becomes
visible. As column 2 of table 8 highlights, this positive effect is contrasted by the nega-
tive and significant interaction between human capital score and the degree of influence
score (coefficient -0.22, significant at the one percent level). This interaction term can
quickly gain in magnitude, for example for a degree of influence score of two and a suc-
cessors human capital score of two the effect would already be a -0.88 percentage points
reduced difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin. Furthermore,
it is interesting to observe that high human capital family successors seem to be capa-
ble of shielding parts of the negative effects of the negative interaction between human
capital score and degree of influence, as the triple interaction term family*human capital
score*degree of influence is positive and significant (coefficient is 0.35 at the five percent
level, column 3 of table 8). Interestingly, this “shielding” effect even seems to increase
slightly with the degree of influence of the predecessor, as the positive and significant co-
efficient (0.07, significant at the one percent level) of family*human capital score*degree
of influence2 in column 5 of table 8 shows. Furthermore, column 4 of table 8 highlights
another feature of the predecessor’s degree of influence in family successions, when we
control for nepotism, the family*degree of influence interaction turns negative and signif-
icant (-1.14, significant at the 10% level). This highlights that in family successions the
degree of influence of the predecessor has more positive effects in nepotistic successions
(coefficient of nepotism strong*degree of influence is 1.23 and significant at the five per-
cent level) as compared to family successions without nepotistic traits. This finding is
similar to the findings of column 4 of the table and highlights that once the successor has
reached a sufficient level of human capital to steer the fortunes of the enterprise, the pre-
decessor is best advised to reduce his degree of influence in order to maximize enterprise
performance. This is also mirrored in a statement from another of the CEO successors
(11) who took part in the in-depth interview: “Then you ask yourself: who is calling
the shots here, it is us or him [the predecessor]? This inevitably happens, because you
say A and the senior says B. You have to find a consensus and sometimes you argue out
the differences on the backs of the employees.” We visualize this aspect by depicting the
results of regression two of table 8 in a three-dimensional diagram including differential
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TABLE 8—OLS-REGRESSION - DEGREE OF PREDECESSOR INFLUENCE AND PERFORMANCE
Dependent variable: 1 Industry- & performance-adjusted PM
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree of influence -0.03 0.58** 0.95** 0.97** 0.86*
(predecessor) (0.115) (0.256) (0.462) (0.465) (0.459)
Degree of influence2 -0.01
(0.072)
Company age 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Company age*Degree of influence -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Human capital score (HCS) 0.81*** 0.78*** 0.81*** 0.88***
(0.261) (0.290) (0.310) (0.313)
Human capital*Degree of influence -0.22*** -0.49*** -0.50*** -0.41***
(0.083) (0.155) (0.158) (0.130)
Family -0.35 0.35 0.66
(0.856) (1.341) (1.345)
External -0.13 -0.13 -0.11
(0.886) (0.893) (0.896)
Family*Degree of influence -0.43 -1.14* -0.96*
(0.434) (0.602) (0.516)
External*Degree of influence -0.30 -0.30 0.17
(0.613) (0.617) (0.484)
Family*HCS*Degree of influence 0.35** 0.46***
(0.150) (0.166)
External*HCS*Degree of influence 0.29 0.29
(0.189) (0.190)
Family*HCS*Degree of influence2 0.07***
(0.024)
External*HCS*Degree of influence2 0.02
(0.027)
Nepotism strong -3.85** -3.87**
(1.883) (1.885)
Nepotism weak -0.17 -0.22
(1.438) (1.430)
Nepotism strong*Degree of influence 1.23** 1.19**
(0.529) (0.503)
Nepotism weak*Degree of influence 0.53 0.49
(0.435) (0.419)
Controls
√ √ √ √ √
Observations 391 383 383 383 383
R2 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.11
Note: The dependent variable is the difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (PM). The differences
are calculated via: industry- (and performance-) adjusted PM of the year 2009 less industry- (and performance-) adjusted
PM of the succession year. Industry-adjusted PM is PM less the median PM of the accordant year and industry (two-digit
ISIC) of a control group (from the Amadeus database); Performance-adjustments are designed by sorting the industry-
adjusted values of a control group into deciles and matching the individual industry-adjusted PM values of the sample with
the accordant control group decile in the year of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control
group decile and year then serves as a control. Independent variables are: Degree of Influence (predecessor) is a score of
the predecessor’s influence consisting of a weighted sum of all predecessor roles; Degree of influence2 is the degree of the
predecessor’s influence squared; Company age is the age of the company in years; Family indicates if a successor is related
by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise; External indicates if
a successor had no previous ties to the enterprise; Human capital score (HCS) is derived from the sum of five proxy
elements: (1) age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant education, and (5) professionalism;
Nepotism strong indicates if the predecessor only considered family members as successors; and Nepotism weak indicates
if the succession is not categorized into the strong nepotism category and a family successor with lower human capital,
compared to the average human capital of non-family successors within the industry of the company, is installed as
successor. Controls are: Ln sales (size) is the natural logarithm of sales in the year of the succession; Industry-adjusted
PM (momentum) is the industry-adjusted ratio earnings before taxes divided by operating revenue in the succession year;
Industry- and performance-adjusted PM (momentum) is industry- and performance-adjusted PM in the succession year;
Ownership is an indicator equal to one if the successor owned a share of the enterprise in the succession year; Default
probability represents probability of default based on the Creditreform solvency-index score of the enterprise in the year
of the succession; Executives displays the number of executives in the succession year; Working relation is an indicator
equal to one if the successor perceives the working relations with the predecessor as good; Investment delay is an indicator
variable equal to one if an investment delay is perceived; Financing requirements is an indicator variable equal to one if
severe unexpected financing requirements were encountered during the succession; and Years is time elapsed since the
succession in years. Interactions between variables are marked via stars *. Significances are displayed within the table
via: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. The values in parentheses display Huber-White robust standard
errors.
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abnormal performance, the degree of the predecessor’s influence, and the human capital
score of the predecessor in figure 3.
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FIGURE 3. SUCCESSOR’S HUMAN CAPITAL, PREDECESSOR’S DEGREE OF INFLUENCE (DOI) AND PERFORMANCE
It is interesting to observe that figure 3 reveals the same general pattern as figure 1:
a positive abnormal performance impact of predecessor activity diminishes with the in-
creasing human capital score of the successor and eventually turns negative. Figure 3
now adds another aspect to this finding: the negative relationship between human capital
score and predecessor activity is amplified and increased in magnitude with an increasing
degree of influence of the predecessor. If the successor is equipped with very low level
of human capital, a high degree of influence of the predecessor leads to a higher abnor-
mal performance as compared to a low degree of predecessor influence. In contrast, if
the successor has high levels of human capital, a high degree of predecessor influence
leads to lower (more negative) abnormal performance as compared to a low degree of
predecessor influence.
Overall, the results of this picture support the theoretical arguments for a “phasing-
in” and “phasing-out” period (also known as the “succession dance”, Handler, 1990),
which allows the successor to gradually catch up with the incumbent’s knowledge while
the predecessor’s activity shields the enterprise from the reducing knowledge and ability
gaps of the successors. Once the successor has acquired a sufficient level of ability, our
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results indicate that the predecessor is best advised to minimize his influence and activity
in order to maximize enterprise performance. Again, we quote one interesting passage of
the in-depth interviews with CEO successors (13): “And even if he leaves the enterprise,
I will certainly ask his advice on important decisions: The intuition of an entrepreneur,
who for thirty years has steered his company, is quite different from the normal intuition.
And that is why, thank goodness, he is still on board.” However, the predecessor might
want to avoid becoming an impediment to post-succession enterprise change, or to coin
it in the spirit of Campbell’s book The Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949): the hero of
today has to avoid becoming the tyrant of tomorrow.
VI. Conclusion
Our results provide evidence that the likelihood of a prolonged predecessor activity
in CEO successions in family firms is significantly driven by family successions and
successions flavored with nepotistic traits. This is possibly because predecessors, in ad-
dition to their private benefits from seeing a family heir steering the fortunes of their
former enterprise, derive positive utility from prolonged activity within kin-steered en-
terprises. Furthermore, predecessors are significantly more likely to stay on board if they
have children and this relationship is most pronounced for daughters. We suspect that
this observation may be explainable by an intrinsic motivation to guide one’s children
into one’s footsteps and a heartfelt wish to ensure a smooth family succession, a possible
need to guide an interim management until the next family generation is old and experi-
enced enough to become the new CEOs, and furthermore an increased need for income
stability when raising children.
Interestingly, in industries with high levels of tacit knowledge (we employ the intangib-
les-sales ratio as a proxy), we also observe a significantly higher likelihood of activity
by the preceding CEO. We suspect this observation may be explainable by the need for
knowledge transfer between the successor and the predecessor, and furthermore, the need
to keep idiosyncratic knowledge accessible. This observation is also in line with our ev-
idence suggesting that the human capital score of the successor significantly negatively
influences the likelihood of predecessor activity. We interpret this in the following way:
when the ability of the successor is still limited, prolonged activity by the predecessor
may be helpful as a period of adjustment, guidance and mentoring, but when the succes-
sor has strong capabilities he will strive for independence and the predecessor’s activity
becomes unnecessary if not an impediment to post-succession change. In addition, we
find that successor ownership significantly decreases the likelihood of predecessor ac-
tivity. This is in line with arguments which attach an insulating effect to (predecessor)
ownership or, due to the status which ownership entails, a barrier to retirement. Further-
more, in line with intuition we observe that the years passed since the succession and
corporate age significantly negatively affect the likelihood of predecessor activity. The
above results are robust to the inclusion of an array of firm- and industry-level controls.
What might be most relevant to practitioners is the performance impact of the activity
of the preceding CEO. Here we observe a highly ambivalent picture, which reveals a very
clear pattern on a second viewing. Our results indicate that prolonged predecessor activ-
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ity entails a significant positive impact on differential industry- and performance adjusted
profit margins (Barber and Lyon, 1996), but there exists a significant negative interaction
with the level of human capital and the predecessor’s activity with respect to differen-
tial abnormal performance. Therefore, the overall performance impact diminishes with
increased successor human capital and eventually turns negative for high levels of suc-
cessor human capital. The above results of our Huber-White robust OLS regressions are
robust to the inclusion of commonly used controls regarding enterprise size, momentum,
ownership structure, and time and also further indicators of the state of the company and
the working relations between successor and predecessor.
We interpret these findings as evidence that if an information or skill gap between the
successor and predecessor exists, a phase of parallel activity, where management tech-
niques and idiosyncratic knowledge are transferred, is vital for enterprise performance.
This is especially the case if the human capital score of the predecessor is low and a pro-
longed predecessor activity shields the enterprise from the (arguably reducing) deficits
of the successor. However, for strong and able successors an information or skill gap
is potentially non-existent, while high human capital successors often spark vital orga-
nizational change (Miller, 1993, and Ahrens and Woywode, 2012). In such cases the
continuing incumbency of the predecessor may be dysfunctional for the organization,
because openness and responsiveness to change stimuli may be potentially diminished
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991, and Virany et al., 1992) and profound organizational
change may for many reasons spark the resistance of the predecessor and lead to internal
conflicts. Furthermore, if the preceding CEO omits to signal a willingness to clear out
of the way in such conflicts and if the roles are not really defined (Handler, 1990), the
successor might suffer from frustration and lower motivation leading to inferior perfor-
mance (Dyck et al., 2002, Sharma et al., 2001, Sharma et al., 2003, and Le Breton-Miller
et al., 2004). This is mirrored in the negative and significant performance impact of pro-
longed predecessor activity when the successor has high levels of human capital. Among
the robustness checks we also employ a 2SLS-IV which reveals that the effect of perfor-
mance on predecessor activity leads to an underestimation of the effect of predecessor
activity on performance by roughly one percentage point of differential industry- and
performance-adjusted profit margin, while on average the general heterogeneous pattern
described above remains valid.
Furthermore, we find evidence that external and family successors seem to be capa-
ble of shielding against some of the negative influence of the successor human capi-
tal*predecessor activity interaction on differential abnormal performance as compared
to enterprise successors, which as former veterans of the preceding CEO arguably have
the hardest task in introducing change and avoiding internal conflicts. However, when
we control for nepotism, it becomes visible that for family successions many of the pos-
itive influences of predecessor activity are due to “shielding effects” in order to avoid
negative performance effects of successors with growing, but low human capital, while
in non-nepotistic succession with arguably strong successors the predecessor’s activity
entails a significant negative effect on differential abnormal performance.
In addition, we also cast light on the degree of the predecessor’s influence on differ-
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ential abnormal performance. Remarkably, we find the same pattern as in the regres-
sions including simply the predecessor’s activity except that it seems to be amplified by
an increasing degree of influence of the predecessor, which is robust to the inclusion
of an array of controls. For low human capital successors a high degree of predeces-
sor influence entails more positive and significant effects on differential industry- and
performance-adjusted profit margins, as compared to a low degree of predecessor influ-
ence. By contrast, for successors with strong human capital a high degree of predecessor
influence is related to much worse negative and significant effects on differential abnor-
mal performance as compared to a low degree of predecessor influence.
Overall, our results highlight the potential positive role of a period of parallel activity
with respect to knowledge transfers, especially if the successor’s ability is still limited.
A smooth “phasing-in” and “phasing-out” process, sometimes also referred to as the
“succession dance” (Handler, 1990), which is dynamically guided by and oriented at the
current level of ability of the successor seems to play a key role in unleashing a maxi-
mum performance in successions. One of the interviewed CEO successors (12) noted:
“In any case, what my father should be grated as a very positive trait, is that when-
ever my duties and responsibilities in the company gained weight, he accordingly and
increasingly reduced his [responsibility].” However, if the successor is already equipped
or has reached a higher level of ability, the preceding CEO is perhaps best advised to
minimize his influence and role and to avoid the hubris of king Jemshı´d.
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APPENDIX
A1. Detailed Sample Selection Information
This section is provided for the reader’s convenience and is similar to Ahrens et al.
(2012), Ahrens and Woywode (2012), and Ahrens et al. (2012,b) who employed a very
similar data set. The second filter for the gross sample selection from the Mannheim
Enterprise Panel (MUP) is composed in the following way. We suspect a succession
event to have taken place, if between the years 2002 and 2008:
1) a leading member of the executive board resigned, or
2) a new leading member of the executive board was appointed, or
3) a previous owner reduced his share, or
4) a new or previous owner (a natural person) increased his share, and
5) one of the previous owners and leading members of the executive board was over
55 years old.
The age criterion raises the chance of observing normal successions caused by old
age and the natural person criterion separates out takeovers by other companies (legal
entities) from the sample, such that the observed population of the sample companies
keeps the “concentrated ownership control” attribute. Furthermore, all enterprises which
ceased to exist or went through a re-establishment are unobserved, which introduces
a survivorship bias to our sample. As a consequence, we point out that our findings
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are limited to the selected sample of surviving enterprises and are of reduced holistic
representativeness. Nevertheless, these constraints only impose minor restrictions on
this article’s research goals.
Applying both filters to the MUP database yields a total gross sample of 14,250 en-
terprises, which is categorized according to the International Standard Industry Classi-
fication of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3.1) of the United Nations as serving as
a basis for standardized computer-aided telephone interviews. The ISIC industry sec-
tions (A) agriculture, hunting and forestry, (B) fishing, (C) mining, quarrying and (E)
electricity gas and water supply, (L) public administration and defense & compulsory
social security, (P) activities of households, (Q) extra-territorial organizations and bodies
as well as division (91) activities of membership organizations are excluded. In addition,
enterprises for which no telephone number is available in the MUP database are dropped
(less than one percent).
The gross sample of 14,250 enterprises is contacted by the Center for Evaluation and
Methods (CEM) using a standardized computer aided interview (ZEW-Unternehmensbe-
fragung “Generationenwechsel Mittelstand”, 2010).
A2. Additional Tables
In table A1 we present the industry classification key which we employed for the
industry cluster aggregation (Table A1 is taken from Ahrens et al., 2012).
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TABLE A1—INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION KEY
ISIC ISIC
Rev. 3.1 Rev. 3.1
ZEW industry key code industry description
(1) (2)
1. Manufacturing D Manufacturing
2. Construction F Construction
3. Business services K Real estate, renting and business activities
(without ISIC 70: real estate activities)
O Other community, social and personal service activities
(only ISIC 90: sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and
similar activities)
4. Consumer services H Hotels and restaurants
K Real estate, renting and business activities
(only ISIC 70: real estate activities)
M Education
N Health and social work
O Other community, social and personal service activities
(only ISIC 92: recreational, cultural and sporting activities
and ISIC 93: other service activities)
5. Wholesale & retail G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motor-
cycles and personal and household goods
6. Other I Transport, storage and communication
J Financial intermediation
Note: For each aggregated industry cluster the key in form of the ISIC Rev. 3.1 code (column 1) and its description
(column 2) is reported. The ISIC industry sections (A) agriculture, hunting and forestry, (B) fishing, (C) mining, quar-
rying and (E) electricity gas and water supply, (L) public administration and defense & compulsory social security, (P)
activities of households, (Q) extra-territorial organizations and bodies as well as division (91) activities of membership
organizations are not included. ISIC industry categories with no observations are not displayed.
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Legend table A2: The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the predecessor remains active after the
succession within his company and zero otherwise.
The variables of interest are the disaggregated elements of the knowledge transfer proxies per industry (at the two-digit
ISIC level) used in table 3 and include: Absolute new firms, an indicator equal to one if the absolute number of new firms
in the respective industry and year (using Eurostat data for 2008 and 2009 for Germany) if higher than or equal to the
overall median of new firms per industry; Start-up ratio an indicator equal to one if the ratio of new firms to the total
population of firms per industry category (using Eurostat data for 2008 and 2009 for Germany) is higher or equal to the
overall median of the start-up ratio per industry; Employees growth is an indicator equal to one if the employee growth
(per company) per industry and year (using Amadeus data for 2002 until 2009 for Germany) is higher than the overall
median industry employee growth at the industry level; Total assets-sales ratio is an indicator equal to one if the total
assets over operating revenue ratio per industry (using Amadeus Data from 2002-2009 for Germany) is greater than or
equal to the overall median total assets-sales ratio at the industry level; Research & development expenses-sales ratio is
an indicator equal to one if the research and development expenditure over operating revenue ratio (using COMPUSTAT
data for EU 15 countries from 2002 to 2009) of the industry is higher than or equal to the overall median research &
development expenses-sales ratio at the industry level; Tacitness (intangibles-sales ratio) is an indicator equal to one if
the average intangibles over operating revenue ratio per industry (using COMPUSTAT data for EU 15 countries from
2002 to 2009) is equal to or above the overall median intangibles-sales ratio at the industry level; CEO human capital
score is an indicator equal to one if the average non-family supply of CEO successor human capital per industry (using
the sample data and the ZEW industry classification) is greater than or equal to the median non-family CEO successor
human capital at the industry level; Employment costs per employee is an indicator equal to one if the employee costs per
employee at the industry level (using Eurostat data from 2002-2008 for Germany) is greater than or equal to the median
employee costs per employee at the industry level.
Controls include: Family CEO, for successors related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning
more than 50% of the enterprise; Enterprise CEO, for unrelated successors who previously worked for the enterprise;
Ownership is an indicator equal to one if the successor owned a share of the enterprise in the succession year; Human
capital (score) is the successor’s human capital score derived from the sum of five proxy elements: (1) age, (2) industry
experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant education, and (5) professionalism; Ln employees refers to the nat-
ural logarithm of the number of employees in the succession year; Executives displays the number of executives in the
succession year; Default probability is default probability in the succession year derived from the Creditreform solvency
index; and Company age is the age of the company in the succession year. Industry level controls are indicators equal to
one if the respective category according to the ZEW industry classification (see appendix table A1) is met. Years is the
number of years passed since the succession. All values are displayed in 07/2009 euros. The table presents estimated
changes in probabilities devising a maximum-likelihood probit model. The stars display significances at: * ten percent,
** five percent and *** one percent. The values in parentheses display the standard errors.
Table A2 presents the disaggregated elements of the knowledge intensity proxies “dy-
namism” and “knowledge intensity” of table 3. An inspection of the results from table A2
yields that the individual proxies are, excluding the proxy for tacitness, all insignificant.
Apart from tacit knowledge, this leads us to reject any proposed relations between the
likelihood of the activity of the predecessor and the devised knowledge transfer proxies.
Table A3 shows a differentiation of the predecessor’s roles with respect to their perfor-
mance impact. In detail, we employ the same model as in column 4 of table 6, but vary
the roles of the predecessor.
In general table A3 shows some heterogeneity between the predecessor roles with
respect to their performance impact, especially with respect to the interactions with the
successor’s human capital score. However, since the interview allows predecessors to
indicate multiple roles and because the observations in some of the role categories are
rather low, we refrain from emphasizing these results and present them mainly for the
sake of completeness.
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TABLE A3—OLS-REGRESSION ANALYSIS - PREDECESSOR ROLES AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE
Dependent variable: 1 Ind.- & perf.-adj. PM
Owner Active & Key
Predecessor (share- responsible Passive Board account Special
roles [Role] holder) owner owner member holder tasks
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[Role] 2.50** 2.86** 1.04 5.97* 2.92 0.20
(predecessor) (1.139) (1.127) (2.119) (3.041) (2.333) (1.387)
Company age 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Company age*[Role] -0.02* -0.01 -0.02 -0.02* -0.01 0.02
(0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014)
Human capital score (HCS) 0.61** 0.59* 0.30 0.39 0.36 0.30
(0.285) (0.307) (0.238) (0.254) (0.242) (0.260)
Human capital*[Role] -1.66*** -1.22*** -1.80* -2.87** -2.26* -0.94
(0.510) (0.463) (1.015) (1.172) (1.284) (0.588)
Family -0.27 0.25 -0.28 0.21 0.12 0.29
(1.190) (1.080) (0.980) (1.117) (1.059) (1.061)
External -0.81 0.46 -0.24 0.26 0.15 0.38
(0.827) (0.858) (0.702) (0.719) (0.693) (0.740)
Family*[Role] -3.59 -3.11 -4.50 -8.71** -5.84* -2.03
(2.548) (2.815) (3.698) (3.847) (3.443) (2.671)
External*[Role] -0.65 -1.10 -3.85 -3.84 col. -2.02
(2.052) (2.137) (5.232) (3.480) col. (2.481)
Family*HCS*[Role] 1.79*** 1.16* 2.80** 3.54*** 2.82* 0.81
(0.654) (0.678) (1.350) (1.320) (1.537) (0.988)
External*HCS*[Role] 1.39** 0.60 3.21* 2.23* 0.93 1.03
(0.692) (0.696) (1.734) (1.268) (0.789) (0.681)
Nepotism strong -2.95* -2.38* -1.72 -2.80** -1.97 -1.99
(1.605) (1.400) (1.221) (1.321) (1.307) (1.349)
Nepotism weak -0.04 -0.01 0.41 -0.05 0.15 0.26
(1.278) (1.119) (1.043) (1.194) (1.129) (1.113)
Nepotism strong*[Role] 3.61 2.67 3.09* 6.70*** 4.38* 1.42
(2.323) (2.486) (1.800) (1.861) (2.478) (1.791)
Nepotism weak*[Role] 2.06 1.87 1.92 3.39* 2.14 -0.12
(2.115) (2.301) (2.666) (1.970) (2.030) (1.836)
Controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383
R2 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07
Note: The dependent variable is the difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (PM). The differences
are calculated via: industry- (and performance-) adjusted PM of the year 2009 less industry- (and performance-) adjusted
PM of the succession year. Industry-adjusted PM is PM less the median PM of the accordant year and industry (two-digit
ISIC) of a control group (from the Amadeus database); Performance-adjustments are designed by sorting the industry-
adjusted values of a control group into deciles and matching the individual industry-adjusted PM values of the sample with
the accordant control group decile in the year of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control
group decile and year then serves as a control. Independent variables are: [Role] (predecessor) is a flexible indicator
equal to one if the role of the predecessor in the respective column is met; Company age is the age of the company in
years; Family indicates if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than
50% of the enterprise; External indicates if a successor had no previous ties to the enterprise; Human capital score (HCS)
is derived from the sum of five proxy elements: (1) age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience, (4) merchant
education, and (5) professionalism; Nepotism strong indicates if the predecessor only considered family members as
successors; and Nepotism weak indicates if the succession is not categorized into the strong nepotism category and a
family successor with lower human capital, compared to the average human capital of non-family successors within the
industry of the company, is installed as successor. Controls are: Ln sales (size) is the natural logarithm of sales in the
year of the succession; Industry-adjusted PM (momentum) is the industry-adjusted ratio earnings before taxes divided
by operating revenue in the succession year; Industry- and performance-adjusted PM (momentum) is industry- and
performance-adjusted PM in the succession year; Ownership is an indicator equal to one if the successor owned a share
of the enterprise in the succession year; Default probability represents probability of default based on the Creditreform
solvency-index score of the enterprise in the year of the succession; Executives displays the number of executives in the
succession year; Working relation is an indicator equal to one if the successor perceives the working relations with the
predecessor as good; Investment delay is an indicator variable equal to one if an investment delay is perceived; Financing
requirements is an indicator variable equal to one if severe unexpected financing requirements were encountered during
the succession; and Years is the time elapsed in years since the succession. Interactions between variables are marked via
stars *. Significances are displayed within the table via: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. The values in
parentheses display Huber-White robust standard errors.
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I. Introduction
The recent economic literature on ownership and control reports that around the world
most firms are controlled by families, founders or their heirs (La Porta et al., 1999, and
Faccio and Lang, 2002). One of the most perilous moments in course of family- and
in particular owner-controlled firms are CEO successions, as only 30% of these firms
survive past the lifespan of their founders (Sonnenfeld and Spence, 1989).
This circumstance has led to a growing attention to the post-succession period in fam-
ily firms in the firm performance literature, which highlights imperfections in the CEO
successor labor market contests leading to subsequent performance declines (Pe´rez-
Gonzale´s, 2006, Bennedsen et al., 2007, and Ahrens et al., 2012). The concentration
of ownership and control opens a leeway for the controlling majority, often the parting
CEO, to pursue private benefit maximization instead of profit maximization (Fama and
Jensen, 1983, and Demsetz 1983). In the case of a CEO succession this pursuit takes
the form of biases towards and favoritism of family members, while such nepotistic ten-
dencies or even primogeniture can have detrimental effects for the family firm and firm
performance (Pollak, 1985, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, and Ahrens et al., 2012).
At the core of this imperfection is the preference or wish of the parting CEO to see
a family heir to steer the fortunes of the family enterprise or even of his oeuvre, which
leads to a constraint of the successor pool to family members only (id est persons related
to the parting CEO by either blood or marriage). However, in the light of the recent
literature on U.S. family structures (“The Demand for Sons”, Dahl and Moretti, 2008)
the question remains whether this is the complete story, or phrased differently: Is there a
second constraint within the family successor pool which further reduces the successor
pool towards male-family successors? As a consequence, if nepotistic successions occur
more often among male successors, then the reduced selectivity of these CEO succession
contests should be mirrored in a lower ability of male family CEO successors as com-
pared to female family CEO successors. In this article we try to identify potential forces
among the family, firm and industry characteristics which lead to cases of nepotism in
CEO successions. We harness an unique data set which covers 804 CEO successions
between 2002 and 2008 in German family firms with concentrated ownership and we
differentiate between strong forms and weak forms of nepotism. Our results indicate
that the occurrence of both forms of nepotism is significantly driven by the presence
of male children among the predecessor’s children which is robust to the inclusion of
various controls and is indicative for a gender preference of the predecessor.
The single pieces of evidence taken alone will not allow us to make a point, but bring-
ing them together they deliver a clear picture: Family entrepreneurs seem to prefer male
family successors over female family successors. When the predecessor has at least one
son and one daughter, a male family successor is chosen in 79% of the family succes-
sions. In addition, if the predecessor has only sons, a male family successor is chosen
in 94% of the family successions, whereas if the predecessor has only daughters, a male
family successor is still chosen in 21% of the family successions. The presence of sons
among the predecessor’s children significantly (at the one percent level) increases the
probability to observe a family succession. This finding is robust to the inclusion of firm
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and industry level controls. Furthermore, our results on the family structure of family
firm entrepreneurs hint at strategic behavior to increase the number of children until at
least one son is born.1
Interestingly, on average female family successors are equipped with significantly (at
the five percent level) higher levels of human capital as compared to male family suc-
cessors. For example, female family CEO successors are nearly eleven years older (sig-
nificant at the five percent level) compared to male family heirs. These differences also
become visible when contrasting post-succession performance developments: the prof-
itability in terms of profit margin reduces by -7.4% in male family successor led enter-
prises, while it increases by 14% in female family successor steered enterprises. This
difference-in-differences remains robust when controlling for industry and performance
trends. The observed human capital of the successors is significantly negatively related
(at the one percent level) to a family origin of the successor, indicating nepotistic tenden-
cies. In addition, our results show that the observed human capital score of the installed
CEO successor is significantly and positively related to the average regional industry
supply of CEO human capital. These results are robust to the inclusion of various con-
trols.
The main finding of this article is that there seems to be a further constraint of the CEO
labor market in the case of successions in family firms due to the preferences for sons.
Our results highlight the fact that in enterprises with concentrated ownership control,
such as family firms, the preferences of the predecessor play a crucial role in the observed
human capital of the installed CEO successor and the subsequent performance of the
enterprise. The article is designed in the following way: Section II gives a literature
overview and is followed by the theoretical section III. Section IV gives information on
the sample. Section V is dedicated to the data analysis. It begins with a brief descriptive
overview, followed by a proposition testing. Section VI discusses the main results and
offers a conclusion.
II. Related Literature
CEO succession have been studied extensively by various scholars leading to a many-
chromatic literature strand. This article focuses on potential constraints of the CEO suc-
cessor labor market with a particular attention on the family structure of the predecessor
and the gender of the successor. Therefore, the main literature strands related to this
article are the theory of the firm, the economic contest literature and the recent economic
literature on family structures.
The question whether gender preferences matter has been raised quite early, as for the
analysis of individual behavior gender preferences might be of importance (Ben-Porath
and Welch, 1976). Two articles of Dahl and Moretti (2004, 2008) find evidence which
supports the notion that parents in the U.S. slightly favor boys over girls. For example,
they report that women with first-born daughters are significantly more likely to become
divorced and significantly less likely to be shotgun married, as compared to women with
1It might be interesting to validate this finding using another data set.
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first-born sons (Dahl and Morretti, 2008). Furthermore, they find that this gender bias
due to the strong preferences of men to have sons, while women only seem to have slight
preferences of daughters over sons (Dahl and Moretti, 2008). Fathers are reported to
spend more time with their sons (Morgan et al., 1988, and Lamb, 1997). While the labor
market behavior of married men seems to be largely inflexible to family size (Angrist and
Evans, 1998), there is evidence that the labor supply and wage rates of men raise more
with the event of having a son as compared to having a daughter (Lundberg and Rose,
2002). Interestingly, the article of Dahl and Moretti (2008) also highlights that fertility
rates in families with a first-born girl are significantly higher as compared to family with
a first-born sons.2
As many family firms are steered by male CEOs, we speculate that gender preferences
might also find their way into CEO succession contests and decisions. For example,
Bennedsen et al. (2007) report that the decision to appoint a family CEO successor is
significantly higher when the first-born is a boy. There is also evidence in the financial
economics literature. Using data of 90 family firms in Thailand, Bertrand et al. (2008)
show that the sons of founders crowd out the ownership and control right of other family
members, which is most evident when the founder has perished. Furthermore, they high-
light that a relative larger number of sons among the children of the founder is negatively
correlated with lower firm-level performance, while no such correlation could be found
for the number of daughters.
It is argued in the literature that among the reasons for such negative performance
outcomes are constraints in the CEO succession contest which curb the natural selectivity
of CEO labor market (Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006, Bennedsen et al., 2007, and Ahrens et al.,
2012).3 Installing such constraints becomes possible, because in family firms one often
finds unity of ownership and control allowing the departing CEO to enforce his own
preferences and private benefits, while such a pursuit potentially imposes agency costs on
minority shareholders, as highlighted in the respective ownership and control literature
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama, 1980, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Shleifer and Vishny,
1986, Johnson et al., 2000, Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001, Dyck and Zingales, 2004,
and Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In CEO succession contests one possible constraint
is restricting the pool of contestants to the family. Such restrictions adversely affect
the labor market contest leading to a lower ability of the winning candidate compared
to an unrestricted candidate field, as the contest’s structure and the available pool of
contestants are decisive for its outcome (Konrad, 2009). In turn, a lower ability of favored
CEO successors can lead to lower post-succession enterprise performance, as has been
reported by Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006) and Ahrens et al. (2012). The question whether
potential gender preferences also induce observable favoritism (or even nepotism) and
human capital effects in CEO successions has to the best of our knowledge not yet been
addressed directly in the literature.
2For the United States there is some evidence which suggests that the intensity of these parental gender preferences
declined over the last decades, possibly due to changes in societal gender system (Pollard and Morgan, 2002).
3CEO successions can also be understood as career ladder contests (Fama, 1980, Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Rosen,
1986, and Ahrens et al., 2012).
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III. Theoretical Section
A. Categories and Definitions
The aim of this article is to explore the influence of gender preferences in CEO suc-
cessions in enterprises with “concentrated ownership control” (or family firms), which
are defined for the purposes of this article as follows:
DEFINITION 1: An enterprise with concentrated ownership control is present if a max-
imum of three natural persons own more than 50% of the enterprise and at least one of
these owners is a leading member of the executive board.
Furthermore, in this article the attribute family is attached to successors related by
marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the
enterprise, while the non-family attribute applies to all other successors. To assess the
human capital of the respective successors, we employ the human capital construct previ-
ously employed by Ahrens and Woywode (2012). This construct is defined as the sum of
five proxy elements: (1) age above median (proxy for general experience), (2) industry
experience above median (proxy for industry related experience), (3) leadership expe-
rience (proxy for practical managerial skills), (4) merchant education, if the successor
holds an university degree in business studies (or strongly related field) or was educated
at an university of cooperative education (proxy for theoretical managerial skills), and (5)
use of a business plan during the succession (proxy for professional managerial skills).
The human capital score mirrors a thought brought forward by Murphy and Za´bojnı´k
(2004) who argue that managerial skills have gained more importance for CEOs over the
last three decades. This is due to the progress in computerization, corporate controlling
and finance, and other arts which, if mastered by the CEO, increase a CEO’s ability to
steer a company and make specific knowledge more accessible than in earlier decades.
In addition, the human capital score also reflects the notion of the human capital theory
that productivity-enhancing investments take place in the education and post-education
phase (Mincer, 1974 and Strober 1990).4
In addition, we address potential biases of the predecessors in favor of specific groups
of CEO successors. Following this idea, we apply a dual approach by distinguishing
between strong nepotism and weak nepotism which we define for purposes of this article
as follows:
DEFINITION 2: Strong nepotism is present if the predecessor only considers family
members as successors.
DEFINITION 3: Weak nepotism is present if the predecessor also considers non-family
members as successors, but decides to install a family member with a human capital
score lower than the average achievable human capital score of managers available in
the respective industry of his enterprise.
4For a more detailed introduction and explanation of the human capital score we refer to Ahrens and Woywode
(2012).
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In other words, weak nepotism is measured via the amount of the successor’s human
capital which predecessors are willing to give up in order to see a family heir steering
the fortunes of their family business. In order to be able to measure any allowance or
discount in human capital, we have to determine a benchmark for the average achievable
managerial human capital. Our benchmark is designed as follows: By assuming that no
nepotism is at work in succession in which the company was not handed over to a family
CEO, we infer that an able successor was chosen in these cases. Therefore, we take the
mean human capital score of the CEOs per industry of only these cases as a benchmark.5
B. Derived Propositions
Using the definitions of the previous section, we derive propositions which are pre-
sented in the following. Apart from strictly excluding non-family successors from the
succession contest (strong nepotism), there may also be weak forms of nepotism, and
the constraints they impose on the succession contest are likely to have an impact on the
contest outcome. Thus, assuming that some family heirs are preferred by their prede-
cessors despite the availability of a better candidate (weak nepotism), then the impact of
such nepotistic tendencies is likely to be mirrored in a lower average human capital of
family successors.
PROPOSITION 1: The successor’s human capital is likely to be lower among family
CEO successors as compared to the average human capital of successors.
In addition to the wish of seeing a family heir to steer the fortunes of ones oeuvre,
we assume that a “demand for sons” (Dahl and Moretti, 2008), thus gender preference
of the predecessor, is likely to find its way into CEO successor decisions, which might
be particularly true for owner controlled family firms which allow the pursuit of private
benefit maximization. Therefore and possibly due to the societal gender system and
general socialization, we suspect that many family firm patriarchs wish their son(s) to
follow in their footsteps.
PROPOSITION 2: Predecessors show a preference of male family heirs as CEO suc-
cessors.
As a potential consequence of the pursuit of preferences or favoritism in CEO succes-
sions are contest constraints, we argue that the predecessors’ wish for sons as successors
fuels tolerance of a lower human capital of the successor (weak nepotism) and might
even lead to an exclusion of non-family successors from the succession contest (strong
nepotism).
PROPOSITION 3: If the predecessor has male children this increases the likelihood of
nepotism in successions.
5We assume that the mean human capital score of all non-family successors per industry in the sample is a sufficient
proxy on the external supply of CEO human capital and assume that this level of human capital is attainable by all
companies in their respective industry within the boundaries of a standard search for a non-family CEO successor. To
calculate the industry means, we employ the rather broad Centre for European Economic Research industry classification
consisting of six general industry categories, as we have only 804 observations.
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However, we suppose that predecessors might be unwilling to accept any amount of
lower human capital arbitrarily, but that they might compare their heirs to the external
CEO labor market and will not allow an exaggerated mismatch in ability. Thus, we
suspect that the supply of human capital, in terms of the average available managerial
human capital in the respective industry of the succession enterprise, will be positively
related to the human capital of the successor installed.
PROPOSITION 4: The family successors’ human capital is positively related to the
level of average achievable CEO human capital in the respective industry of the enter-
prise.
IV. Sample Selection
In this article we revisit the data set of Ahrens and Woywode (2012). The data set for
this article relies on the following sources: (a) the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP),
(b) the Bureau van Dyjk Amadeus database (Amadeus), (c) the Hoppenstedt database,
(d) the Creditreform solvency index information, (e) German Bundesbank information,
(f) standardized computer aided telephone interviews (ZEW-Unternehmensbefragung
“Generationenwechsel Mittelstand”, 2010), (g) non-standardized direct interviews and
(h) web-searches. Overall, we observe 804 CEO successions in German family enter-
prises with concentrated ownership and control with a size of 30 to 1,000 employees,
which took place between 2002 and 2008.6
V. Data Analysis
A. Summary Statistics
A first inspection of the data set shows that female CEO successions occur more often
in family successions, a quarter of the family successions are female family CEO suc-
cessions, whereas a fifth of all successions are female CEO successions. The fact that
there are much fewer female successions already hints at a potential preference of male
over female successors.7 Overall, female family CEO successions occur relatively often
in the consumer services sector (32.4% of female family successors, and 30.9% of fe-
male successors), as opposed to lower relative rates in the manufacturing sector (20.5%
of female family successors, and 16.4% of female successors.).8
We theorize that a wish for a male successor might play a key role in the choice of
a successor. Thus, we start by categorizing the children structure of the predecessors
into: (a) male children only, (b) female children only, (c) mixed children, and (d) no
children. The summary statistics of this categorization which are presented in table 1
already reveal interesting results.
6For further information on the sample selection, we refer to Ahrens and Woywode (2012).
7It might also be that female successions occur less often because of gender differences in the CEO labor supply.
However, due to the size of the difference, we believe that it is unlikely that labor supply can exclusively explain the
difference.
8For additional summary statistics we refer to the appendix A1.
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TABLE 1—CHILDREN STRUCTURE OF THE PREDECESSOR AND SUCCESSIONS
Male Female No Gender Ratio Ratio (4)
Variable Total only only Mixed children unknown (2) to (3) to (2)&(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Type of succession
1. Family 455 141 58 249 2 5 2.43 1.25
(57.81) (64.68) (49.15) (65.70) (3.45) (35.71)
[100.00] [30.99] [12.75] [54.73] [0.44] [1.10]
2. Non-family 332 77 60 130 56 9 1.28 0.95
(42.19) (35.32) (50.85) (34.30) (96.55) (64.29)
[100.00] [23.19] [18.07] [39.16] [16.87] [2.71]
Difference 7.8** -5.3** 15.6***
(1-2) (3.2) (2.6) (3.6)
Total 787 218 118 379 58 14 1.85 1.13
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
[100.00] [27.70] [14.99] [48.16] [7.37] [1.78]
B. Gender of family CEO successor
3. Male 336 131 12 191 1 1 10.92 1.34
family CEO (75.68) (93.57) (21.43) (78.93) (50.00) (25.00)
4. Female 108 9 44 51 1 3 0.20 0.96
family CEO (24.32) (6.43) (78.57) (21.07) (50.00) (75.00)
Difference in 87.14 -57.14 57.86
class (3-4)
Total 444 140 56 242 2 4 2.50
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
[100.00] [31.53] [12.61] [54.50] [0.45] [0.90]
C. Intensity of nepotism
5. Nepotism 363 112 40 204 2 5 2.80 1.34
(46.12) (51.38) (33.90) (53.83) (3.45) (35.71)
[100.00] [30.85] [11.02] [56.20] [0.55] [1.38]
5a. Strong 52 17 4 31 0 0 4.25 1.48
nepotism (6.61) (7.80) (3.39) (8.18) (0.00) (0.00)
[100.00] [32.69] [7.69] [59.62] [0.00] [0.00]
5b. Weak 311 95 36 173 2 5 2.64 1.32
nepotism (39.52) (43.58) (30.51) (45.65) (3.45) (35.71)
[100.00] [30.55] [11.58] [55.63] [0.64] [1.61]
6. Family no 92 29 18 45 0 0 1.61 0.96
nepotism (11.69) (13.30) (15.25) (11.87) (0.00) (0.00)
[100.00] [31.52] [19.57] [48.91] [0.00] [0.00]
7. Non-family 332 77 60 130 56 9 1.28 0.95
(42.19) (35.32) (50.85) (34.30) (96.55) (64.29)
[100.00] [23.19] [18.07] [39.16] [16.87] [2.71]
Difference -0.6 -8.5** 7.3
(5-6) (5.4) (3.9) (5.8)
Difference 8.8*** -6.2** 18.9***
(5-7) (3.3) (2.6) (3.7)
Total 787 218 118 379 58 14 1.85 1.13
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
[100.00] [27.70] [14.99] [48.16] [7.37] [1.78]
Note: The predecessor’s children structure is categorized in columns 2 to 6 in: Male only for predecessors with one or
more sons; Female only for predecessors with one or more daughters; Mixed for predecessors with both one or more
sons and one or more daughters; No children for predecessor without children; and Gender unknown for predecessors
with children whose gender was not indicated in the interview. The successions are clustered according to the following
categories: Family, if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than
50% of the enterprise; Non-family, if a successor is not related to one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the
enterprise; Male family CEO is an indicator equal to one if a male family successor was chosen; Female family CEO is
an indicator equal to one if a female family successor was chosen; Nepotism includes all successions which fall either
into the strong or weak nepotism category; Strong nepotism refers to successions in which non-family CEOs were not
considered as successors; Weak nepotism includes non-strong nepotism successions in which a family successor with a
lower human capital than the average of the non-family CEO successors of the respective industry was installed; and
Family no nepotism presents family successions in which no nepotism was observed. The fraction of observations as a
percentage of the absolute amount of the observations per children structure category is displayed in parentheses. The
fraction of observation as a percentage of the absolute amount of observations: (a) per succession type (panel A), (b) per
gender (panel B), or (c) per nepotism category (panel C) is shown in square brackets. Standard errors are reported in
italics.
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The patterns in table 1 suggest that family entrepreneurs seem to prefer male succes-
sors to steer the fortunes of their family enterprise. This becomes clear by inspecting
some basic numbers (panel A): When we compare family to non-family successions, the
“male children only” category has a 7.8 percentage points higher share (significant at the
five percent level) within the family category as compared to the non-family category,
while the “‘female children only” category has -5.3 percentage points lower share (sig-
nificant at the five percent level) in the family category as compared to the non-family
category. Furthermore, cases where the predecessor has at least one son and one daughter
have a 15.6 percentage points higher share (significant at the one percent level) among
family successions as compared to non-family successions. Interestingly, predecessors
who have exclusively sons hand their enterprises in 64.7% to family heirs, whereas pre-
decessors who have exclusively daughters only do so in 49.2% of the cases.
Column 7 of panel A reveals another striking insight. Seen from a biological point
of view, the ratio “male children only” to “female children only” (column 7) should be
near 1, as the likelihood of giving birth to a girl is (roughly) as high as for a son. Such
a result is in tendency observable for the non-family successions with a ratio of 1.28.
However, the ratio is 2.43 for family successions, a finding which is very unlikely to be
caused by biological randomness. This hints that the predecessors tried to obtain a son
strategically by increasing the number of children until they had a son, which leads to
reduced observations of the “female children only” category. This peculiar result alone
might be interpreted as indication of a preference of sons as successors, as the ratio “male
children only” to “female children only” is 1.85 over the total sample.
Within the family succession category (panel B) another interesting finding underlines
the preference for male successors: If the predecessor has only male children, in 93.6%
of the cases a male family CEO is installed, whereas if the predecessor has only female
children, then the decision in favor of a female family CEO is only observed in 78.6% of
cases. Furthermore, if the children structure is “mixed” a male family CEO is installed
in 78.9% of cases. Column 8 highlights another finding: statistically, the probability of
remaining within the category “female only” or “male only” reduces by each additional
child after the first child, while the chances of following the “mixed” category increase.
Thus, the ratio of “mixed” to “female only” plus “male only” (column 8) is indicative for
the number of total children (and thus the attempts to have a son). When we apply this
intuition, we observe that predecessors who install a male family CEO are more likely
to have more children (ratio 1.34) as compared to cases where a female family CEO is
installed (ratio 0.96). From a more general point of view, bringing the individual pieces
of evidence from panel A and B together, the overall picture is supportive of proposition
2.
In proposition 3 we speculate that the wish of some predecessors to install a male fam-
ily heir as CEO successor might also boost nepotistic tendencies. In panel C of table 1
we advance this idea. Overall, within the “male children only” category 51.4% of the
successions entailed nepotistic traits, while within the “female children only” category
this was the case in only 33.9% of the successions.9 It is worth noting that the “male-
9This finding is mirrored in the significant differences in shares within the children structure categories across the
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children only” to “female children only” ratio (trying to obtain a son) increases with the
intensity of nepotism and is highest for strong nepotism (4.25, column 7, panel C), while
the same is true for the “mixed children” to “male-children only” plus “female children
only” ratio (indicative for the number of children) which is also highest for strong nepo-
tism (1.48, column 8, panel C). We conclude that proposition 3 cannot be rejected on the
basis of these initial observations. Overall, we find that predecessors strategically tried
to obtain a son, while this behavior positively correlates with the intensity of nepotism.
However, if we observe nepotism less often among female family CEOs as table 1
suggests, then this is likely to have a positive impact on the human capital of female
family heirs. Figure 1 presents a visualization of the allowances in family CEO human
capital against the average achievable human capital across the industry dimension.
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FIGURE 1. HUMAN CAPITAL OF CEO SUCCESSORS PER INDUSTRY
As we can see from figure 1, the average human capital of family successors is lower
across the industries as compared to non-family successors, which is indicative for propo-
nepotism dimensions: The “male children only” category has an 8.8 percentage points higher share (significant at the
one percent level) among the nepotistic family succession category (row 5) when compared with the non-family category
(row 7). In contrast, the “female children only” category has a -6.2 percentage points lower share (significant at the
five percent level) among the nepotistic family successions category as compared to the non-family category (and -8.5
percentage points, significant at the five percent level, when nepotistic family successions are compared to non-nepotistic
family successions in row 6 in panel C).
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sition 1.10 In figure 1 it is important to note that the discount of human capital among
female family successors is much lower in many industries. In the business service sec-
tor, female family CEO successors are even equipped with a higher endowment of human
capital than non-family successors on average. This indicates that favoritism occurs less
frequently among female CEO successors, which is weakly indicative for proposition 3
and also indicates that the predecessors seem to prefer sons, rather than daughters, as
successors.
Table 2 presents the human capital elements and the succession characteristics in more
detail.
The results in table 2 show that female family successors are in some areas equipped
with significantly higher human capital. Female family successors benefit from signif-
icantly higher age (10.9 percentage points, significant at the five percent level) and are
11.5 percentage points more often equipped with a merchant education (significant at
the five percent level) when compared to male family successors. With regard to the
other human capital proxies, the evidence is mixed and insignificant. Furthermore, on
average the predecessor stays active in a leading and shareholding position more often in
female family successions as compared to successions of male family successors, which
potentially mirrors a lack of confidence in the successor. In reading the results from
table 2 it is important to contrast the post-succession performance developments. The
average profitability in terms of profit margin reduces by -7.4% for male family succes-
sors, while female family CEO manage to increase profit margin by 14%, even though
they are subject to stronger gravitational forces towards the mean as they on average in-
herit more profitable enterprises in the successions year as compared to male heirs. This
difference-in-differences remains robust when controlling for industry and performance
trends, however it is not significant.11 Overall, the human capital score reports that the
share of high human capital female family successors is 11.9 percentage points higher
(significant at the five percent level) as compared to male family successors.
10We excluded cases of strong nepotism in this figure.
11The performance is measured between the succession year and the year 2009. This entails the advantage to au-
tomatically cancel out time-invariant firm characteristics driving performance. Profit margin (PM) might be subject to
industry trends. Hence, we introduce industry adjustments, which are calculated by subtraction of the median PM of the
accordant year and industry (at the two-digit ISIC code level) of a control group (from the Amadeus database) of 187,388
company-year observations. PM is calculated by dividing earnings before taxes (Amadeus item 33) by operating revenue
(Amadeus item 24) and a multiplication by 100. We required all industry categories in the control group to include at least
five observations per year and industry. We employ two-digit industry controls because Richard N. Clarke (1989) shows
that the difference between two-digit and four-digit SIC controls is marginal. Furthermore, we also attempt to eliminate
outliers by winsorizing the unadjusted PM values at the 0.025 level and take into account the influence of performance
trends due to pre-succession performance by introducing performance adjustments employing performance peer groups
(Barber and Lyon, 1996). We design the peer groups for the performance adjustments by dividing the industry-adjusted
values of the control group into deciles for each accounting period. By matching the industry-adjusted profit margin
of each sample firm with the accordant control group decile in the year of the succession, the relevant control group is
identified for each enterprise. The median PM of the relevant control group and year is then used as a control for the PM
observations of the sample group (see also Ahrens and Woywode, 2012).
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TABLE 2—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FEMALE AND MALE SUCCESSION CHARACTERISTICS
Difference
Succession type of means
Variable Family Female family Male Family Non-family (3) and (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Use of business plan (%) 46.8 43.5 47.3 58.5 -3.8
(2.34) (4.79) (2.73) (2.64) (5.51)
High experience - age (%) 29.0 38.0 27.1 47.9 10.9**
(2.13) (4.69) (2.43) (2.68) (5.28)
Merchant education (%) 38.0 46.3 34.8 36.7 11.5**
(2.28) (4.82) (2.60) (2.58) (5.48)
High experience - industry (%) 35.8 40.7 35.4 47.0 5.3
(2.25) (4.75) (2.61) (2.68) (5.42)
Leadership experience (%) 9.0 5.6 9.2 38.1 -3.7
(1.34) (2.21) (1.58) (2.6) (2.72)
High human capital (%) 49.7 59.3 47.3 65.3 11.9**
(2.34) (4.75) (2.73) (2.55) (5.48)
Predecessor active (%) 47.5 53.7 45.8 43.3 7.9
(shareholder & executive) (2.34) (4.82) (2.72) (2.66) (5.54)
Unplanned succession (%) 8.1 12.0 7.2 10.4 4.9
(1.29) (3.15) (1.41) (1.64) (3.45)
Operating revenue (in mil. euros) 10.5 8.1 11.1 10.5 -3.1*
(succession year) (0.97) (0.98) (1.24) (0.83) (1.58)
Employees (number) 78.6 68.3 80.1 86.9 -12.7*
(succession year) (3.64) (4.60) (4.61) (5.38) (6.51)
Profit margin (PM) (%) 6.8 7.1 6.8 5.3 0.3
(succession year) (0.47) (1.10) (0.53) (0.42) (1.22)
1 Profit margin (PM) (%) -0.3 1.0 -0.5 0.80 1.5
(0.36) (1.07) (0.39) (0.35) (1.14)
1 Industry-adjusted PM (%) -0.1 0.9 -0.2 0.9 1.1
(0.38) (1.06) (0.41) (0.33) (1.14)
1 Industry- and 1.4 2.9 1.1 1.7 1.8
performance-adjusted PM (%) (0.33) (1.02) (0.36) (0.32) (1.08)
Years since succession (years) 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.4 0.2
(0.09) (0.19) (0.11) (0.11) (0.22)
Note: The table presents succession characteristics in the succession year and the subsequent performance development
between the succession year and the year 2009 (1). Successions are categorized into: Family, for successors who are
related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise (column 1);
Female family, for female family successors (column 2); Male family, for male family successors (column 3); and Non-
family, for successors who are unrelated to the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise (column 4). Use of
business plan is an indicator variable equal to one if a business plan was used during the succession. High experience -
age is an indicator equal to one if the successor’s age is higher or equal to the median age of the successors of the sample
in the succession year. Merchant education is an indicator variable equal to one if the successor studied business studies
at university or attended an university of cooperative education. High experience - industry is an indicator equal to one if
the successor’s industry experience is higher or equal to the median industry experience of the successors of the sample
in the succession year. Leadership experience is an indicator variable equal to one if the successor benefits from previous
executive board experience. High human capital of the successor is a score derived from the sum of the five elements
age, industry experience, leadership experience, merchant education, and professionalism to serve as a proxy for ability.
Predecessor active (shareholder & executive) refers to an indicator equal to one if the predecessor still holds shares and
remains operatively active in a leading position. Unplanned succession indicates if the succession was unplanned due
to death or disease of the predecessor. Profit margin (PM) is earnings before taxes divided by operating revenue in the
succession year. Operating revenue is operating revenue in the succession year. Employees is the number of employees
in the succession year. Industry-adjusted PM is PM less the median PM of the accordant year and industry (two-digit
ISIC), Industry- and performance-adjusted PM is industry-adjusted PM less the median industry-adjusted PM of the
relevant performance control group. Performance control groups are designed by sorting the industry-adjusted values of
the variables of the control group enterprises into deciles and matching the industry-adjusted values of the variable in the
sample with the accordant control group decile in the year of the succession. The median of the relevant variable in the
respective decile and year is then employed as a control. Years since succession is the time elapsed in years since the
succession. All values are displayed in 07/2009 euros. The stars display significances (Welch-Satterthwaite test) at: * ten
percent, ** five percent, and *** one percent. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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B. Proposition Testing
We begin by testing proposition 1 and apply an ordered logistic regression model on
the observed human capital score (HCS) of the successors in order to address concerns
that allowances in successor human capital (weak nepotism) could also be driven by
variables other than family membership.12 Our linear index model reads as follows:
(1) Y = αi + δ fi + X iβ + εi Ordered logistic model (table 3)
Here, Y denotes the human capital score, αi is the intercept, δ is the coefficient of
interest (in this case fi is the variable for the succession type, e.g. family versus non-
family), X i is an array of controls with a vector of coefficients β, and εi denotes the
error term.13 In order to take into account that not all firms attract the same number and
quality of potential successors, our controls include company characteristics and industry
controls.
Our results of the ordered logit regressions mirror the intuition derived from figure
1. Overall, they highlight that family heirs are significantly more likely to have a lower
human capital score, which can be seen in columns 1 to 3 of table 3. In detail, column 3
of table 3 entails a highly significant negative coefficient for family CEOs (-0.806) even
after the inclusion of various company and industry controls. We interpret this finding
as evidence for proposition 1 and conclude that proposition 1 cannot be rejected on the
basis of these results.
However, as column 1 shows, the coefficient for the average achievable human cap-
ital (industry wide supply of CEO resources) is insignificant. This leads us to refine
proposition 4 towards the idea that successor human capital is positively related to the
average regionally achievable human capital per industry. Pursuing this thought, we split
our benchmark on the average achievable CEO human capital into four geographical re-
gions.14 As can be observed in columns 2 and 3 of table 3, we find support for the refined
version of proposition 4: Higher levels of the successor’s human capital are significantly
more likely (coefficient 1.114, significant at the five percent level) if the average achiev-
able CEO human capital in the enterprise’s region and industry is higher. This finding is
robust to the inclusion of various controls.
It can be observed in column 3 of table 3 that good quality of the predecessor’s succes-
12We exclude all cases of strong nepotism from these regressions, as the allowances in human capital are related to the
weak nepotism category, which by definition 3 excludes cases of strong nepotism.
13We highlight at this point that this is an abbreviation, as both logit and the probit require the effects of x to go
through the index of xβ. For logit models this is Pr(Y = 1|X) = Pr(Y ∗ > 0) = exp(Xβ)/[1 + exp(Xβ)] and for probit
models Pr(Y = 1|X) = Pr(Y ∗ > 0) = 8(Xβ), where 8 is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution. In the following we use the abbreviation index model and simply refer to probit and logit.
14We use four geographical regions as it is reasonable and convenient to split Germany into the clusters north, central
(or west), south and east, as each of these clusters has at least one large metropolitan area while at the same time the
clusters have approximately the same size. In detail, we use the German postal code to distinguish between (1) eastern
Germany with national postal codes starting with 0 and 1, (2) northern Germany with national postal codes starting with
2 and 4, (3) central Germany with national postal codes starting with 3, 5 and 6, and (4) southern Germany with national
postal codes starting with 7, 8, and 9.
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TABLE 3—WEAK NEPOTISM AND HUMAN CAPITAL OF SUCCESSORS
Human capital score of CEO Family CEO (Artifact test)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Variables of interest
Family CEO -0.880*** -0.883*** -0.806***
(indicator) (0.142) (0.145) (0.190)
Industry-wide supply of 0.644 1.196*** 0.938
CEO resources (score) (0.415) (0.381) (1.491)
Regional industry supply of 0.704*** 1.114** 0.236
CEO resources (score) (0.249) (0.413) (0.216)
B. Company level variables
Ln operating revenue -0.018 -0.070 -0.047 -0.186**
(euros) (0.108) (0.071) (0.072) (0.078)
Employees 0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001
(sum) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Default probability 0.153 -0.077 -0.059 -0.085
(percent) (0.137) (0.095) (0.095) (0.097)
Financing requirements 0.267 -0.392* -0.400* -0.366*
(indicator) (0.284) (0.204) (0.207) (0.208)
Investment delays 0.534** -0.733*** -0.740*** -0.851***
(indicator) (0.237) (0.160) (0.163) (0.167)
Good succession planning -0.538** 0.291* 0.232 0.225
(indicator) (0.217) (0.149) (0.152) (0.154)
C. Industry level variables
Construction 0.294 0.029
(indicator) (0.282) (0.399)
Business services 0.230 -0.915***
(indicator) (0.280) (0.302)
Consumer services 0.035 -0.682
(indicator) (0.389) (0.495)
Wholesale & retail trade 0.025 -0.025
(indicator) (0.253) (0.349)
Number of observations 694 666 469 492 469 492
Pseudo R2 0.0183 0.0210 0.0420 0.0820 0.724 0.1283
Note: The dependent variable is human capital score in columns 1-3 and family CEO successor (an indicator variable
equal to one for family CEO successors) in column 4 to 6. Human capital score is a proxy of ability derived from
the sum of the five elements age, industry experience, leadership experience, merchant education, and professionalism.
The variables of interest are: Family CEO is an indicator equal to one if the successor is related to one of the three
natural persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise by either marriage or blood, Industry-wide supply of CEO
resources is the mean human capital score per industry of non-family successors, and Regional industry supply of CEO
resources is the mean human capital score per industry and regional cluster of non-family successors. Company variables
include: Ln operating revenue is the natural logarithm of operating revenue, Employees is the sum of employees, Default
probability is derived from the Creditreform solvency index, Financing requirements equals one if unexpected financing
requirements occur during a succession, Investment delay equals one if necessary investments were delayed before the
succession, Good succession planning equals one if the predecessor’s succession planning was perceived by the successor
to be good. Industry level variables are indicators equal to one if the respective category according to the ZEW industry
classification is met (see appendix A2). The values of the regressors refer to the succession year. All euro values are
harmonized to 07/2009 euros. The stars display significances at the * ten percent, ** five percent, and *** one percent
level. The table presents estimated changes in probabilities devising a maximum-likelihood ordered logit model (columns
1-3) and a maximum likelihood probit model (columns 4-6). The values in parentheses display the standard errors.
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sion planning seems to be negatively related (the coefficient is -0.538, significant at the
five percent level) to the probability of installing a successor with high human capital.
Interestingly, investment delays are significantly positively related to the successor’s hu-
man capital level (0.534, significant at the five percent level). We interpret this finding in
the following way: The leadership ability required for a successor to steer an enterprise
if a succession is well-planned is not as high as if the succession is more complicated
due to cash-in behavior by the predecessor leading to soaring and unsolved issues in the
enterprise’s foresight.
In columns 4 to 6 of table 3 we address concerns that the effect of the family variable
on the human capital score could be affected by artifacts, because the mean external
supply of human capital might reduce the likelihood of seeing a family successor and
increase the human capital of the successor. We investigate this issue using a simple
probit model on the likelihood of observing a family CEO successor including the same
array of controls. By inspecting the results, we reject the articulated concern. We observe
the exact opposite: The likelihood to see a family heir even increases with the mean of
externally available human capital across the industries (in column 4 the coefficient is
1.196, significant at the one percent level).15 From the results of this artifact test we infer
that the discount on human capital score of family heirs is explainable to a great extent
by preferences to install family heirs.16
As a next step, we test proposition 2 using a probit index model, which reads as fol-
lows:
(2) Y = αi + δci + X iβ + εi Probit model (table 4)
Here, Y indicates a family succession, αi is the intercept, δ is the coefficient of interest
(here c covers the children structure of the predecessor, e.g. son(s) vs. no son(s)), X i
is an array of controls with the vector of coefficients β, and εi denotes the error term.
The idea is that, given the predecessor has children, the predecessor’s preference for sons
should be mirrored in a significantly higher likelihood to observe a family CEO if a son
is among the children. Thus, the regressions are restricted to predecessors with children.
The results provide a clear picture. The presence of one or more sons significantly
increases the likelihood to observe a family succession as compared to predecessors with
one or more daughters and no sons (the coefficient of the son(s) indicator in column 6
is 0.51, significant at the one percent level). This result remains robust to inclusion of
company and industry characteristics and is indicative for predecessors’ preference for
male family heirs as CEO successors which is in line with proposition 2. Furthermore, in
columns 4 to 6 of table 4 we observe that family successors are less likely in some indus-
tries. Especially in the business services sector we find a highly significant and negative
15This significance vanishes when introducing industry controls in column 6 of table 3.
16As another robustness check, we included profit margin as a direct performance measure into our regressions. It
turned out to have no significant effect, but introduced a selection bias due to missing observations. Thus, we excluded
this measure from our regressions and refer to default probability, investment delay and financing requirements as proxies
for firm performance and state of the firm.
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TABLE 4—PROBIT: FAMILY SUCCESSION DECISIONS OF PREDECESSORS WITH CHILDREN
Dependent variable: Family Succession Indicator
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Variables of interest
Son(s) only 0.40*** 0.52***
(0.14) (0.19)
Daughter(s) only -0.40*** -0.52***
(0.14) (0.19)
Mixed children 0.43*** 0.03 0.50*** -0.02
(0.13) (0.11) (0.17) (0.14)
Son(s) among children 0.42*** 0.51***
(0.13) (0.16)
B. Company level variables
Ln sales -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.21***
(Euro) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Employees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(number) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Default probability 0.02 0.03 0.03
(percent) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Financing requirements -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.57***
(indicator) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Investment delay -0.91*** -0.92*** -0.92***
(indicator) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Predecessor active -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
(indicator) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Unplanned succession -0.26 -0.26 -0.26
(indicator) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Avg. regional human capital -0.20 -0.20 -0.20
supply (score) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
C. Industry level variables
Construction -0.28 -0.28 -0.28
(indicator) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Business services -0.98*** -0.98*** -0.98***
(indicator) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Consumer services -0.32 -0.32 -0.33
(indicator) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Wholesale & retail trade 0.31 0.31 0.31
(indicator) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Number of observations 715 715 715 521 521 521
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.14 0.14
Note: The dependent variable is equal to one if the successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the
three persons owning more than 50% percent of the enterprise. Variables of interest include: Son(s) only is an indicator
for predecessors with one or more sons, Daughter(s) only is an indicator for predecessors with one or more daughters,
Mixed is an indicator for predecessors with both one or more sons and one or more daughters, and Son(s) there is an
indicator equal to one if among the predecessor’s children there is at least one son. Controls include: Ln sales, the
natural logarithm of operating revenue, Employees, is the number of employees, Default probability is derived from
the Creditreform solvency index, Financing requirements equals one if unexpected financing requirements occur during
a succession, Investment delay equals one if necessary investments were delayed before the succession, Predecessor
active is an indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor still holds shares of the enterprise and remains operatively
active in a leading position, Unplanned succession is an indicator equal to one if the successions is unplanned due to
death or heavy disease of the predecessor, Regional industry supply of CEO resources is the mean non-family human
capital score per industry and regional cluster (derived from the proxies age, industry experience, leadership experience,
merchant education, and professionalism). Industry indicators according to the ZEW industry classification are included
(see appendix A2). The values of the regressors refer to the succession year. All values are deflated to 07/2009 euros.
The stars display significances at the * ten percent, ** five percent, and *** one percent level. The table present estimated
changes in probabilities devising a probit (maximum-likelihood) model. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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coefficient -0.98. We also find evidence that enterprise size in terms of sales reduces the
likelihood of family CEO successors (-0.21, significant at the one percent level). In ad-
dition, we observe negative coefficients of investment delay (-0.92, significant at the one
percent level) and financing requirements (-0.57, significant at the 10% level) which mir-
rors a “cuckoo’s egg behavior” in the sense that companies with a questionable outlook
are family-outsourced like a cuckoo’s egg by choosing non-family successors.
As a last step it remains to search for the drivers of nepotism and to address proposition
3 which postulates that the presence of male heirs plays a major role in this respect.
(3) Y = αi + δci + X iβ + εi Probit models (table 5)
Within the two probit index models Y indicates weak nepotism (or strong nepotism
respectively), αi is the intercept, δ is the coefficient of interest (here ci circulates around
the children structure of the predecessor), X i is an array of controls with a vector of
coefficients β, and εi denotes the error term. The array of controls includes company
characteristics and industry controls. All regressions are limited to successions where
the family structure permitted a potential succession by close family heirs. The results
are presented in table 5.
The results of the direct probit regressions of table 5 are striking. They offer strong
evidence in favor of proposition 3. The presence of a son among the children of the
predecessor significantly increases the probability of weak nepotism (0.65, significant at
the one percent level, column 2) as compared to predecessors with daughters only. The
same relationship is observable for strong nepotism (0.51, significant at the ten percent
level in column 4). We conclude that proposition 3 cannot be rejected on the basis of
these results.17
From these findings we conclude that in enterprises with concentrated ownership and
control the installation of a successor is strongly affected by the preferences and behavior
of the predecessor.
C. Discussion
We point out that the regression results we found may be subject to omitted variable
issues. In particular, it would be very interesting to evaluate how the gender of the pre-
17Furthermore, as can be seen from the regression in columns 1 to 4, on average we find a negative marginal effect of
size on the likelihood to observe nepotistic successions for small companies (until roughly three million euros), which is
mirrored in the strongly positive, but insignificant coefficient of “ln sales(below 15)”. This effect is in line with intuition:
When companies become too small, they might be unattractive to externals. Above three million euros, this effect vanishes
and size tends to have a null impact on the likelihood of strong nepotism. With respect to weak nepotism, columns 1 and
2 show that weak nepotism is significantly less likely (at the one percent level) in the construction (-0.51) and business
services (-0.87) sector, as compared to the manufacturing sector. Interestingly, there are no significant deviations towards
strong nepotism across the industries as all industry indicators remain insignificant and of low magnitude. Sudden and
unplanned successions, which occur due to disease or death of the predecessor, increase the likelihood of succession in
accordance with our definition of strong nepotism (0.56, significant at the five percent level). We suspect that this result
is not due to favoritism or biased succession contests, but rather due to time constraints in cases of unplanned situations,
which potentially render non-family successions void.
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TABLE 5—DRIVERS OF NEPOTISM - PROBIT REGRESSIONS
Weak nepotism Strong nepotism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Variables of interest
Son(s) only (indicator) 0.59*** 0.52*
(0.167) (0.298)
Daughter(s) and son(s) (indicator) 0.69*** 0.50*
(0.153) (0.282)
Son(s) amongst children (indicator) 0.65*** 0.51*
(0.146) (0.274)
B. Company level variables
Ln operating revenue (euros) -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11
(0.103) (0.103) (0.159) (0.159)
Ln sales (below 15) (indicator) 3.44 3.29 4.50 4.50
(4.653) (4.657) (5.844) (5.844)
Ln sales (above 15) (euros) -0.24 -0.23 -0.31 -0.31
(0.317) (0.317) (0.399) (0.399)
Employees (sum) 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.01**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Employees squared (sum) 1.12e-6 9.98e-7 -8.09e-6 -8.08e-6
(2.08e-6) (2.08e-6) (5.46e-6) (5.45e-6)
Default probability (percent) 0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.11
(0.083) (0.083) (0.070) (0.070)
Unplanned (indicator) -0.31 -0.30 0.56** 0.56**
(0.227) (0.227) (0.256) (0.256)
C. Industry level variables
Construction (indicator) -0.51*** -0.50*** 0.18 0.18
(0.167) (0.166) (0.250) (0.249)
Business services (indicator) -0.87*** -0.86*** 0.02 0.02
(0.176) (0.176) (0.254) (0.253)
Consumer services (indicator) -0.33 -0.33 0.02 0.02
(0.243) (0.244) (0.351) (0.351)
Wholesale & retail trade (indicator) -0.11 -0.11 0.17 0.17
(0.161) (0.161) (0.240) (0.240)
Other (indicator) -0.34 -0.34 0.19 0.18
(0.280) (0.280) (0.412) (0.412)
Observations 557 557 597 597
Pseudo R2 0.0717 0.0709 0.0673 0.0673
Note: The dependent variable is weak nepotism in columns 1 and 2 (an indicator variable equal to one if a family CEO
with human capital lower than the average human capital of non-family successors in the industry of his enterprise was
installed), and strong nepotism in columns 3 and 4 (an indicator variable equal to one if exclusively family members were
considered as successors). The variables of interest are: Son(s) only is an indicator equal to one if all the predecessor’s
children are male, Daughter(s) and son(s) is an indicator equal to one if the predecessor’s children are mixed, and Son(s)
amongst children is an indicator equal to one if among the predecessor’s children there is at least one son. Company
variables include: Ln operating revenue is the natural logarithm of operating revenue of the succession year, Ln sales
(below 15) is an indicator equal to one if sales is smaller than fifteen million euros, Ln sales (above 15) displays the effect
of Ln sales above fifteen million euros, Employees is the sum of employees, Employees squared is the sum of employees
squared, Default probability is derived from the Creditreform solvency index, and Unplanned is an indicator equal to one
if the succession was due to unplanned disease or death of the predecessor. Industry level variables are indicators equal
to one if the respective category according to the ZEW industry classification (see appendix A2) is met. The values of the
regressors refer to the succession year. All values are displayed in 07/2009 euros. The stars display significances at the *
ten percent, ** five percent, and *** one percent level. The table presents estimated changes in probabilities devising a
maximum likelihood probit model. The values in parentheses display the standard errors.
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decessor affects the observed patterns.18 Furthermore, the question remains how much
of the observed pattern is due to gender preferences of the predecessor as compared to
gender differences in CEO labor supply. However, the fact that in unplanned family suc-
cessions the female succession rate jumps to 35.1% is indicative that the predecessors’
preferences play a major role in the otherwise lower female succession rate.19 We be-
lieve that in particular the family patterns observed in table 1 are indicative for a gender
preference of the predecessor. Generally, it would be of value to test our propositions
using another succession sample to exclude a potential sample bias.
VI. Conclusion
Our results provide evidence that the labor market selectivity in CEO successions in
family firms with concentrated ownership control is constrained due to gender prefer-
ences of the preceding CEO. We differentiate between strong nepotism and weak nepo-
tism in successions and find that the occurrence of both forms is significantly driven by
the presence of sons among the predecessor’s children, which is robust to the inclusion
of various controls. Interestingly, the predecessors’ preference of male family successors
leads in turn to the observation that female family successors are equipped with better
levels of human capital as compared to male family successors. Furthermore, succes-
sions of female family successors are less often biased by nepotism as compared to male
family successions.
These results highlight that in enterprises with concentrated ownership control such as
family firms, the preferences of the predecessor, exemplia gratia preferences for family
heirs or for male successors, play a crucial role in the successor selection process. They
influence the succession contest’s outcome with respect to the human capital level of
the successor and subsequent enterprise performance. Consequently, it seems crucial to
sensitize the predecessor on his key role and responsibility regarding this aspect.
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APPENDIX
A1. Additional Summary Statistics and Additional Tables
Table A1 presents additional summary statistics of the classification and distribution
of the observed successions.
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TABLE A1—CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVED SUCCESSIONS
Manu- Business Consumer Wholesale
Industry Total facturing Construction services services & retail Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1. Male 625 260 88 112 47 96 22
successor (80.7) (83.6) (80.0) (84.2) (69.1) (78.1) (75.9)
[100.0] [41.6] [14.1] [17.9] [7.5] [15.4] [3.5]
2. Female 149 51 22 21 21 7 15
successor (19.3) (16.4) (20.0) (15.8) (30.9) (22.0) (24.1)
[100.0] [34.2] [14.8] [14.1] [14.1] [18.1] [4.7]
Total 774 311 110 133 68 123 29
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
[100.0] [40.2] [14.2] [17.2] [8.8] [15.9] [3.7]
3. Male family 336 155 48 32 23 65 13
successor (75.7) (79.5) (69.6) (74.4) (67.7) (76.5) (72.2)
[100.0] [46.1] [14.3] [9.5] [6.9] [19.4] [3.8]
4. Female family 108 40 21 11 11 20 5
successor (24.3) (20.5) (30.4) (25.6) (32.4) (23.5) (27.8)
[100.0] [37.0] [19.4] [10.2] [10.2] [18.5] [4.6]
Total 444 195 69 43 34 85 18
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
[100.0] [43.9] [15.5] [9.7] [7.7] [19.1] [4.0]
Note: Successions are categorized into: Male successor, for male successors, Female successor, for female successors;
Male family successor, for male successors who are related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons
owning more than 50% of the enterprise, and Female family successor, for female successors who are related by marriage
or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise. The industries are clustered using
aggregated ISIC classifications, see appendix A2. The fraction of successions as a percentage of the absolute amount
of the gross sample (column 1) or of the absolute amount of observed successions per industry cluster (columns 2-7) is
displayed in parentheses. The fraction of successions as a percentage of the absolute amount of observed successions per
succession type is shown in square brackets.
The industry classification key for the industry aggregation employed (using aggrega-
tions of the International Standard Industry Classification of All Economic Activities of
the United Nations, ISIC Rev. 3.1) is shown in table A2.
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TABLE A2—INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION KEY
ISIC ISIC
Rev. 3.1 Rev. 3.1
ZEW industry key code industry description
(1) (2)
1. Manufacturing D Manufacturing
2. Construction F Construction
3. Business services K Real estate, renting and business activities
(without ISIC 70: real estate activities)
O Other community, social and personal service activities
(only ISIC 90: sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and
similar activities)
4. Consumer services H Hotels and restaurants
K Real estate, renting and business activities
(only ISIC 70: real estate activities)
M Education
N Health and social work
O Other community, social and personal service activities
(only ISIC 92: recreational, cultural and sporting activities
and ISIC 93: other service activities)
5. Wholesale & retail G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motor-
cycles and personal and household goods
6. Other I Transport, storage and communication
J Financial intermediation
Note: For each aggregated industry cluster the key in form of the ISIC Rev. 3.1 code (column 1) and its description
(column 2) is reported. The ISIC industry sections (A) agriculture, hunting and forestry, (B) fishing, (C) mining, quar-
rying and (E) electricity gas and water supply, (L) public administration and defense & compulsory social security, (P)
activities of households, (Q) extra-territorial organizations and bodies as well as division (91) activities of membership
organizations are not included. ISIC industry categories with no observations are not displayed.
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I. Introduction
Changes in organizational leadership are pivotal moments. But in enterprises where
concentrated ownership meets ownership control, CEO changes are regularly intertwined
with ownership changes and become decisive in a company’s fate, as the CEO is often
the heart of the organization he is conducting. Provided the leadership of the departing
CEO has lasted long enough, both an internal equilibrium of well-established rules or
norms, roles, and power distribution, but also of processes and routines, as well as an
external equilibrium of economic and sociological embeddedness have developed (Cyert
and March, 1963, Nelson and Winter, 1982, and Granovetter, 1985).
By relinquishing the focus on the departing CEO and by the enthronement of a new
CEO, a company may become subject to profound reorganization and substantial change
(Miller, 1993). Furthermore, in many circumstances this change proves to be vital and
advantageous, because experience often makes organizations and leaders cling to old
routines of behavior whilst the optimal solutions to organizational challenges might have
changed over time (Miller, 1993, Beck et al., 2008). In this context the new leader can act
as a reset: He assesses the contemporary fit of the organizational equilibria and general
business model and introduces changes.
Consequently, the recent succession literature discusses the ties of successions with
change management (Pardo-del-Val, 2009). Managing momentous change is complex:
Adapting the stabilizing institutionalized fabric possibly fuels opposition from organiza-
tional members (Coch and French Jr., 1948) and inertial forces stemming from structural
and environmental embeddedness arise which hinder intended adaptations to a dynamic
environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). To make things worse, older organizations,
for example family firms with a long tradition, might be subject to particularly strong
inertial forces and their reorganizations are especially complex and hazardous imply-
ing a high default probability (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, Amburgey et al., 1993, and
Haveman, 1993). The work of Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006) and Ahrens et al. (2012) hints
that CEO successors with high levels of human capital seem to cope better with these
challenges. However, despite the growing literature on successions, it is surprising how
little is known in detail about the performance impact of such restructuring decisions
during successions (Miller, 1993). After all and ceteribus paribus, managerial actions
should play a key role in explaining firm performance, which is perhaps most true for
leader-centered family firms.1
This article addresses this gap and visualizes the post-succession managerial actions
and evaluates their impact on performance. For this purpose we harness an unique data
set which tracks 25 management action types and enterprise performance in 804 lead-
ership changes in enterprises with high ownership concentration and ownership con-
trol. As the CEO successors’ ability and propensity to implement changes vary signif-
icantly across their origins (family, enterprise or external) (Helmich and Brown, 1972,
1Family firms are possibly the most prominent example of constellations of a large shareholder with some satellite
minority shareholders, as modeled by Shleifer and Vishny (1986). In addition, ownership concentration and family
influence in medium-sized publicly traded companies is a substantial phenomenon across the world. La Porta et al.
(1999) report that 45 percent of the observed enterprises are controlled by families.
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and Ahrens et al., 2012), we develop a CEO successor typology with respect to origin and
ability and combine it with a contingency approach which controls for the economic con-
ditions of the succession enterprise (normal, low relative profit margin, industry down-
turn, and turnaround situation). By relying on accounting-based performance indicators,
we carry out a differential performance analysis. A central advantage of the differential
performance approach is that it controls by construction for time-invariant firm char-
acteristics which might drive firm performance. Following the financial economics lit-
erature strand on firm performance, our performance measures include industry- and
performance-adjustments of comparison groups in order to control for the effects of time
and industry trends as well as possible mean reversion effects (Barber and Lyon, 1996).
In addition and to account for further heterogeneity of the successions, we incorporate
an array of commonly used controls for firm characteristics into our regressions. These
include measures for firm size, momentum (starting profitability), ownership, default
probability as well as further indicators on the state of the firm in the succession year
including possible investment delays and financing requirements, but also sociological
controls such as the ability (human capital) and origin of the CEO and the activity of the
predecessor to control for influences of knowledge transfers.
The results of our analysis offer empirical evidence that in many family firms which
experience a CEO succession, a potential for vital corporate amendments has accumu-
lated, which is unleashed by intensive post-succession corporate change. This change
entails a positive and significant impact on enterprise performance even after controlling
for industry and performance trends and including an array common company controls.
Successors with high human capital are capable of detecting and initiating significantly
(at the one percent level) more corporate change and achieve a 1.15 percentage points
higher (significant at the one percent level) industry- and performance-adjusted profit
margin in the post succession period as compared to successors with low human capital.
In addition, the total amount of change is subject to the origin of the successor and the
economic contingency in which the succession occurs. The highest total change is ob-
servable in the turnaround category, followed by the low relative profit margin category
of the economic contingencies.
With regard to the individual actions’ performance impact, we find that a moderate
review of the existing product portfolio seems to lead to a 1.23 percentage points higher
industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (significant at the five percent level and
robust to the inclusion of various controls). In addition, a review of the existing suppli-
ers (0.92, significant at the five percent level) and a review of the compensation scheme
(0.82, significant at the five percent level) seem to drive abnormal post-succession perfor-
mance. Furthermore, these effects gain magnitude if the successor manages to conquer
new customer groups. Interestingly, internationalization strategies during successions
are accompanied by significantly reduced (-1.70, at the five percent level) abnormal en-
terprise performance.
This article is designed in the following way: Section II gives a literature overview
and is followed by the theoretical section III. Section IV gives detailed information on
the sample. Section V is dedicated to the data analysis. The final section VI discusses
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the main results and concludes.
II. Related Literature
The determining factors of success in successions in family firms are considered in a
variety of intertwined literature strands. However, the perspective taken by this article
mainly relates to three disciplines: the theory of the firm, the firm performance literature,
and the change and business restructuring literature.
As successions in family firms often include the replacement of an old unity of owner-
ship and control by a new unity of ownership and control, the topic is closely related to
the theory of the firm literature. Several ownership structure and agency issues (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976, Fama, 1980, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Demsetz and Villalonga,
2001, and Schulze et al., 2001) are touched upon. As concentrated ownership and own-
ership control structures in family firms possibly curb the surveillance mechanisms of the
old CEO’s actions to zero or only internal checks, a possible pursuit of private benefit
maximization could potentially endanger firm performance around CEO and ownership
changes (Johnson et al., 2000, Dyck and Zingales, 2004, and Villalonga and Amit, 2006).
For example, firm performance might be adversely affected because of favoritism, exem-
pli gratia through the appointment of family CEO successors with inadequate abilities
(Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006).
Furthermore, the classical agency costs issue (Arrow, 1963, Holmstro¨m, 1979, and
Arrow, 1985) becomes relevant: With respect to firm performance, is it better to install
an external or a family member as CEO successor? From a theoretical point of view, over
the generations the endowment of talents, including leadership and managerial talents, is
likely to return to the population’s mean (Galton, 1886, Galton, 1890, Heckman, 1995,
Mulligan, 1999, and Mehrotra et al., 2011), while inheriting great amounts of wealth
might possibly induce lethargic and contemplative behavior (Carnegie, 1889, Carnegie,
1891/1933(reprint), and Holtz-Eakin et al., 1993). Nevertheless, it is argued that the
installation of family managers is vital due to the reduced agency costs and improved
monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983), stronger family peer pressure (Kandel and Lazear,
1992), pro-organizational behavior (Davis et al., 1997) and long-term orientation (Le
Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006, and Block and Thams, 2007).
In line with the above divergent considerations, the general empirical evaluation of
family influence and firm performance is mixed.2 However, with respect to firm per-
formance in the succession phase, the literature is fairly unidirectional and observes a
negative impact of family CEO successors on firm performance, which has so far been
explained by a lower human capital of family heirs (possibly due to nepotism), a lower
propensity to implement changes of family heirs and the effects of the “Carnegie Con-
jecture” (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006, Bennedsen et al., 2007,
2Positive relationships using various measures are reported by McConaughy et al. (1998), Anderson and Reeb (2003),
Maury (2006), Adams et al. (2009), and Mehrotra et al. (2011). Mixed evidence is provided by Morck et al. (1988),
Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Miller et al. (2007). Furthermore, negative relationships were observed by Yermack
(1996), Morck et al. (2000), Hillier and McColgan (2009). For a detailed literature overview and descriptions of the
measures employed we refer to Pe´rez-Gonza´lez (2006).
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and Ahrens et al., 2012). In addition, many succession conditions are complex. They
often constitute a phase of organizational change or (r)evolution and sometimes even
organizational crisis, thus the decision making in such situations (Smart and Vertinsky,
1977, and Gladstein and Reilly, 1985) is non-trivial and the quality of the new CEOs’
decisions may depend on their experience and human capital (Canella Jr. and Rowe,
1995, Adner and Helfat, 2003, Holcomb et al., 2009).
In the spirit of Hannan and Freeman (1984) inertial forces due to established power
structures and procedures, or due to a company’s history and experiences or even anxious
ignorance (Hedberg et al., 1976, Nystrom and Starbuck, 1984, Miller, 1990 and 1991,
Schein, 1993, and Miller, 1994), could have potentially desensitized a company to nec-
essary adaptations. Just as tents are sometimes better than palaces, a new CEO who has
fewer links to the corporate’s past experience evaluates the firm’s issues from a different
perspective. He or she has fewer commitments to past policies and organizational rules
and is thus in a position to act as a catalyst for productive and adaptive change (Grinyer
and Spender, 1979, Hofer, 1980, Tushman and Romanelli, 1985, Miller, 1991 and 1993,
and Barker III and Duhaime, 1997) and may spark a new phase of organizational evo-
lution, if not revolution (Greiner, 1972, and Miller, 1980). The amount of change in
successions is often substantial (Miller, 1993), sometimes even comparable to profound
restructuring situations. However, the succession literature has so far (to the best of our
knowledge) mainly ignored addressing this post-succession change and its performance
impact.
Similar to restructuring and turnaround activities, the change which unfolds in the post-
succession renewal processes can be categorized into strategic adaptations (Barker III
and Duhaime, 1997) and efficiency-enhancing changes (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983,
and Robbins and Pearce II, 1992).3 As a consequence, Barker III and Duhaime (1997)
suggest the enrichment of financial data with detailed field data on managerial actions,
as the potential for inference from financial data on managerial decision making is very
limited.4 Furthermore, findings of the responsible restructuring literature (Cascio, 2005)
play a key role because the small and medium sized enterprises observed here cannot
restructure at any rate without touching critical resources or limits due to their limited
size. In line with this argument, the literature hints that strategies including a successful
new usage of existing company resources strongly contribute to organizational recovery
(Morrow et al., 2007). On such a firm size level a successful re-adaptation may involve,
in the spirit of Hammer and Champy (2003), the combination of several jobs into one
without damaging the functional core of the organization.
III. Theoretical Section
A. Categories and Definitions
The aim of this article is to investigate the managerial actions and their performance
impact following CEO successions in enterprises with “concentrated ownership control”.
3For a literature overview including early works on turnaround situations we refer to Pearce II and Robbins (1993).
4In this article, we track 25 different managerial actions in order to address this issue.
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For the purposes of this article we begin by defining the “concentrated ownership con-
trol” attribute:
DEFINITION 1: An enterprise with concentrated ownership control is present if a max-
imum of three natural persons own more than 50% of the enterprise and at least one of
these owners is a leading member of the executive board.
Furthermore, we classify the successions along the dimensions “origin” of the succes-
sor, “human capital” of the successor, and “economic contingency” of the enterprise in
the succession year, because we suspect that these dimensions influence the pattern of
the post-succession managerial actions and thereby post-succession performance.
The origin dimension distinguishes between the following origins: family, for succes-
sors related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than
50% of the enterprise, enterprise, for unrelated successors who were previously employ-
ees of the enterprise, external, for successors with no previous ties to the enterprise, and
hybrid, for multiple successors with differing backgrounds.
We assess the human capital dimension by creating a human capital score as a proxy.
This proxy is composed of the sum of five elements which include (1) age above median
(proxy for general experience), (2) industry experience above median (proxy for industry
related experience), (3) leadership experience (proxy for practical managerial skills), (4)
merchant education, if the successor holds an university degree in business studies (or
strongly related field) or was educated at an university of cooperative education (proxy
for theoretical managerial skills), and (5) use of a business plan during the succession
(proxy for professional managerial skills).
In the fashion of Ahrens et al. (2012), the selection of the human capital proxies
mirrors an argument brought forward by Murphy and Za´bojnı´k (2004). Murphy and
Za´bojniı´k (2004) argue that general management skills have gained more importance
for CEOs over the last 30 years due to the advances in management science, corporate
controlling and finance and other arts, which, if mastered by the CEO, enhance the CEO’s
ability to lead an enterprise.5 Thus, we try to capture general managerial skills and
argue that leadership experience, a degree in business studies and the ability to apply
this knowledge using advanced professional instruments, such as a business plan (which
includes a stragic plan, but also a finance- and liquidity-plan and an earnings forecast),
are satisfactory proxies. The role of the successor’s education is also emphasized in the
succession literature (Morris et al., 1997 and Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Further,
the small business literature emphasizes the beneficial aspects of education in business
studies and managerial skills (exemplia gratia cash-flow management) for small business
success (Ibrahim and Goodwin, 1986). In addition, education may also be interpreted as
a signal of ability, since the investment “degree in business studies” is easier to obtain
for more gifted individuals (Spence, 1973, Arrow, 1973, and Spence 1974).6
5In addition Murhpy and Za´bojnı´k (2004) highlight that the advances in computerization of the digital age over the
last 30 years have made company specific knowledge more accessible to managers as compared to earlier times.
6In a way, the business plan indicator variable also monitors whether the general managerial skills acquired are in
active use as opposed to being only a signal.
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However, the human capital theory highlights that productivity-augmenting invest-
ments in human capital might also occur in the post-education period (Mincer, 1974
and Strober 1990), which we try to capture by incorporating experience related human
capital proxies. First of all, the succession literature casts light on the fact that proven
skills, such as previous leadership experience, are vital and generate credibility in suc-
cessions (Barach et al., 1988, Barach and Ganitsky, 1995, Chrisman et al., 1998, and
Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). For this reason we include leadership experience as an
investment with respect to building up CEO relevant human capital. Furthermore, Min-
cer (1974) shows that the time distribution of the investments in human capital leads to
an age variation in earnings resulting in a positive correlation between age and earnings
(sometimes called the age profile). As this higher payment might be seen as remunera-
tion for higher ability due to experience, we use age as a proxy for general experience,
which might also be relevant for the ability to lead a company as a CEO.7 Finally, by
employing industry experience, we also add one company specific knowledge proxy to
the four general proxies, which mirrors potential advantages due to mastering the tricks
of the trade of the specific industry of the accordant company.8 Finally, we decided to
work with a sum of these five proxies as many combinations of the above named ele-
ments might reflect a augmented ability to succeed as a CEO. The attribute HHC for
high human capital is assigned to the successors if the overall score of the respective
successor is above or equal to the median score of the sample, and LHC for low human
capital otherwise.
The economic contingency dimension is designed to reflect insights from the restruc-
turing and crisis literature and contains four categories which are normal successions,
low relative profit margin cases, successions during industry downturns, and turnaround
cases. Inspired by Miller (1993) and Barker III and Duhaime (1997), we employ relative
performance in the succession year as an indicator of the respective strategic alignment
of the company. More precisely, we attach the low relative profit margin attribute to a
company if it performs -1.0 percentage points in profit margin below its respective in-
dustry mean in the succession year and if it does not fall into the turnaround category.
In such circumstances, the respective company’s profit margin situation is likely to stem
from firm-based actions or inactions leading to a need for strategic adaptation (Cameron
et al., 1988).
Furthermore, companies may be forced to adapt, if their respective industry suffers
from a downturn or environmental decline due to shifts in demand size or demand shape
(Harrigan, 1980; Zammuto and Cameron, 1985; and Whetten, 1987). Such industry
contractions often lead to pressure at the firm level and sometimes also to organizational
decline, as the general profitability level declines due to survival contests in industries
which support only a reduced number of firms. We attach the industry downturn attribute
7We have to add that Mincer (1974) highlights that this relation between age and earnings decreases over time and
eventually turns negative at old age. In addition, Miller (1991) argues that seasoned CEOs might become “stale in the
saddle” and less effective. We argue that we can ignore these diminishing or even negative effects in our study, as the
average age of the CEO successors falls into the increasing part of the relationship.
8One could also measure the experience within the respective enterprise. However, this would exclude external CEO
successors by definition.
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to a company if the following conditions are met: The average profit margin of their
respective industry is below 2.0% in the succession year and if it does not earn more
than 5.0% profit margin in the succession year and if it does not fall into the turnaround
category.
As a third category we identify companies which are either suffering from both low
relative profit margin and industry downturn attributes or which earn less than 0.5% profit
margin in the succession year. We attach the turnaround attribute to these companies as
they are likely to need major operative and strategic adaptations. All companies which
do not meet these three categories are put into the normal succession category for healthy
enterprises.9
B. Derived Propositions
Using the categories defined above, we derive propositions which are presented in the
following. To start with, many succession conditions are complex and often go along
with a phase of organizational change (Miller, 1993), sometimes even a revolution or
organizational crisis. It follows that the decision making in such crisis situations (Smart
and Vertinsky, 1977, and Gladstein and Reilly, 1985) is demanding.10 In general, suc-
cessors with a higher human capital should be better at detecting the need for and imple-
menting change and thereby outperform less experienced or less able successors (Trow,
1961, Canella Jr. and Rowe, 1995, Adner and Helfat, 2003, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006, and
Holcomb et al., 2009).
PROPOSITION 1: Successors with high human capital implement more changes as
compared to successors with low human capital.
We also argue that the economic contingency dimension affects the extent and type of
change. For example, companies with the low relative profit margin attribute are more
likely to have failed to adapt strategically as compared to firms in the normal succes-
sion category. However, the current fit of the firm’s strategy is likely to have an impact
on the choice of implemented changes. Companies with weak strategic positions have,
ceteribus paribus, a higher need for strategic change as compared to companies with a
strong strategic position (Barker III and Duhaime, 1997).11
Furthermore, if reductions in demand size or demand shape due to an industry down-
turn occur during a succession, then such industry contractions may pressurize firms
9Furthermore, it would be interesting to capture the social contingencies such as the social system in the company
which each successor inherited upon succession to office, as this is likely to have an effect on the actions (and performance
of the actions) taken by the successor (Guest, 1962). However, this approach is unavailable with the data we have at hand.
In addition, please note that some of the definitions and categories applied in this article follow Ahrens et al. (2012),
while the human capital score employed in this article is reapplied in Ahrens et al. (2012,b) and Ahrens et al. (2012,c).
10This should especially be the case for successions in enterprises which suffer from turnaround conditions prior to a
succession. While the literature agrees that a top management change (a succession) in such situations is often desirable,
the typical following steps (Bibeault, 1982) for a turnaround such as “evaluation” of the situation and of cash flows, the
“emergency” stage (immediate measures) and the restructuring and rebuilding of the organization (“stabilization”) require
advanced management skills.
11Apart from the higher likelihood of strategic adaptations, a low relative profit margin might also stem from operative
deficits, thus we also expect operative changes to occur more frequently as compared to the normal successions category.
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into striving for efficiency enhancing changes (Harrigan, 1980, Zammuto and Cameron,
1985, and Whetten, 1987), but it also increases incentives to evade the downturn by
following a strategic reorientation (Barker III and Duhaime, 1997). However, industry
downturns are an external source of pressure, while low relative profit margin situations
hint at internal issues and are thus more likely to be amendable by actions by the man-
agement. We thus expect that the overall change in low relative profit margin successions
is higher compared to successions in the industry downturn category. In turnaround sit-
uations we expect an urgent and important need for change and that the overall extent of
changes in the turnaround category is unsurpassed by the changes in the other categories.
PROPOSITION 2: The number of changes during successions increases over the eco-
nomic contingencies in the following order: normal (lowest), industry downturn, low
relative profit margin, and turnaround (highest).
We argue that in many successions a potential for improvements and adaptions has
accumulated due to the presence of organizational inertia which may be fueled by es-
tablished power structures, rules and procedures, a company’s history and experiences,
and anxious ignorance (Hedberg et al., 1976, Hannan and Freeman ,1984, Nystrom and
Starbuck, 1984, Miller, 1990 and 1991, Schein, 1993, and Miller, 1994). By overcom-
ing these barriers, a successor or new CEO may spark productive and adaptive change
(Grinyer and Spender, 1979, Hofer, 1980, Tushman and Romanelli, 1985, Miller, 1991
and 1993, and Barker III and Duhaime, 1997), which taps a company’s potential for im-
provements and translates it into boosted enterprise performance. However, we believe
that once the major improvement potentials have been salvaged, additional change is un-
likely to entail large positive effects. Assuming that the most obvious and vital changes
are the first to be introduced, it might be possible to speak of diminishing marginal re-
turns to additional changes.12
PROPOSITION 3: There exists a previously accumulated and limited performance im-
provement potential in CEO successions which is salvageable by post-succession change.
IV. Sample Selection
In this article we revisit the data set of Ahrens et al. (2012). The data set for this ar-
ticle relies on the following sources: (a) the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP), (b) the
Bureau van Dyjk Amadeus database (Amadeus), (c) the Hoppenstedt database, (d) the
Creditreform solvency index information, (e) German Bundesbank information, (f) stan-
dardized computer-aided telephone interviews, (g) non-standardized direct interviews,
and (h) web-searches.
We begin by extracting a gross sample of owner-controlled enterprises from the MUP
database filtering for the following settings for the years 2002 to 2008:13
12Additional change might even be disruptive only. Furthermore, it is possible that the amount of change an organiza-
tion can bear at a time without causing additional negative effects is limited.
13We chose this time horizon as MUP data from earlier than 2002 are less complete and reliable.
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1) 30 to 1,000 employees, and
2) going concern, and
3) possesses the concentrated ownership control attribute.
Employing a second filter, we single out 14,250 companies which experienced a succes-
sion within this time horizon.14
We collect financial data and impute missing values by employing the following hier-
archy: 1. MUP information, 2. Amadeus information, 3. Creditreform solvency index
information, 4. Hoppenstedt information, and 5. web-searches. Apart from the sam-
ple group, a control group of 187,388 company-year observations is drawn from the
Amadeus database.15 Employing Bundesbank price index information, all values are
reported in 07/2009 euros.
Devising standardized computer-aided telephone interviews, all gross sample enter-
prises are contacted. In addition, all interviewees suit the following criteria:
1) interviewee is a successor, and
2) interviewee is a leading member of the executive board, and
3) interviewee holds an ownership fraction of the enterprise, and
4) the succession took place between the years 2002 and 2008.16
We arrive at a net sample of 804 CEO successions. The interview spans four key
nexi which are succession type, human capital of the successor, post-succession man-
agerial decision pattern of the successor, and enterprise performance. The first interview
nexus is designed to allow a fine distinction between succession types and includes in-
formation on the successor’s origin (e.g. family, enterprise or external). The second
information nexus (human capital) delivers observations on variables such as the succes-
sor’s age, leadership experience, industry experience and his or her highest educational
degree or qualification. Nexus three collects data on the post-succession decision pattern
by tracking the management actions executed between the succession year and the year
2009. Enterprise performance is measured using accounting variables, for example profit
margin, number of employees, and credit rating score measured in the succession year
and in 2009. In addition, indicators of the state of the company, such as unexpected post-
succession financing requirements and perceived pre-succession investment delays, flank
the set of traditional accounting variables. In addition to the 804 standardized interviews,
we record 20 successors and two experts in non-standardized in-depth interviews, which
serve as an additional, but unrepresentative, source for the interpretation of the empirical
results, especially with regard to questions which are difficult to capture in standardized
interviews.
14Appendix A1 presents further information on the second filter.
15The control group enterprises are required to be of a size between 30 up 1,000 employees and their accounting
data to cover the same time horizon as the sample group (2002 to 2009). Furthermore, we exclude unconsolidated sister
statements (Amadeus consolidation code U2) as well as duplicates.
16We ask for the year when the successor became a leading member of the executive board.
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V. Data Analysis
A. Summary Statistics
We begin by presenting the summary statistics of the changes implemented across the
dimensions “economic contingency” and “human capital” in table 1.
It is most striking to observe the high general intensity of change during successions.17
Successions seem to unleash a great wave of corporate change, which underlines ties to
reorganization and restructuring research strands. One CEO in-depth interview partner
(18) remarked on this: “...the whole structure was in a sort of daily grind, ...now that
we were initiating changes and new approaches, ...it was like a wake-up call which went
through the enterprise.” In addition, table 1 offers a very clear and intuitive pattern: high
human capital successors implement significantly more changes than low human capital
successors (1.70, significant at the one percent level, column 7).18 It is remarkable that
all elements of the organizational structure are changed significantly more often by high
human capital successors as compared to low human capital successors. Enterprises in
the turnaround category experience the highest amount of total change, followed by the
categories low relative profit margin and industry downturn, whereas the lowest change
intensity can be found under normal conditions (columns 1 to 4). In general, the evidence
of table 1 supports the ideas advanced in propositions 1 and 2.
Within the normal category we also observe a relatively high percentage of product
innovation (39.4%) and improvement in the production methods (54.1%). This may
be explained by the circumstance that these enterprises can concentrate resources on
innovation and research & development due to their relative strength. In addition, we
find that in normal succession cases, companies successfully tried to push into national
and international markets and reduced the importance of regional markets.
Interestingly, in successions in the industry downturn category, we measure the low-
est rate of dismissals of execute directors (20.9%). This may be explained by the fact
that an industry downturn is not something the management can be blamed for. Fur-
thermore, attempts to strategically evade a shrinking general demand in the downturn
become visible: CEO successors try hardest, compared with the other categories, to find
new customers (92.5%) and also have the highest rate of product portfolio diversification
(additional products: 66.7%). This goes along with an eleven percentage points higher
rate of change within marketing and sales as compared with normal successions. In ad-
dition and compared with normal successions, higher rates of operative and efficiency-
related changes occur in the industry downturn category, possibly in a push to become
more efficient in the face of a declining and embattled market. Arguably, this explains
and is mirrored in the higher rates of change compared to normal successions in the cat-
egories working time policy (9.0 percentage points higher), compensation scheme (6.7
percentage points higher), production (5.0 percentage points higher), and new suppliers
(9.1 percentage points higher).
17This is inline with observations by Miller (1993).
18Product innovation is not included in the total change score due to low observations.
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TABLE 1—ECONOMIC CONTINGENCY, HUMAN CAPITAL AND IMPLEMENTED CHANGES
Economic contingencies Human Diff.
Low rel. Industry Turn- capital LHC -
Variable Normal PM downturn around LHC HHC HHC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total change 8.4 9.7 9.2 10.6 7.41 9.11 -1.70***
A. Labor organization (%)
New executive directors 50.2 69.5 49.2 56.9 44.4 53.2 -8.8**
Dropped executive directors 26.0 40.7 20.9 43.2 20.0 28.0 -8.0***
Flattened hierarchy 27.6 42.4 30.3 27.3 23.9 32.1 -8.2**
Steepened hierarchy 12.5 6.8 13.6 13.6 12.7 14.1 -1.4
Working time policy 29.8 45.8 38.8 45.5 28.1 39.7 -11.7***
Compensation scheme 33.6 35.6 40.3 43.2 26.4 41.3 -14.9***
B. Organizational structure (%)
Purchasing 50.0 52.5 50.7 70.5 42.0 53.1 -11.1***
Production 51.1 60.3 56.1 67.4 43.8 50.5 -6.6**
Marketing and sales 65.1 78.0 76.1 81.8 57.6 71.2 -13.5***
Personnel 51.5 64.4 55.2 55.3 44.0 55.6 -11.6***
Corporate finance & controlling 57.0 61.0 58.2 63.6 48.9 57.5 -8.7**
C. Products and innovations (%)
Product innovation 39.4 50.0 20.5 33.3 40.0 41.0 -1.0
Additional products 56.2 64.4 66.7 61.4 57.3 60.5 -3.2
Additional methods of production 54.1 50.8 55.2 61.4 47.7 53.1 -5.4
Sorting out of products (moderate) 30.5 29.3 28.4 43.2 23.6 35.0 -11.4***
Sorting out of products (heavy) 3.0 6.9 1.5 6.8 1.4 4.0 -2.6**
D. Business relations (%)
New customers 83.8 84.5 92.5 88.4 81.5 87.4 -5.9**
Loss of old customers 24.4 25.4 26.9 20.5 20.2 27.6 -7.4**
New suppliers 53.6 54.2 62.7 65.9 49.9 58.5 -8.7**
Dismissal of old suppliers 36.1 42.4 40.3 52.3 27.4 39.5 -12.1***
New bank relations 16.2 15.2 16.4 22.7 13.8 17.7 -3.9
New financiers 18.3 28.8 25.4 25.0 12.4 20.4 -8.0***
E. Geographical activity (%)
1 Regional markets -3.8 0.0 -3.0 -6.8 -2.0 -3.5 1.5
1 National markets 3.8 -1.7 7.5 2.3 2.9 2.6 0.2
1 International markets 6.8 6.8 3.0 13.6 2.9 7.9 -5.1***
Note: The table presents changes implemented between the succession year and the year 2009. Successions are catego-
rized into Normal, for successions in healthy enterprises which do not fall into the categories low relative profit margin
(PM), industry downturn or turnaround in the succession year; Low rel. PM, for successions in companies which earn
lower profit margins compared to their industry peers in the succession year; Industry downturn, for successions in en-
terprises which experience an industry downturn (low profit margins across the industry) and which do not earn more
than five percent profit margin in the succession year; and Turnaround, for successions in companies which face both low
relative profit margin and an industry downturn or which earn less than 0.5% profit margin in the succession year. Fur-
thermore, successors are distinguished by high human capital (HHC), or low human capital (LHC) otherwise, depending
on the successor’s score on a human capital proxy (HCS) including (1) age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership expe-
rience, (4) merchant education, and (5) professionalism. Interviewees were asked to indicate post-succession changes of
their enterprise in each of the subcategories from A to D. Each of the change indicator variables records 1 if a change is
indicated during the interview and 0 otherwise. The geographical activity of the enterprise in the year of the succession
and in 2009 is recorded in the interview. Category E presents the change in activity per geographical subcategory. The
stars display statistical significance of differences at the * ten percent, ** five percent, and *** one percent level.
CHAPTER 4: RESTRUCTURING, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE 137
In contrast to the low dismissal rates in the industry downturn category, the low relative
profit margin category is accompanied by high executive staff dismissal rates (40.7%)
and the highest rate of additional appointments of executive staff (69.5%). Arguably, this
is because low relative profit margins are highly likely to stem from internal deficits of
operative or strategic nature for which the management may be held responsible. Within
the low relative profit margin category we also argue to observe stronger strategic re-
configurations, which we believe are mirrored in the highest observed rate of product
innovation (50.0%), a 12.9 percentage points higher change intensity of in the marketing
and sales function and an 8.2 percentage point higher rate of product portfolio diversi-
fication as compared with normal successions, whilst the complete product portfolio is
subject to critical assessment (heavy sorting out of products in 6.9% of the cases). We
also find a stronger commitment to close possible gaps in operative efficiency within the
low relative profit margin category, which is reflected in a higher intensity of changes in
the areas of production (8.9 percentage points higher), personnel (12.9 percentage points
higher), working time policy (16 percentage points higher) and dismissal of old suppliers
(6.3 percentage points higher) as compared to the normal category.
It is not really surprising that the turnaround category entails the highest rate of dis-
missal of executives (43.2%). Major attempts to reconfigure the organization and to
push for organizational efficiency become visible and are mirrored in the highest rates of
change indications, compared to all other categories, in compensation scheme (43.2%),
production (67.4%), corporate finance & controlling (63.6%), purchasing (70.5%), new
suppliers (65.9%), and a dismissal of old suppliers (52.3%). Furthermore, the product
portfolio is often subject to a thorough review (moderate/heavy sorting out of products
indicated in 43.2% / 6.8% of the turnaround successions), while product innovation is
often pursued in a more conservative way as compared to normal successions (6.1 per-
centage points less often). Actions to stabilize revenues are evident: 81.8% of the sur-
viving turnaround companies indicate changes within marketing and sales, which is 16.7
percentage points more compared with normal successions. At the same time, 88.4% of
the surviving turnaround companies indicate having gained new customers and in only
20.5% of the cases losses of old customers, which is the lowest rate across the “economic
contingency” dimension.19
Table 2 offers an overview using two basic differential performance indicators which
are profit margin and number of employees. Profit margin (PM) is a straightforward
measure of operational efficiency and can serve as an intuitive benchmark for company
performance. The differential performance is measured between the succession year and
the year 2009. Although the measure is a simple difference, it entails the advantage that
it automatically cancels out time-invariant firm characteristics which might drive firm
performance. As the PM values might be subject to industry trends, we introduce indus-
try adjustments. We also take into account the influence of potential mean reversion due
to transitory accounting components, but also the influence of performance trends due to
pre-succession performance by introducing performance adjustments using performance
19We also perform a factor analysis to visualize structures across the managerial changes. We present the results in
appendix A2.
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TABLE 2—HUMAN CAPITAL, ECONOMIC CONTINGENCY AND DIFFERENTIAL PERFORMANCE
Economic contingency Human capital 1
Low rel. Industry Turn- LHC HHC LHC-
Variable All Normal PM downturn around successor successor HHC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PM (succession year) 6.12 9.12 1.84 3.15 0.02 7.55 5.17 2.39***
1 PM 0.21 -0.69 1.28 0.69 2.90 -0.74 0.84 -1.58***
(0.25) (0.37) (0.48) (0.30) (0.76) (0.44) (0.29) (0.53)
1 Industry-adjusted PM 0.39 -0.28 2.13 0.11 2.36 -0.66 1.09 -1.75***
(0.25) (0.38) (0.51) (0.33) (0.55) (0.42) (0.30) (0.52)
1 Ind.- and performance- 1.54 1.86 1.21 0.98 1.08 0.96 1.92 -0.96**
adjusted PM (0.23) (0.35) (0.52) (0.31) (0.53) (0.36) (0.29) (0.47)
1 Employees (%) 20.7 17.5 16.4 25.9 9.0 15.1 24.9 -9.8*
(3.27) (3.77) (5.42) (5.63) (3.58) (1.75) (5.62) (5.88)
1 Industry-adjusted 36.7 33.9 19.0 45.0 21.4 31.1 41.0 -9.9
employees (%) (3.42) (4.05) (5.27) (6.26) (4.34) (2.09) (5.85) (6.21)
Note: The table presents the mean performance development between the succession year and the year 2009. Successions
are categorized into: Normal, for successions in healthy enterprises which do not fall into the categories low rel. profit
margin, industry downturn or turnaround in the succession year; Low rel. PM, for successions in companies which have
a lower profit margin (PM) compared to their industry peers in the succession year; Industry downturn, for successions
in enterprises which experience an industry downturn (low profit margin across the industry) and which do not earn more
than five percent profit margin in the succession year; and Turnaround, for successions in companies which face both low
relative profit margin and an industry downturn or which earn less than 0.5% profit margin in the succession year. The
human capital of successors is distinguished by Low human capital (LHC) and High human capital (HHC) depending on
the successors’ score on a human capital proxy score including (1) age, (2) industry experience, (3) leadership experience,
(4) merchant education, and (5) professionalism. The performance indicators presented are calculated via: (a) profit
margin (PM): earnings before taxes divided by operating revenue, (b) industry-adjusted variables: the subtraction of the
control group median of the respective variable in the according year and industry (two-digit ISIC) from the sample
variable, (c) industry- and performance-adjusted variables: industry-adjusted variables less the median industry-adjusted
variable of the relevant performance control group, (d) number of employees: the growth of the firm’s employees in
percent. Control groups for performance are designed by sorting the industry-adjusted values of the variables of control
group enterprises (drawn from the Amadeus database) into deciles and matching the industry-adjusted values of the
variable in the sample with the accordant Amadeus decile in the year of the succession. The median of the relevant
variable in the respective decile and year is then employed as a control. The stars display (Welch-Satterthwaite test)
significances at: * ten percent, ** five percent and *** one percent. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
peer groups (Barber and Lyon, 1996).20
20PM is calculated by dividing earnings before taxes (Amadeus item 33) by operating revenue (Amadeus item 24)
and a multiplication by 100. PM relies on accruals of the same accounting period, which might be seen as an advantage
compared to employing return on assets (ROA) instead. Assets might go into the ROA indicator at historic costs, while
the earnings before taxes is measured in current dollars. ROA is subject to idle or recently acquired assets, while the
downside of profit margin or return on sales is that it does not measure the efficiency of the assets (Barber and Lyon, 1996).
Furthermore, PM and number of employees are accounting-based indicators and thus mainly mirror past, but not future,
performance. The literature points out that accounting values might be influenced by over- and understatement (Barber
and Lyon, 1996). Therefore, a combination of market-based data, for example market-to-book ratios, and accounting-
based data might be vital (for examples, see Villalonga and Amit, 2006, and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006). Ideally, one would
create a difference over a three year average before and after a succession. However, in this study these approaches are
unavailable with the data at hand because many small and medium sized enterprises are not publicly traded. The industry-
adjusted values are calculated by subtraction of the median PM of the accordant year and industry (at the two-digit ISIC
code level) of a control group of 187,388 company-year observations taken from Amadeus. All industry categories in the
control group are required to include at least five observations per year and industry (at the two-digit ISIC code level).
We use two-digit industry controls because Richard N. Clarke (1989) shows that the difference between two-digit and
four-digit SIC controls is marginal. In addition, we try to eliminate the influence of extremes and outliers by winsorizing
the unadjusted PM values at the 0.025 level. We design the peer groups for the performance adjustments by dividing the
industry-adjusted values of the control group (the Amadeus database enterprises) into deciles for each accounting period.
By matching the industry-adjusted variable (e.g. PM) of each sample firm with the accordant Amadeus decile in the year
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To begin with, we only have limited performance observations which reduces the pos-
sibilities of performance analyses within the economic contingency dimension. We count
235 enterprises in the normal category, 59 with low relative profit margin, 67 in the
industry downturn category, and 44 turnaround enterprises. We find that the average
succession case in our sample achieves a profit margin of 6.12% in the succession year.
Performance in the succession year decreases as intended along the categories normal
(9.12%), industry downturn (3.15%), low relative profit margin (1.84%), and turnaround
(0.02%). We draw attention to the fact that these numbers are subject to a survivorship
bias, because we do not include companies which went out of business. When comparing
low human capital (LHC) and high human capital (HHC) successors, it is not surprising
to observe that on average high human capital successors accept slightly less profitable
enterprises (mean PM of 5.17% in the succession year). Enterprises with a lower per-
formance tend also to be more difficult and challenging to manage, and might thus be
avoided by low human capital successors who on average bought or inherited enterprises
with an PM of 7.55% in the succession year. After controlling for performance and
industry trends as well as time-invariant firm effects, we find that HHC successors per-
formed significantly better with respect to the profit margin development as compared to
LHC successors (difference-in-differences is 0.96 percentage points profit margin). Fur-
thermore, it is interesting to see that the surviving companies in the turnaround category
(column 5) manage the restructuring without reductions in the overall workforce. We
even measure an average increase of 9.0% in workforce. This hints that the small and
medium-sized companies observed seem to value responsible restructuring techniques
(Cascio, 2005) and try to protect their workforce from layoffs, possibly because their
workforce constitutes an investment and vital asset for them which is more difficult to
replace as compared to large enterprises. However, from our data we cannot see possible
shifts from permanent workforce towards a more flexible and contract based workforce.21
B. Proposition Testing
We begin by testing propositions 1 and 2 using a simple ordinary least squares regres-
sion with Huber-White robust standard errors and with the sum of the reported manage-
ment actions as the dependent variable. Results are presented in table 3.
High human capital successors carry into effect significantly more changes as com-
pared to successors with low human capital (column 1 of table 3). In addition, the sum
of the changes is related to the economic contingency in the manner that was postulated
by proposition 2. Turnaround successions spark significantly more change as compared
to normal successions. In the reading of table 3 it is interesting to note the external CEO
seems to spark significantly more change as compared to non-external CEOs, which
of the succession, the relevant control group is identified for each enterprise. The median value of the relevant control
group and year is then used as a control for the performance observations of the sample group.
21In addition we find that the enterprises of HHC successors also experience a 9.8 percentage points higher increase in
workforce (significant at the 10% level) as compared to LHC successors (column 8 of table 6). However, the significance
of the difference-in-differences in workforce vanishes when introducing industry adjustments. This is not astonishing at
a second glance, as one might expect that HHC successors might be expected to be potentially capable of deploying their
existing workforce more efficiently, which may lead to a lower demand for workforce in HHC successor-led companies.
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TABLE 3—OLS REGRESSIONS - OVERALL CHANGE
Dependent variable: sum of reported changes
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Variables of interest
High human capital (HHC) 1.64*** 1.59*** 1.56*** 1.37***
(0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
External CEO 1.51*** 0.94* 0.93** 1.14**
(0.50) (0.52) (0.51) (0.50)
Industry downturn 0.45 - - -
(0.59) - - -
Low rel. PM 1.09* - - -
(0.64) - - -
Turnaround 2.05*** - 1.29** 1.39***
(0.55) - (0.52) (0.52)
Male successor 1.71** 1.71** 1.73** -
(0.67) (0.67) (0.67) -
B. Control variables
Industry- and performance- 0.38*** 0.38*** - 0.37*** 0.35*** - -
adjusted PM (0.11) (0.11) - (0.11) (0.11) - -
Industry-adjusted PM -0.12*** -0.13*** - -0.13*** -0.10** - -
(0.04) (0.04) - (0.04) (0.04) - -
Default probability -0.30 -0.27 -0.28 -0.30 -0.33* -0.34* -0.31*
(0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Further controls
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Construction (industry) -0.87 -1.06* -1.04* -0.89 -0.79 -0.87 -0.97*
(0.57) (0.58) (0.59) (0.60) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
Further industry controls
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Years since succession 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.25** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.25**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Observations 350 350 353 339 339 341 353
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.12
Note: The dependent variable is the sum of the reported management actions in the post-successions period. Independent
variables are: High human capital (HHC) indicates if the successor’s human capital score (derived from the proxies
age, industry experience, leadership experience, merchant education, and professionalism) is greater or equal than the
median score; External CEO is an indicator for successors without previous ties to the enterprise; Low relative PM,
for successions in companies which earn lower profit margins compared to their industry peers in the succession year;
Industry downturn, for successions in enterprises which experience an industry downturn (low profit margins across the
industry) in the succession year; Turnaround, for successions in companies which face both low relative profit margin
and an industry downturn or which earn less than 0.5% profit margin in the succession year; and Male successor indicates
one if the successor is male. Controls include: Industry- and performance-adjusted PM (momentum) is the industry-
adjusted profit margin (PM) in the succession year less the median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control group;
Industry-adjusted PM (momentum) is PM in the succession year less the median PM of the according year and industry
of a control group. Industry-adjusted PM values are calculated by the subtraction of a control group median (drawn from
the Amadeus database) of the accordant year and industry (two-digit ISIC) from the sample variable. Control groups for
performance are designed by sorting the industry-adjusted values of the Amadeus database enterprises (control group)
into deciles and matching the industry-adjusted PM values of the sample group with the according control group decile
in the year of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control group decile and year then serves
as a control; Default probability is based on the Creditreform solvency index score of the enterprise in the year of the
succession; Ln sales (size) is the natural logarithm of operating revenue in the year of the succession; Ownership is
an indicator equal to one if the successor owned a share of the enterprise in the succession year; Predecessor active
(shareholder & executive) is an indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor still holds shares of the enterprise and
remains operatively active in a leading position; Unplanned successions is an indicator for unplanned successions due to
heavy disease or death of the predecessor; Construction (industry) and the further industry indicator variables are equal
to one if the respective category according to the ZEW industry classification (see appendix) is met; and Years since
succession reports time elapsed in years since the succession. All values are displayed in 07/2009 euros. The stars within
the table display significances at the * ten percent, ** five percent, and *** one percent level. The values in parentheses
display Huber-White robust standard errors.
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supports a finding discussed by Ahrens et al. (2012), while there also seems to be a
gender component: Male successors introduce significantly more changes as compared
to female successors. These results are robust to the inclusion of an array of company,
industry and time controls. Moreover, as columns 5 to 7 show, these effects are to a great
degree independent from each other. Propositions 1 and 2 are supported in a remarkable
way by the evidence visualized in table 3 and we conclude that we cannot reject them on
the basis of our results.
As a next step, we investigate the performance impact of this change (proposition 3)
employing a Huber-White robust ordinary least squares regression. In detail our model
reads as follows:
(1) Y = αi + δci + X iβ + εi Ordinary least squares model (table 4)
Here, Y denotes differential industry-adjusted PM (for columns 1 to 3) or differential
industry- and performance-adjusted PM (for columns 4 to 6), αi is the intercept, δ is the
coefficient of interest (in this case of the variable sum of the changes), X i is an array
of controls with a vector of coefficients β, and εi denotes the error term. In line with
the recent literature on firm performance and successions we include controls for typi-
cal firm characteristics (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, Pe´rez-Gonza´lez, 2006, and Ahrens
et al., 2012, who use a similar model). In detail, our controls include size (operative
revenue) in the succession year, momentum (e.g. industry-adjusted and industry- and
performance-adjusted profit margin in the succession year), ownership structure in the
succession year, default probability in the succession year, and year controls. In addi-
tion, we include further controls to address the effect of family successors, investment
delays and unexpected financing requirements, and the activity of the predecessor for
possible effects of the predecessor’s tacit knowledge (Berman et al., 2002) to increase
the robustness of our results. Furthermore, we exclude four observations (∼1.25%) due
to extreme values when inspecting studentized residuals, Cook’s D, DFITS and leverage
to residuals squared plots. The results are visualized in table 4.
Robust to the inclusion of various controls, the natural logarithm of the cumulative
change has a positive and significant impact on post-succession enterprise performance
(coefficient 0.93, significant at the five percent level; 1.16 for industry-adjusted), which is
observable in columns 1 and 4 of table 4. This result is indicative that in many succession
cases a potential for improvement has accumulated and that, once it is salvaged by post-
succession management changes, it unleashes additional enterprise performance. Fur-
thermore, the logarithmic form of the relationship already hints at decreasing marginal
returns from additional changes, as the additional performance potential becomes in-
creasingly salvaged. What this translates into on the operative level, becomes clear when
we cite some of the in-depth CEO successor interviewees, for example (1): “... since last
year, we have not even had a sales and operation plan”; (4): “If you ask me, what was
missing in the company was controlling.”; (10): “... a lot had settled around it, we had
75 employees, but we figured out that we could do the same job with 50”; “We used to
have three tax and accounting consultancies, one for our assets and the wage payments,
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TABLE 4—OLS REGRESSIONS - HUMAN CAPITAL, CHANGES AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE
Dependent variable: differential adjusted profit margin (PM)
Ind.-adj.1PM Ind.& perf.-adj.1PM
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln changes 1.16*** - 1.44** 0.93** - 1.14*
(0.42) - (0.61) (0.42) - (0.61)
High human - 1.17*** 3.10* - 1.15*** 2.78
capital (HHC) - (0.43) (1.69) - (0.44) (1.73)
Ln changes * - - -0.97 - - -0.82
HHC - - (0.77) - - (0.78)
Industry- and performance- - - - -0.31** -0.27* -0.32**
adjusted PM - - - (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Industry-adjusted PM -0.30*** -0.27*** -0.28*** 0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Family-, company-,
industry- and time-controls
√ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 290 309 290 290 309 290
R-squared 0.2285 0.2224 0.2452 0.0448 0.0508 0.0642
Note: The dependent variables are the difference in industry-adjusted profit margin (PM) in columns 1 to 3 and dif-
ference in industry- and performance-adjusted PM in columns 4 to 6. The differences are calculated via: industry-
(and performance-) adjusted PM of the year 2009 less industry- (and performance-) adjusted PM of the succession year.
Industry-adjusted PM values are calculated by the subtraction of a control group median (drawn from the Amadeus
database) of the accordant year and industry (two-digit ISIC) from the sample variable. Control groups for performance
are designed by sorting the industry-adjusted values of the Amadeus database enterprises (control group) into deciles
and matching the industry-adjusted PM values of the sample group with the according control group decile in the year
of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control group decile and year then serves as a con-
trol. The variables of interest include: Ln changes, is the natural logarithm of the sum of observed changes during the
succession; and High human capital (HHC) indicates if the successor’s human capital score (derived from the proxies
age, industry experience, leadership experience, merchant education, and professionalism) is greater or equal than the
median score. Controls are: Ln sales (size) is the natural logarithm of operating revenue in the year of the succession;
Industry- and performance-adjusted PM (momentum) is the industry-adjusted PM in the succession year less the median
industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control group; Industry-adjusted PM (momentum) is PM in the succession year less
the median PM of the according year and industry of a control group; Ownership is an indicator equal to one if the suc-
cessor owned a share of the enterprise in the succession year; Default probability is based on the Creditreform solvency
index score of the enterprise in the year of the succession; Family CEO indicates if a successor is related by marriage or
blood to at least one of the three persons owning more than 50% of the enterprise; Financing requirements is an indicator
variable equal to one if severe unexpected financing requirements were encountered during the succession; Investment
delay is an indicator variable equal to one if an investment delay is observed; Predecessor active (shareholder & exec-
utive) is an indicator variable equal to one if the predecessor still holds shares of the enterprise and remains operatively
active in a leading position; and Years is the number of years since the succession until 2009. Interaction terms between
variables are displayed as variable I * variable II. The stars within the table display significances at the * ten percent, **
five percent, and *** one percent level. The values in parentheses display Huber-White robust standard errors.
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the next for the taxes and the third for public accounting. And still we factorized our
bills while the payroll accounting was calculated by hand.”; “...the internal organization
was really 30 to 40 years old, and it was about time to overhaul it.”; (13): “...the goods
received were booked by the incoming goods department by hand, every day hundreds
of book entries... . We have completely new logistic systems. That had an immense
impact.”; and (16): “...we experienced some skidding,... because we were clinging to
long to formerly successful structures, but whose success was individual-related.” Over-
all, this is strong evidence in favor of proposition 3 and we conclude that proposition 3
should not be rejected on the basis of these results.
Furthermore, table 4 shows that HHC successors generate a 1.15 percentage points
higher industry- and performance-adjusted post-succession profit margin (significant at
the one percent level, column 5 of table 4) as compared to LHC successors, which under-
lines results observed by Ahrens et al. (2012). This indicates that HHC successors are
potentially better at seeing and executing the potential for improvements and highlights
the crucial role of CEO human capital for enterprise performance in successions. Ar-
guably, management actions can be interpreted as human capital “put into practice”. In
this respect it seems that there is a performance impact of managerial actions during suc-
cessions. The idea that the management’s actions might be a ritual of symbolic meaning
which entails no effect on firm performance (Gamson and Scotch, 1964, Pfeffer, 1981,
and Meindl and Ehrlich, 1987) seems not to fit in this setting. However, there seem to be
more benefits from CEO human capital to enterprise performance than just the manage-
ment actions we track, as can be seen in column 3 of table 4 where both the coefficient
of the changes (1.44) and the coefficient of the high human capital indicator (3.10) are
positive and significant.
In the reading of table 4 it is interesting to observe that the coefficient of the inter-
action term between the natural logarithm of the sum of the changes implemented and
high human capital is insignificantly negative. The finding is difficult to interpret, as
the coefficient of high human capital jumps from 1.17 (column 2) to 3.10 (column 3)
when including the interaction term. However, from this finding we suspect that HHC
successors also tackle changes which are more difficult to implement, and furthermore,
as HHC successors also implement more changes (which might suffer from decreasing
marginal returns), that there seems to be a “speed-limit” for the amount of organizational
change an organization can absorb without jeopardizing enterprise performance. One
of the CEO successors (18) of the in-depth interviews noted on this: “I said to myself:
“Man, a change here should really go faster!” But there are certain operations whose
size you have to obey or which simply take their time.”
With the results of the tables 3 and 4 in mind, one question, which is perhaps most
relevant for practitioners, is which management changes are winners with respect to
enterprise performance. Or put differently, in terms of a search for best practice, is there
something we can learn from the performance impact of the individual management
actions? In order to investigate this question, we track abnormal differential performance
due to execution of a specific managerial action using the same regression model as in
table 4, besides the variable of interest now being the respective managerial action. Due
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to the great amount of changes, we restrict the presentation to significant results, which
are shown in table 5.
TABLE 5—OLS REGRESSIONS - PERFORMANCE IMPACT OF CHANGES
Dependent variable: 1 Ind.& perf.-adj. PM
Full sample Long-run Family=1 Interactions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Compensation scheme 0.82* 0.81* 0.97 1.26* 0.15 - -
(0.46) (0.47) (0.63) (0.68) (0.50) - -
Moderate sorting 1.23** - - - 0.44 -1.60 -
(0.50) - - - (0.60) (1.03) -
Sorting out of products - 2.59** 3.48** 3.60** - - -
- (1.01) (1.46) (1.53) - - -
Sorting out of products2 - -1.38** -1.77* -1.82** - - -
- (0.57) (0.89) (0.87) - - -
Dismissal of 0.92** 0.93** 1.54** 0.39 - - -1.33
old suppliers (0.45) (0.46) (0.69) (0.73) - - (1.15)
Internationalization -1.70** -1.72** -2.02* -2.73*** - - -
(0.73) (0.74) (1.03) (0.83) - - -
New customers - -0.01 -0.11
- (0.65) (0.69)
Moderate storing* 2.03** - -
comp. scheme (1.00) - -
New customers* - 3.40*** -
moderate sorting - (1.16) -
New customers* - - 2.92**
dism. of old suppliers - - (1.26)
Controls
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Years since succession
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Observations 305 305 146 164 307 305 305
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08
Note: The dependent variable is the difference in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (PM). The differences
are calculated via: industry- (and performance-) adjusted PM of the year 2009 less industry- (and performance-) adjusted
PM of the succession year. Industry-adjusted PM values are calculated by the subtraction of a control group median
(drawn from the Amadeus database) of the accordant year and industry (two-digit ISIC) from the sample variable. Control
groups for performance are designed by sorting the industry-adjusted values of the Amadeus database enterprises (control
group) into deciles and matching the industry-adjusted PM values of the sample group with the according control group
decile in the year of the succession. The median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant control group decile and year then
serves as a control. The variables of interest are [Management action indicators] (for example Compensation scheme)
which are equal to one if a change was indicated in the accordant action category. Control variables include: Ln sales
(size) is the natural logarithm of operating revenue in the year of the succession; Industry- and performance-adjusted
PM (momentum) is the industry-adjusted PM in the succession year less the median industry-adjusted PM of the relevant
control group; Industry-adjusted PM (momentum) is PM in the succession year less the median PM of the according year
and industry of a control group; Ownership is an indicator equal to one if the successor owned a share of the enterprise
in the succession year; Default probability is based on the Creditreform solvency index score of the enterprise in the
year of the succession; Family indicates if a successor is related by marriage or blood to at least one of the three persons
owning more than 50% of the enterprise; Financing requirements is an indicator variable equal to one if severe unexpected
financing requirements were encountered during the succession; Investment delay is an indicator variable equal to one
if an investment delay is observed; Predecessor active (shareholder & executive) is an indicator variable equal to one if
the predecessor still holds shares of the enterprise and remains operatively active in a leading position; and Years since
succession reports the time in years since the succession. Long-run refers to successions which took place between
2002 and 2005. Interaction terms between variables are displayed as variable I * variable II. The stars within the table
display significances at the * ten percent, ** five percent, and *** one percent level. The values in parentheses display
Huber-White robust standard errors.
CHAPTER 4: RESTRUCTURING, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE 145
To start with, what seems to be most fruitful with respect to inducing abnormal per-
formance is a moderate review of the product portfolio. Enterprises in which a moderate
sorting out of products is indicated benefit from a 1.23 percentage point higher industry-
and performance-adjusted profit margin as compared to enterprises which do not per-
form this action (column 1 of table 5). Possibly an honest due diligence of a company’s
product portfolio during successions reveals pet products or products which are mainly
offered due to a company’s history rather than for performance reasons. In addition, a
positive impact on performance for enterprises which follow a selective product or mar-
ket pruning strategy and refocus on their strengths is in line with the restructuring litera-
ture (Hambrick and Schecter, 1983). However, a heavy sorting out of products is rather
indicative of severe difficulties and likely to break through the speed limit of organiza-
tional change, sparking organizational resistance and being very difficult to implement.
Therefore, we would expect a heavy sorting out of products to have a negative impact
on performance and the relationship of the intensity of product sorting out and enterprise
performance to be described by an inverted u-shape. Interestingly, this is exactly what
we observe in column 2 of table 5 as can be seen in the positive coefficient of sorting out
of products (2.59, significant at the five percent level) and the negative and significant
coefficient of sorting out of products squared (-1.38, significant at the five percent level).
In addition, reviewing relations with old suppliers seems to be a worthwhile idea with
respect to inducing abnormal performance in successions. A dismissal of old suppliers
seems to be related to a significant (at the five percent level) increase of 0.92 percentage
points in industry- and performance-adjusted profit margin (column 1 of table 5). More-
over, we find that a review of the existing compensation scheme is significantly positively
(0.82, significant at the ten percent level) related to abnormal enterprise performance in
successions. It is worth noting that for companies which have to manage a succession
process it seems definitely not the time to start to pursue internationalization projects
(coefficient -1.70, significant at the five percent level). As internationalization strategies
are risky and require profound market and industry knowledge, a relatively new succes-
sor may not yet be equipped for such ventures and is perhaps best advised to focus on
national and regional markets. The above effects are robust to the inclusion of various
controls and seem to be robust in nearly all cases when subjecting them to sub-samples
such as a long-run view or restricting the sample to family successions (column 3 and
4).22
We draw attention to the fact that the positive impact of the review of the product port-
folio and of previous supplier relations is amplified when the the new CEO successfully
gains access to new customer groups, as is indicated by the positive and highly significant
interaction terms new customers*moderate sorting (3.40, significant at the one percent
level) and new customers*dismissal old suppliers (2.92, significant at the five percent
level) in column 6 and 7 of table 5. Besides the large amount of change, this highlights
the vital and important aspect of keeping and acquiring new customers in the aftermath
of CEO successions in family firms.
22Furthermore, it would be interesting to have the possibility to verify our findings using a separate data set on CEO
successions.
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In general, our findings give an indication of the average performance impact of man-
agerial actions in successions, such as a beneficial role for a review of the product portfo-
lio, the compensation scheme and old supplier relations. At the same time, we would like
to emphasize that these findings should not be confused with rules. There are no “cook-
ing recipes” or “blueprint solutions” available with regard to the managerial actions: a
thorough understanding of the company’s specific situation is vital for identifying the
appropriate changes.
VI. Conclusion
Our results provide evidence that in many family firms (companies with concentrated
ownership control), which experience a CEO succession, a potential for vital corporate
amendments has accumulated which is unleashed by intensive post-succession corporate
change. The overall impact of this change on enterprise performance was found to be
positive and significant, even after controlling for industry and performance trends and
including an array of common company controls.
In line with this evidence, the crucial role of the CEO successor’s human capital for
post-succession enterprise performance becomes visible. We find that successors with
high human capital are capable of detecting and initiating significantly more corporate
change and achieve a 1.15 percentage points higher industry- and performance-adjusted
profit margin in the post succession period when compared with successors with low
human capital. These findings are robust to the inclusion of an array of controls. Fur-
thermore, we observe that the total amount of change is subject to the origin of the
successor and is influenced by the economic contingency in which the succession oc-
curs. The lowest total change is found in normal successions followed by successions
during an industry downturn and successions in the low relative profit margin category.
The highest amount of change is observable in the turnaround category.
We also present a performance analysis regarding the impact of individual manage-
ment actions. We find that a moderate review of the existing product portfolio seems
to lead to a significant increase in differential industry- and performance-adjusted profit
margin (plus 1.23 percentage points, significant at the five percent level and robust to the
inclusion of various controls). In addition, a review of the compensation scheme (0.82,
significant at the ten percent level) and a review of the existing suppliers (0.92, signif-
icant at the five percent level) seem to drive abnormal post-succession performance. In
addition, we observe that some of these effects amplify if the successors successfully
acquires new customer groups. Interestingly, internationalization strategies during suc-
cessions are observed to occur along with significantly reduced (-1.70, at the five percent
level) abnormal enterprise performance.
We emphasize that these general findings should not be confused with “blueprint rules”
and highlight the role of understanding the individual company’s situation before initi-
ating change. When following a predecessor’s footsteps, the new CEO not only inherits
a formal position, but also finds a current internal and external equilibrium of organiza-
tional rules, norms, power structures and procedures, which are, in the abstract, nothing
other than the result of the organization’s past experiences and behavior. The question
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is this: are the reasons for these organizational forms still extant, and if not, are there
better forms achievable within the limits of reasonable effort? The new CEO often has
to combine the organization’s past experience with new, possibly external, insights to
unleash the additional performance potential of his company. This approach is perhaps
best explained with an example: In 1911 Roald Amundsen and Robert Scott started ri-
val expeditions in a race to be the first explorer and pioneer to reach the Antarctic South
Pole. As a seasoned polar veteran, Amundsen made a huge effort in his native Norway to
plan his journey and continued to subject his equipment to rigorous scrutiny and refine-
ment during the time in his winter base camp in Antarctica’s Bay of Whales. Amundsen
employed old knowledge and experiences, exemplia gratia employing traditional Nordic
skiing and Eskimo Husky dog-sledge techniques, harnessing the sledges to Huskies used
to the vicious conditions, crafting and adapting Eskimo clothing made of thick leather
and fur capable of withstanding the lowest temperatures, and combining this knowledge
with modern, contemporary equipment, such as the 1892 invention of the Primus stove,
which was the first pressurized-burner kerosene (paraffin) stove and which had a reputa-
tion of being reliable under adverse conditions.
The British Antarctic expedition under the command of Captain Scott was equipped
with very modern motor sledges and ponies, and relied techniques which were formerly
employed by the British navy. This gallant British company of scientists, explorers and
adventurers had high morale, grit, valor and courage. When their motor sledges and
ponies failed, Scott and his men pulled the sledge themselves on their frostbitten journey
of more than 800 miles. Fighting for every mile, Scott and his company reached the pole,
but perished tragically in the unforgiving winter only a few miles away from the safety
of their base camp. In contrast, Amundsen’s team reached the pole, had no casualties
and after being en route for 99 days en route returned safely to their base camp.23
In this vein, our advice to CEO successors when searching for the “right” changes is:
adopt the techniques of the Amundsen approach, but in the spirit and the manner of the
Scott approach.
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APPENDIX
A1. Further Sample Selection Information
The second filter is designed to find enterprises where a succession event was likely to
have occurred. The filter required the following arguments to be true between the years
2002 and 2008:
1) a leading member of the executive board resigned, or
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2) a new leading member of the executive board was appointed, or
3) a previous owner reduced his share, or
4) a new or previous owner (a natural person) increased his share, and
5) one of the previous owners and leading members of the executive board was at
least 55 or older.
The age requirement increases the likelihood to observe normal successions caused
by old age. The natural person requirement ensures that the observed companies keep
the “concentrated ownership control” (family firm) attribute, which excludes takeovers
by other enterprises (legal entities) from the sample. We draw attention to the fact that
we do not observe enterprises which went out of business during a succession. This
creates a survivorship bias and thus we emphasize that any results reached are of re-
duced holistic representativeness and limited to the selected sample. However, we be-
lieve that this bias is only a minor caveat with respect to this article’s research aims. In
addition to the second filter, the ISIC industry sections (International Standard Industry
Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3.1) of the United Nations) (A)
agriculture, hunting and forestry, (B) fishing, (C) mining, quarrying and (E) electric-
ity gas and water supply, (L) public administration and defense & compulsory social
security, (P) activities of households, (Q) extra-territorial organizations and bodies as
well as division (91) activities of membership organizations are excluded. Also, compa-
nies for which no telephone number is available in the MUP database are dropped (less
than one percent). The gross sample of 14,250 enterprises is contacted by the Center
for Evaluation and Methods (CEM) employing a standardized computer aided interview
(ZEW-Unternehmensbefragung “Generationenwechsel Mittelstand”, 2010).
A2. Additional Tables
The industry classification key for the industry aggregation employed is shown in ta-
ble A1. We categorize the successions using aggregations of the International Standard
Industry Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3.1) of the United Nations.
Table A2 shows the results of a factor analysis of the management actions. Employ-
ing an unrotated plain-vanilla version (estimates of the communality are computed using
squared multiple correlates), we find one factor with an Eigenvalue greater or equal to
1.0, which we name ORGRES as it seems to represent mostly internal organizational
restructuring. This factor seems to be more prominent with high human capital succes-
sors and in turnaround situations, mirroring our previous findings. Using the principal
component factor method and employing varimax or minimum entropy rotation (Jen-
nrich, 2004), we find a very stable pattern which includes 9 factors with an Eigenvalue
greater or equal to 1.0. These factors seem to represent: internal organization restructur-
ing, supply-restructuring, portfolio review, heavy portfolio review, management change,
hierarchy flattening, financial restructuring, national focus, and international focus.
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As can be observed in table A3, the prominence of the factors across the various dimen-
sions is highly heterogeneous, which is analyzed using ordinary least squared regressions
with Huber-White robust standard errors. In detail our model reads as follows:
(A1)
Y = αi + origin ci + economic contingency di + human capital fi + εi
Ordinary least squares model (table A3)
Here, Y denotes the respective factor, αi is the intercept, and the independent vari-
ables include the dimensions “origin”, “economic contingency” and “human capital”. εi
denotes the error term.
TABLE A1—INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION KEY
ISIC ISIC
Rev. 3.1 Rev. 3.1
ZEW industry key code industry description
(1) (2)
1. Manufacturing D Manufacturing
2. Construction F Construction
3. Business services K Real estate, renting and business activities
(without ISIC 70: real estate activities)
O Other community, social and personal service activities
(only ISIC 90: sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and
similar activities)
4. Consumer services H Hotels and restaurants
K Real estate, renting and business activities
(only ISIC 70: real estate activities)
M Education
N Health and social work
O Other community, social and personal service activities
(only ISIC 92: recreational, cultural and sporting activities
and ISIC 93: other service activities)
5. Wholesale & retail G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motor-
cycles and personal and household goods
6. Other I Transport, storage and communication
J Financial intermediation
Note: For each aggregated industry cluster the key in form of the ISIC Rev. 3.1 code (column 1) and its description
(column 2) is reported. The ISIC industry sections (A) agriculture, hunting and forestry, (B) fishing, (C) mining, quar-
rying and (E) electricity gas and water supply, (L) public administration and defense & compulsory social security, (P)
activities of households, (Q) extra-territorial organizations and bodies as well as division (91) activities of membership
organizations are not included. ISIC industry categories with no observations are not displayed.
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activity. Employing a microeconomic model, we argue abnormal un-
certainty and transactions costs reduce profitability and volume of en-
trepreneurial activity while companies complying with good practices
enjoy rewards in the optimal contracts. However, applied to an interna-
tional context, counterintuitive niche cases where imperfect institutions
enhance the wealth of nations occur, mirroring seemingly contrary find-
ings in the development literature. Policies and business strategies to
escape imperfect institutions are discussed, casting light on medieval
merchant guilds or township and village enterprises and arguing for a
holistic approach when introducing policies for institutional change.
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Commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and
with them, the liberty and security of individuals, [...]. This, though it has been the least
observed, is by far the most important of all their effects. (Adam Smith (1776), Book III,
Chapter IV, 3.4.4)
I. Introduction
This article explores the effects of imperfect institutions on entrepreneurial activity by
considering its microfoundations using a principal-agent framework. By “microfounda-
tions” we mean the underlying economic mechanics hidden below the surface of the ob-
served contracting behavior and profits of a market participant. “Imperfect institutions”
are characterised by inefficiency and an incomplete supply of Dixit’s (2009) “good gov-
ernance”: (1) security of property rights, (2) enforcement of contracts and (3) collective
action to remedy the effects of externalities.
Studying entrepreneurial activity under imperfect institutions is important because
markets tend to develop failures in the absence of sound institutional economic gover-
nance. Good governance and thus sound institutions are essential to Smithian capitalism
(Dixit, 2009).1 Moreover and adding to the confusion, the development literature offers
contrary findings on the role of imperfect institutions. There is some literature where im-
perfect institutions “sand” and others where they “grease” the wheels of growth.2 To
practitioners, these opposing observations give economists the flavour of ancient as-
tronomers, who had observed and predicted the night sky, but could not provide rea-
sonable explanations for their observations. However, billions of people and millions of
companies trade under imperfect institutions every day, a state which calls for advances
and further understanding in the field.
Applying results and a model of the principal-agent theory, this article offers an ap-
plied perspective arguing that possibly both views are right under certain contingencies
and discusses practical policy and management implications. Its results suggest that,
contingent on the assumptions introduced below, overall entrepreneurial activity is re-
duced by the various effects of an imperfect institutional design. It argues that com-
1Smith (1776) writes of the effect of secured property rights: “But men in [...] defenceless state naturally content
themselves with their necessary subsistence, because to acquire more might only tempt the injustice of their oppressors.
On the contrary, when they are secure of enjoying the fruits of their industry, they naturally exert it to better their
condition, and to acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniences and elegancies of life.” (Adam Smith (1776),
Wealth of Nations, Book III, Chapter III, 3.3.12). Whilst he writes on contracts and conflicting objective functions of two
parties: “What are the common wages of labour, depends, everywhere upon the contract [...] made between [...] two
parties, whose interest are not the same.” (Adam Smith (1776), Book I, Chapter VIII, 1.8.11). However, both property
and contracts are subject to institutions, as Hobbes (1651) notes: “If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties
performe presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of Warre of every man
against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd: But if there be a common Power set over them both, with
right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other
will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions,
without the feare of some coerceive Power; [...]” (Thomas Hobbes (1651), Leviathan, Chapter XIV).
2For some different positions, see Leff (1964), Lui (1985), and Me´on and Sekkat (2005). An overview is given by
Aidt (2009).
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panies complying with fair practices will gain partnership rents for not exploiting the
sub-optimal institutional set-up. Contingent on the specific parameterization, the results
of the employed principal-agent model also allow for counter-intuitive niche cases where
the wealth of a nation is enhanced by an imperfect institutional design.
For entrepreneurs, inefficient institutions are often associated with a costly hurdle,
thereby tempering entrepreneurial activity as a direct effect. But aside from this obvious
effect, for companies well acquainted with their underdeveloped local institutional set-
up, a leeway of opportunities to gain advantages through exploitative behavior unfolds.
This is particularly the case, when these companies are dealing with uninformed third
(foreign) companies. Examples of such exploitations include favouritism, bribery, minor
breaching of contractual agreements and moderate violations of property rights such as
patent right infringements, which are not punished by a domestic court of law. Accord-
ingly, this article explores the impact of scarcity of “sound economic governance” with
respect to the entrepreneurial activity and profits of the parties involved.
In this article entrepreneurial activity is modeled by a principal-agent model in order
to investigate a simple trade or venture between two entrepreneurs. In order to model
the government and market failures, this article applies a private values framework.3
The model developed is best suited to situations, where a non-informed entrepreneur
or company wishes to venture in a foreign or alien market and is obliged to establish
a venture (or to trade) with a specific local partner due to his lack of choice, lack of
information or even by force of authorities. With respect to these spatial contingencies,
the real world examples of such a setting include cases of western enterprises wishing
to venture in emerging economies, interregional trade in less developed (or developing)
economies and medieval economies operating under imperfect institutions.4 Clearly,
such a contracting situation occurs countless times in many economies each day and is
therefore also relevant from a macroeconomic perspective.
The perspective of this article is of applied and policy oriented nature and constitutes
an interdisciplinary synthesis. As far as the model is concerned, it builds on the work
of numerous researchers of the principal-agent and contract theory realm, especially the
fundamental and technical work of Akerlof (1970) and Laffont and Martimort (2002).
However, its applied perspective builds a bridge to findings and observations made by
scholars of the realms of institutional economics, entrepreneurship and development eco-
nomics literature, especially the work of Rodrik (2008) and Dixit (2009).
In section I the specific terminology and the model assumptions are introduced. Sec-
tion II discusses the model and derives its respective optima, while section III discusses
its implications for policy advisers and for strategic management in the light of develop-
ment, entrepreneurship and business policy literature. The conclusions of this article are
briefly summarized in section IV.
3A survey and treatment of similar classes of such theoretical problems is given by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).
For a technical exposition of the general principal-agent realm we refer to Laffont and Martimort (2002).
4The context of Greif’s (1993) Maghribi Traders’ Coalition is a good example.
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II. A Model of Entrepreneurial Activity under Imperfect Institutions
A. Terminology
The following classifications of institutions are derived for the purpose of this article
and to serve within the limits of this article. We believe that the distinctions allow us to
carve out the different economic effects more clearly.
To start with, this article’s notion of a sound institution is a “second-best institution”.
Note, that a second-best institution may still not be perfect, but as perfect as a policy
maker is currently able to design it. This embraces the idea that appropriate and sound
institutions may still diverge greatly from the ultimate best-practice economic gover-
nance. Indeed the economist’s first best state may be unattainable, since context-specific
market and government failures, especially in less developed and developing economies,
will always constrain the set of feasible institutional designs. Realizing this general prin-
ciple, Rodrik (2008) coined the term “second-best” institution.
Installing optimal second-best institutions is complex and various authors have con-
tributed research to this field. Dixit (2004) argues that self-enforcing governance ar-
rangements are often more efficient than formal institutions in less developed countries.
Laffont and Martimort (1999) highlight the benefits of institutional separation. Further-
more, the role of informal institutions replacing formal ones for entrepreneurship is em-
phasized by Tonoyan et al. (2010). Acemoglu et al. (2001) point out that institutions
for the security of property rights could, from a historical perspective, be the single most
important factor for the wealth of nations. Summarizing, Rodrik (2006) drives home
the point that there are no blueprints for optimal institutions, but that country specific
economic constraints should be taken into account.
Taking these ongoing discussions into account, we refrain from specifying the con-
structs (and variables) which constitute an optimal institutional set-up contingent on its
environment. We assume instead that a governance optimization has already been per-
formed by a sophisticated policy maker and refer to the result as a “second-best insti-
tution”. Furthermore, if an institution is not classifiable as “second-best institution”, it
is referred to as an “imperfect institution” within this article. In order to distinguish
within the principal-agent model between different economic effects of institutional im-
perfections, the class of imperfect institutions is further divided into two sub-categories:
“inefficient” and “inferior” institutions.
“Inefficient institutions” include institutions which are superfluously costly. For exam-
ple, an inefficient institution may be a bureaucratic process which imposes unnecessary
transaction costs on its customers (e.g. an entrepreneur wishing to acquire a license).
The term “superfluous” indicates that a sophisticated policy maker could suppress the
inefficiencies in the given context. The costs may also be induced by externalities which
the inefficient institutions fail to internalize. Examples include insufficient organization
of “collective action” to incorporate external social costs induced by individuals and the
under-supply of public goods or social-security-nets. Broadly understood, inefficient in-
stitutions coincide with the scarcity of the third element of Dixit’s (2009) definition of
functions of good economic governance: (3) collective action.
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The second subcategory of imperfect institutions is that of “inferior institutions”, which
refers to institutions which superfluously forbear exploitative behavior. An example of
an inferior institution is a court of law which does not punish a minor breach of contrac-
tual agreements or violations of property rights. Further examples of inferior institutions
are institutions which allow favoritism or bribery. To a certain extent, this represents a
scarcity of the first two elements of Dixit’s (2009) definition of functions of good eco-
nomic governance: (1) security of property rights and (2) enforcement of contracts. Note
that according to these definitions an institution may be inefficient as well as inferior.
B. Model Specification
The model applies the Gauß-notation for sums and the Leibniz-notation for calculus.
In detail, the model incorporates the following assumptions:
A1. Players, Behavior and Risk. There exists an entrepreneur (principal), referred to
in a Schumpeterian sense as the “initiator” (or sometimes initiator-company), and
a partner-trader (agent), referred to as the “partner” (or partner-company), both of
them being risk-neutral and profit maximizers.
A2. Initiator’s objective. The initiator wishes to venture in a market currently being
regulated by an imperfect institution. For this purpose, he considers a venture
with a partner who is active in the market being considered.5 Let 5 denote the
initiator’s profit of the venture. Furthermore, assume that ρ denotes the revenue
of the venture, depending on the volume of professional entrepreneurial activity e
that is created by it.6
(1) ρ(e).
Assume the revenue function of the venture to be defined as
(2)
δρ(e)
δe
> 0,
δ δρ(e)
δe
δe
< 0,
ρ(0) = 0,
δρ(0)
δe
→+∞ as e → 0.
In addition, the initiator is obliged to contribute a certain amount of resources to
the venture, in order to assure the partner of the attractiveness of a co-operation
agreement. Such an input can take various forms: direct payments or investments,
5Alternatively, it is also possible to think of a trade between a local and a stranger.
6We shall add that we employ e as a construct for simplicity reasons. The construct e may be composed of numerous
variables, possibly in a macroeconomic context of the number of small and medium sized enterprises and their respective
turnover.
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delegation of human resources or sharing of sensible knowledge. Hence, for sim-
plicity’s sake, we model all benefits of the partner abstractly as a transfer t in
monetary units from the initiator to the partner. Hence, the objective function of
the initiator reads
(3) 5 = ρ(e)− t.
A3. Information structure. The partner has private information ψ on the inferior in-
stitutions in his market. This private information allows the partner to exploit the
venture to an extent depending on its knowledge of the inferiority. For example,
the partner has private information with regard to which person can be bribed in
order to commit a non-punishable larceny of knowledge within a venture. It is
public knowledge, that ψ is randomly drawn from the interval
(4) 9 = {ψ, ..., ψ}.
with probability density function h(ψ), which is identically for each partner. H(ψ)
denotes the respective cumulative distribution function. H(ψ) is absolutely con-
tinuous and differentiable.
A4. Exploitative behavior and preferences. To the extent of the partner’s possibili-
ties due to his information draw ψ , the partner executes a bribe (for instance to
be privileged in a contract distribution by the institution or to commit a larceny
of the initiator’s knowledge without punishment) which will result in costs for the
initiator. A well informed partner ψ can carry out a substantial bribe, while an
uninformed partner ψ cannot bribe. The costs of bribing or exploiting directly
correspond to the amount of the entrepreneurial activity which the bribe needs to
cover.7 However, for simplicity it is assumed in this model that the partner always
bribes the institution and furthermore that the partner’s benefits from bribing equal
its bribing costs.8 Covered by the bribe any exploitation of the contract is observ-
able by the initiator ex post, but cannot be punished judicially due to the inferior
institutions.
A5. Partner’s objective. Taking into account the venture transfers t from the initiator,
the partner has the following objective function
(5) π = t − C(e, θ).
The partner incurs costs of the function
(6) C(e, θ) = eθ.
7This corresponds to a variable bribe. A simple, fixed bribe would also be thinkable, but is not introduced here.
Simple fixed bribes can be considered as a costly hurdle for investment.
8This assumption implies that this model does not cover moral hazard profit maximizations, which is not the focus of
this article and would be a distraction from the main arguments. We suggest it as a topic for future research.
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The marginal costs θ of the partner include his variable production costs u =
θ , which are normalized to be equal for all partners, and also his bribing costs.
Directly corresponding to the draw of the partner’s private information 9 on the
institutional inferiority, the realization of the marginal costs of the partner belongs
to the set
(7) 2 = {θ(ψ), ..., θ(ψ)}.
As an example, θ describes an informed partner type with high exploitation abil-
ity and mathematically with high marginal costs, while θ describes an uninformed
reliable partner with low marginal costs. It is public knowledge, that the corre-
sponding continuous probability density function g(θ) is distributed identically
for each partner. Let G(θ) denote the corresponding cumulative distribution func-
tion. G(θ) is commonly known, absolutely continuous and differentiable. For
simplicity’s sake, we furthermore assume a monotone hazard rate of θ
(8)
δ
δθ
(
G(θ)
g(θ)
)
≥ 0 ∀ (e, t, θ) ∈ A×2.
A6. Contracting variables. A denotes the set of all feasible contracts. Both parties can
contract on the level of entrepreneurial activity e and on the transfer t , which are
both observable and verifiable. A is defined as
(9) A = {(e, t), where e, t ∈ R+}.
A7. Imperfect institution. The institution may be imperfect in two ways. Firstly, due
to institutional inefficiencies, employing the rule of the institution inflicts costs
of 8 on the initiator (This may be due to an inefficient routine or due to a bribe).
Secondly, the institutional inferiority is modeled as follows: The institution detects
any exploitation by the partner greater than his exploitation ability according to his
information draw ψ . Thus, the institution imperfectly supervises the contracts and
property rights of the initiator which inflict variable costs on the initiator.
A8. Timing. Contracting takes place at an interim stage. At time T = 0 the partner
draws on his level of private information of the inferior institutions in his market
and bribes. At the successive stage T = 1, the initiator offers a menu of venture
contracts. Accordingly, the contracts are accepted or refused by the partner in
T = 2. At stage T = 3 the chosen contract is executed.9
A9. Outside options. There are no outside options available to both initiator and part-
ner.
9Clearly, it is perfectly feasible for contracting to take place at an ex-ante stage T = 0. However, then we also would
need to control for risk-attributes of the parties, which would be distracting from the main argument.
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A10. Initial endowment. Any fixed costs of the partner are considered as sunk costs.
The initial endowment of wealth of the partner π is zero. In the end the partner
will accept the venture only if at least his status-quo level of wealth is covered.
III. The Model - Discussion and Optimal Contracts
Employing the principal-agent model described above, how much entrepreneurial ac-
tivity will unfold? Who benefits from such an environment and what are the wealth levels
of the parties? What is the optimal menu of contracts for the initiator? In what ways will
contracts and entrepreneurial activity diverge compared to a second-best institutional sur-
rounding? The core idea is that imperfect institutions can both directly increase the costs
of entrepreneurial activity and create abnormal uncertainty on the quality and trustwor-
thiness of trading partners. The resulting reallocations of wealth leave the relationship
between imperfect institutions and wealth in most cases negative, but are subject to con-
textual parameters which also allow niche cases with positive results.
These questions will be the driving forces of the following discussion, which is of tech-
nical nature and follows findings of the principal-agent theory, which is a well researched
theoretical framework. In detail, the model described above belongs to the class of ad-
verse selection with incentive and participation constraints under a continuum of types.10
Thus, with great respect for its historical development, we refer to the synthesis of Laf-
font and Martimort (2002), for theoretical and earlier versions of the mathematics, proofs
and concepts applied within this section. We must not be credited for the model’s math-
ematical derivation, as we rely on their towering achievement and adopt their notation in
the following mathematical section.11 We highlight that our contribution in the following
mathematical section is strictly limited to the application and transfer of the Laffont and
Martimort (2002) theory to an entrepreneurship under imperfect institutions setting in
order to offer a model based on logic to the “sand” or “grease” debate around imperfect
institutions, which is capable to unify seeming contrary positions and from which we
then derive management and policy implications.
A. Second-Best Institutions - A Benchmark
Following Laffont and Martimont (2002), pp. 28-81, we comment briefly on the opti-
mal contract under second-best institutions to establish a benchmark as a starting point of
the discussion. We assume an utopian world where properly and efficiently functioning
institutions prohibit any exploitations (or bribes) and that the initiator is correctly in-
formed about the level of costs of his venture partners u = θ . Accordingly, the initiator’s
maximization problem reads as follows:
(10)
maximize
(e,t)
5 = ρ(e(θ))− t (θ)
subject to t (θ)− C(e, θ) ≥ 0.
10See Laffont and Martimort (2002), appendix of chapter 3, pp. 134-140.
11See Laffont and Martimont (2002), chapters 2 and 3, pp. 28-140.
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Clearly, the participation constraint must bind, since the proper institutional surrounding
does not allow exploitations
(11) t (θ) = eθ.
A substitution and maximization leads to the rearranged first-order condition
SOLUTION (PROPOSITION) 1:
(12)
δρ(e∗(θ))
δe
= θ.
The initiator contributes t∗ = e∗(θ)θ to the venture and accesses the market and the
partner’s resources at a fair price (i.e. he has to pay for no additional costs). If we assume
that there were two types of partners: an inefficient partner with marginal costs u = θ
and an efficient partner u = θ , the optimal contracts read
(13)
(e∗, t∗) iff θ = θ,
(e∗, t
∗
) iff θ = θ.
It is possible to depict these contracts on the (e, t) space by representing the initiator’s
profit 5 and the partner’s wealth level π in the form of isoprofit functions. The isoprofit
functions of the partners will follow the indifference path t − eθ = π from the origin,
according to their respective definition in assumption (A5.).12 In addition, the isoprofit
function of the initiator is by definition in assumption (A2.) a strictly concave function in
e. Considering both isoprofit functions, the optimal contract is described by the tangen-
tial point between them, when the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits. Two main
observations can be drawn from this figure. Firstly, the initiator maximizes his profits by
expanding entrepreneurial activity e until his marginal benefit equals his marginal costs.
Since in the optimal contracts the marginal benefit from the venture for the initiator is
higher when venturing with type θ , this in turn implies the volume of the entrepreneurial
activity e with this type is lower e∗ < e∗.13 Secondly, the objective of the initiator is to
accrue e and to avoid t , his profit 5 increases when moving to the south-east direction
on the (e, t) space. For the partner the opposite is true. Therefore, since θ > θ , the
tangential point when dealing with the partner of type θ will allow the initiator to reach a
higher profit level, than when venturing with the partner type θ (Laffont and Martimont,
2002). In a nutshell, these results are well in line with economic intuition. Companies
12Since the gradient of these functions is determined by θ , two different isoprofit functions will only cross once in
the (e, t) space. Hence, the partners’ isoprofit functions in this model fulfill the Spence-Mirrlees property, which assures
that a monotone ranking between the types θ on the marginal rate of substitution between entrepreneurial volume e and
transfer t is possible. Or mathematically stated
δ
δθ
(
δπ
δe
δπ
δt
)
≶ 0 ∀ (e, t, θ) ∈ A×2.
See Mirrlees (1971) and Spence (1974).
13Since θ > θ , it follows that the marginal benefits are ordered (δρ(e∗(θ)))/(δe) > (δρ(e∗(θ)))/(δe). Note that
this fact holds due to the spatial boundaries of ρ defined in assumption (A2.) which postulate positive and diminishing
marginal revenues in e.
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FIGURE 1. THE BENCHMARK CONTRACT (e∗, t∗) ON THE (E,T)-SPACE
venture more profitably and intensely with more efficient partners.
B. Inefficient Institutions
We start with the easiest case of an imperfect institution: assume an institution is
inefficient, but not inferior. Its inefficiency inflicts costs 8 on the entrepreneurial activity
(for example the initiator has to purchase an expensive license). Exploitation is not
tolerated by the institution. The initiator is correctly informed about the type of partner
he is venturing with u = θ . Furthermore assume again, that there are only two types
of partners: an inefficient partner u = θ and an efficient partner u = θ . With the
assumptions of the model above, the following three cases are possible.
As a first case, if 8 ≤ 5
∗
there will be no effect on the volume of entrepreneurial ac-
tivity. Secondly, once the threshold value 5
∗
is reached, projects with sub-optimal part-
ners will begin to be located outside the profitability horizon. Projects, which otherwise
would have been viable, are now subject to shut-down due to the inefficient institutional
environment. Thus, the reduced range of projects executed will only include (e˜; e∗).
Thirdly, if 8 > 5∗, entrepreneurial activity breaks down completely since no project is
located inside the profitability horizon. These direct effects of institutional inefficiency
can be visualized in the (e, t) space, as displayed in the figure below.
Although this effect may seem very intuitive, it entails a big effect for economies, be-
cause, similar to a black hole, all entrepreneurial projects beyond the profitability horizon
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will not be realized.
C. Discussion of Inferior Institutions - Trading with Thieves
Assume now that the institution is inferior and thus tolerates exploitations or bribes,
but is not inefficient. In accordance with the assumptions, the marginal costs θ of pos-
sible partners include their variable production costs u, which are now normalized to be
equal for all partners u = θ , but also the costs of their bribery. The partner’s bribing
ability directly corresponds with the draw of the partner’s private information 9 on the
institutional inferiority, the realisation of the marginal costs of the partner thus belongs
to the set 2 = {θ(ψ), θ(ψ)}. Furthermore, in order to clarify the mechanics, assume for
the moment that there are still only two levels of information about the inferiority.
The initiator must now budget for being exploited, since he knows that he is now
trading with thieves whose abilities he does not know. In addition, for the non-informed
partner of type θ it is more profitable to select the contract designed for the exploiting
partner θ when offered a menu of proposals during a contract negotiation.14 To see this
numerically, we compute the profits of a partner of type θ when mimicking a partner of
14The contract (t∗, e∗) is located westwards of (t∗, e∗) on the (e, t) space, choosing the (t∗, e∗) contract will enable
the non-exploiting partner of type θ to reach a higher iso-profit function π .
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type θ
(14)
t
∗
− e∗θ,
⇔ t
∗
− e∗θ + e∗θ − e∗θ,
⇔ π(θ)+ e∗(θ − θ).
Thus, the partner θ is in a position to barter for e∗(θ − θ).15 Either he pretends to
have knowledge about the inferior institutions or he barters for an additional rent as a
compensation. Hence, the contracts tailored for a normal second-best institutional set-up
normal are no longer optimal as the partners no longer self-select the contract designed
for them. In order to avoid such pretensions in negotiations, the initiator can only identify
the true level of information θ , if it is in the best interest of the partner to reveal his level.
Therefore, an optimal contract must take into account, that being offered a choice of
contracts in A, truth-telling is weakly preferred by the partner for any possible pair of
θ ∈ 2 × 2. Following Laffont and Martimont (2002), this puts additional truth-telling
constraints on the problem, which read
(15)
t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ,
t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ.
Moreover, a simple addition yields an additional insight:
(16)
t (θ)− t (θ)+ t (θ)− t (θ)+ e(θ)θ − e(θ)θ − e(θ)θ + e(θ)θ ≥ 0,
⇔ e(θ)(θ − θ)− e(θ)(θ − θ) ≥ 0,
⇔ e(θ) ≥ e(θ).
Therefore, the truth-telling constraints force the initiator to limit the volume of his en-
trepreneurial activity with the exploiting partner of type θ at least to that of the non-
exploiting type θ . In other words, the level of entrepreneurial activity must be ranked
monotonically according to the level of exploitation of the inferior institution by the
partner types. It is worth noting, that this peculiar structure arises regardless of the ob-
jective function of the initiator. The initiator’s objective function is now weighted by the
likelihood ϑ to meet the θ partner type, since the trustworthiness of the venture partner
is blurred by a veil of uncertainty. Following Laffont and Martimont (2002), pp. 28-81,
15The partner of type θ already manifests the most informed type and hence it cannot avoid the initiator’s discrimina-
tion, thus π(θ) = 0.
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the objective function and the initiator’s problem read
(17)
maximize 5
(e(θ),t (θ));(e(θ),t (θ))
= ϑ(ρ(e(θ))− t (θ))+ (1− ϑ)(ρ(e(θ))− t (θ))
subject to t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ 0, (I)
t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ 0, (II)
t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ, (III)
t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ. (IV)
The solution to this problem yields the optimal contracts with all possible venture part-
ners. After some calculations one arrives at the following first order conditions:16
SOLUTION (PROPOSITION) 2:
(18)
δρ(e⋄(θ))
δe(θ)
= θ,
δρ(e⋄(θ))
δe(θ)
= θ +
ϑ
(1− ϑ)
(θ − θ).
By observing the resulting contracts, we note that overall entrepreneurial activity is
greatly reduced, as compared to the contract (e∗, t∗) that would have been implied under
second-best institutions. The first order conditions yield the same result for the partner of
type θ . However, the first order conditions indicate that the marginal benefits with partner
type θ have increased, reflecting a reduced entrepreneurial activity with this type.17
The transfers of the optimal contracts t⋄ = e⋄θ + e⋄(θ − θ) and t
⋄
= e⋄θ , as well
as the partners’ resulting wealth levels π⋄ = e⋄(θ − θ) and π⋄ = 0, indicate another
economic link: the partner type θ accrues a positive partnership rent for not exploiting.
Due to this rent, the wealth level of the initiator will also be lower, 5∗ > 5⋄.18
D. Optimal Contracts under Inferior Institutions
Let us now allow for the more realistic case of a continuum of information levels θ ∈
2 = {θ, ..., θ}, with a density function g(θ) and a cumulative distribution function G(θ)
behaving in accordance to assumption (A5.). This problem discussed in Laffont and
Martimont (2002) pp. 134-140 and we follow their solution. In line with the approach
in the discussion above, we now search for the optimal contract (e◦(θ), t◦(θ)) in order
to compare it with the benchmark case. As a starting point, the objective function of the
16For the reader’s convenience, we omitted the calculations and refer to the appendix.
17This is due to the assumed shape of the ρ-function, (δρ(e))/(δe) > 0 and ((δρ(e))/(δe))/(δe) < 0, which leads to
e⋄ < e∗ and e⋄ = e∗. Also, the results follow the monotone ranking demanded by equation (16): e⋄ = e∗ > e∗ > e⋄
(Laffont and Martimont, 2002).
18See Laffont and Martimont (2002).
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initiator under these conditions reads19
(19) maximize 5
{(e(θ),t (θ))}
=
∫ θ
θ
[ρ(e(θ))− t (θ)] g(θ) δθ.
The objective function is now subject to an infinite amount of constraints due to the
infinity of possible types of θ . As the problem is designed to be well behaved in order
to carve out the possible economic effects of the inferiority of an institution, it turns out
that the infinite amount of constraints in our case collapses to an individual rationality
constraint π(θ) ≥ 0, a second constraint which imposes a monotone ranking on the
entrepreneurial activity depending on the information level (δe(θ))/(δθ) ≤ 0 and a truth-
telling constraint (δπ(θ))/(δθ) = −e(θ).20 This makes the program of the initiator much
handier and allows us to calculate the optimal contracts. The program of the initiator, in
terms of profit levels, now reads
(20)
maximize 5
(e(·),π(·))
=
∫ θ
θ
(ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ − π(θ)) g(θ)δθ,
subject to π(θ) ≥ 0, (I)
δe(θ)
δθ
≤ 0, (II)
δπ(θ)
δθ
= −e(θ). (III)
In line with Laffont and Martimont (2002), we try to reduce the variables in the objective
function. For this purpose, we employ the truth-telling constraint (δπ(θˇ))/(δθˇ) = −e(θˇ)
to enlarge π(θ) = π(θ).
(21)
π(θ) = π(θ)+ π(θ)− π(θ),
⇔ π(θ)−
∫ θ
θ
δπ(θ)
δθ
δθ,
⇔
∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσ + π(θ).
However, the most informed type θ of the partners is not capable to pretend to be even
more informed, since the cumulative distribution function G(θ) is common knowledge.
It follows immediately that he will be discriminated perfectly. As a consequence, the
individual rationality constraint of the most informed type θ will be binding: π(θ) = 0.
19The integral is used, since the initiator can only form an expected value. This will be the sum of all possible (thus
type dependent) profit situations times their respective likelihood in the form of the density function.
20The derivation and the calculations belong to the standard repertoire of the principal-agent realm and would be
distracting from the main results. They are provided in the appendix for the reader’s convenience.
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Thus, we can write
(22) π(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσ .
This is a remarkable feature of the optimal contract. It dictates that partners will receive
a partnership rent
∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσ for compliance with good practices.21 Observe that we can
plug this result into the objective function of the initiator, which also implies that the
constraint π(θ) ≥ 0 is fulfilled due to the partnership rent. As Laffont and Martimont
(2002) point out the objective function of the initiator now reads
(23)
maximize 5
e(·)
=
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ −
∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσ
)
g(θ)δθ,
subject to
δe(θ)
δθ
≤ 0. (II)
For the moment, we will neglect the remaining monotonicity constraint and follow a
more practical approach by checking whether the omitted constraint is fulfilled after-
wards. We directly proceed by maximizing the objective function of the initiator. The
double integral exudes an air of difficulty, but it turns out that it can be tackled by inte-
gration by parts and a substitution of
∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσ .22
(24)
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ −
∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
f (x)
)
g(θ)︸︷︷︸
g(x)
δθ,
⇔
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ
−
([∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσG(θ)
]θ
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
∫ θ
θ
(δ ∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσ
δθ
G(θ)
)
δθ
))
g(θ)δθ,
⇔
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ +
∫ θ
θ
(
−e(θ)
G(θ)
g(θ)
g(θ)
)
δθ
)
g(θ)δθ,
⇔
∫ θ
θ
(
ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ − e(θ)
G(θ)
g(θ)
)
g(θ)δθ.
21Note that this rent must be paid independently of the initiator’s objective function. See also Laffont and Martimont
(2002).
22We employ the extension of Leibniz’s law for integration by parts:∫ b
a f (x)g(x)δx =
[
f (x)
∫
g(x)δx
]b
a
−
∫ b
a
(∫
g(x)δx
) δ f (x)
δx δx .
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Now we are in a position to optimize this expression point-wise which yields the follow-
ing results:
SOLUTION (PROPOSITION) 3:
(25)
δρ(e◦(θ))
δe(θ)
− θ −
G(θ)
g(θ)
= 0,
⇔
δρ(e◦(θ))
δe(θ)
= θ +
G(θ)
g(θ)
.
It is remarkable, that for the partner of type θ , this result shows the following attributes
(26)
δρ(e◦(θ))
δe(θ)
= θ +
G(θ)
g(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= θ.
This indicates that non-exploiting partners will enjoy the same extent of co-operation as
under second-best institutions, as shown by Laffont and Martimont (2002). Let us sum-
marize the situation derived for the optimal contracts under inferior institutions. For this
purpose, we expose the results in the (e, t) space. We note that overall entrepreneurial
0
*
t
t
e
*
e
*
t
ee =
*
Π
0=pi
0=pi
e
t
t

∂θ
θ
σσ )(e
Optimization
θ
θδ
θδρ
=
)(
))((
e
e
)(
)(
)(
))((
θ
θθ
θδ
θδρ
g
G
e
e
+=
Partnership-rent
0>pi
*Θ
Reduction
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activity is harshly reduced, since the level of entrepreneurial activity with bribing part-
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ners (or companies) is reduced according to the extent of their exploitations and their
position in the population’s general compliance with good practices. Vice versa, partner-
companies with a reputation for good practices enjoy partnership rents
∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσ , de-
pending on their degree of compliance. Remarkably, non-exploiting partners of type θ
will enjoy the same volume of trade as under second-best institutions, plus being re-
warded for their good practices due to the partnership rent. Overall, it is more profitable
for the initiator to venture with non-exploiting partners than with exploiters. However,
the general level of profitability will be lower as compared to second-best institutions
5∗ > 5◦. This is due to the fact that the initiator has to reward good compliance with
partnership rents to remedy the inferior institutional environment. Thinking beyond the
assumptions of the model, we note that these effects are sensitive to improvements in
competition. If a competitive situation develops, for example two partners starting a bid-
ding race for the contract with the initiator, the veil of uncertainty on the partners’ costs
is lifted considerably, since the bargaining position of the initiator improves dramatically.
IV. Derived Propositions and Policy and Management Implications
A. Propositions and Boundaries
The insights gained from applying the Laffont and Martimont (2002) model above will
be cumulatively exposed in the form of propositions of a theorem.
THEOREM 1:
I. Inefficient institutions:
PROPOSITION 1: An inefficient institution has no impact on the volume of entrepre-
neurial activity if the cost inflicted by its inefficiency is outside the profitability horizon.
PROPOSITION 2: An inefficient institution diminishes the volume of entrepreneurial
activity if the cost inflicted by its inefficiency exceeds the profits generated by some
projects. All projects outside the shifted profitability horizon will be shut down.
PROPOSITION 3: An inefficient institution prevents all entrepreneurial activity if the
cost inflicted by its inefficiency exceeds the profits generated by all projects.
II. Inferior institutions:
PROPOSITION 4: An inferior institution has no impact on the volume of entrepre-
neurial activity for partners complying with good practices.
PROPOSITION 5: An inferior institution diminishes the volume of entrepreneurial ac-
tivity by an extent according to the general compliance of partners with good practices
(G(θ))/(g(θ)) and the extent of their individual exploitational abilities θ(ψ).
PROPOSITION 6: An inferior institution diminishes the profitability of all entrepre-
neurial activity for the initiator.
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PROPOSITION 7: The presence of an inferior institution forces the initiator to award
partnership rents
∫ θ
θ
e(σ )δσ to its partners.
PROPOSITION 8: Competition dampens the effects of inferior institutions on entrepre-
neurial activity.
We stress that these propositions should be read from an agnostic perspective, as they
are subject to the spatial boundaries defined in the assumptions of the model, as well
as the implicit assumptions of the model. One such implicit assumptions is that the
construct “entrepreneurial activity” is modeled sufficiently in the form of a simple trade
or venture and a production function. We are aware that it is influenced by many more
variables in practice.23 We purposely neglect and fade out other variables in order to
carve out the economic effects of imperfect institutions on entrepreneurial activity.
Our approach is driven by the profit maximization objective and views the entrepreneur
as an autonomous decision making entity. Other authors, for example Cyert and March
(1963) emphasize that companies are a collection of individuals. In addition, in the
literature strand on organizational theory, personality traits of persons in charge, polit-
ical processes within a company and generally broader goal systems of the company
are considered as determinants of the actual behavior of firms. These sociological and
psychological dimensions are neglected in our approach, since the perspective taken is
related more to industrial organization, microeconomics and contract theory.
Furthermore, we would like to stress that the approach taken implicitly assumes a
deterministic framework. We argue that exogenous changes in the structural elements
of the economy, e.g. in our article the institutional design, induce changes in the en-
trepreneurial activity. We are aware of the fact that other authors, for example Branden-
burger and Nalebuff (1996), highlight that companies can gain advantages by changing
the structural elements in the market themselves. According to our approach, this corre-
sponds to an institutional amendment, be it informal or formal. Such considerations are
however beyond the scope of this article.
B. Policy Implications
Reflecting the recognition that markets are unlikely to operate well in the absence of
proper institutions which provide them with security through predicable rules, much of
the reform focus in the developing world has shifted towards improving and reforming
institutions and governance. But at what institutions should governance reformers aim?
Some insights for practical policy making can be drawn from the propositions of the
theorem. Due to the generality of the model, they are applicable to a wide range of set-
tings, ranging from a regional, microcosmic trade situation to an international venture.
However, and in line with contemporary development economics research, see Rodrik
23For example one could postulate that variables like “literacy rate” influence the “entrepreneurial activity” construct.
But the decision to form a venture itself is also influenced by numerous variables. A large body of literature has attempted
to explain the portfolio of venture decisions by firms and has identified numerous reasons for inter-firm collaboration, thus
influencing venture activity. See Hitt et al. (2011), or for an agency theoretical point of view, see Reuer and Ragozzino
(2006).
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(2007), the contextuality of these policy implications cannot be overstated. Proper insti-
tutions may be necessary for economic growth, but they are not a blueprint for achieving
economic growth. Thus, the policy implications given here are formulated with the em-
phasis on humility, they should not be confused with rules.
I. The Partnership Rent: A Diagnostic Signal. - The propositions predict that once a
country allows for inferior institutions, the entrepreneurs and companies will isomorphi-
cally introduce partnership rents for good compliance as a rational response.24 In turn,
high partnership rents relative to second-best levels indicate the need for lifelines outside
the formal institutional environment. Thus, they might be taken as a diagnostic signal
of high institutional inferiority for policy makers (in parts, as there may also be other,
e.g. cultural, reasons). In practice, such partnership rents may take various forms such
as special conditions and discounts in relational contracting situations with the goal of
building up a long-term relationship of mutual trust between trading partners to allow
successive projects (i.e. repeated partnerships).25
II. Reforming Institutions: i. Inferior Institutions. - Following the principal-agent
framework applied here, there are two main approaches open to the government reformer.
The first approach is to enhance the institutional surrounding in which the exploitation
occurred (e.g. improve law enforcement and rule of law). However, in practice this
relationship is non-trivial since the model predicts that as a consequence the enhancement
will undermine the lifelines of partnership rents which formerly saved companies from
exploits. Therefore, one has to consider whether the informal partnership rents cpr or
the formal law enforcement routines cinst due to exploitations impose more transaction
costs on firms. In line with Dixit (2003) as well as Li (2003), we argue that trading based
on partnership rents requires no fixed costs but high marginal costs. In contrast, law
enforcement is associated with high fixed costs for its provision but lower marginal costs.
Maintaining and enforcing an institution may be only become optimal for entrepreneurs
when a certain amount of trading contacts is exceeded, which may not be the case for
early development stages. Thus, the answer obviously depends on the country specific
development situation: how interwoven is the economy and how many ties or business
contacts have to be maintained by the individual entrepreneurs? Is there (or will there
be) a demand for an institution such that cpr > cinst ?
The second approach is to tackle the exploitation at its roots. One reason for the
exploit’s magnitude is asymmetric information. Entrepreneurs foreign to a specific mar-
ket possessed inefficient screening opportunities and the quality of its trading partners
remained opaque. Thus, increasing competition, helping companies to gather informa-
tion about market participants and disseminating or even ostracizing transgressors will
remedy the institutional situation. Supply of information may be provided from official
institutions or on a private profit-maximizing basis, as Dixit (2003) shows in a theoretical
24In this context, we draw the attention of the interested reader to a neo-institutional perspective outlined from DiMag-
gio and Powell (1983) which consider isomorphic institutional change in organizational fields as a response to uncertainty
(amongst other reasons).
25Work from Abreu et al. (1991) on repeated partnerships shows that under imperfect conditions long-term agreements
may foster compliance.
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context. However, supplying market information is costly and may be difficult to achieve
in practice.
Besides the above economic suggestions, sociological and psychological aspects shall
not be forgotten. Even if the exploitation or bribe was possible, it would be the indi-
vidual behavior and action which made it real. In the manner in which Be´nabou and
Tirole (2003) argued, intrinsic incentives will shape and interact with the outcomes of
extrinsic incentives. If the internal value system of the individual had attributed utility
or happiness to behavior in accordance with social norms of honesty, righteousness and
fairness, and if the internal values system reacted to a violation of these norms by in-
creased disutility in the form of a feeling of guilt, then less exploitations might be carried
out. The prevalence of egoistic and transgressive behavior is thus broken and the need
for governance or partnership rents is reduced. However the installation of such so called
“pro-social preferences” is a long-winded process, which will take hold only gradually as
individuals become educated in and familiar with social norms, as the work of Camerer
(2003) on behavioral economics indicates. Thus, fostering “pro-social preferences” by
direct or indirect education is considerable as a worthwhile, but long-run policy.
The above political advice is not new. An early form of these insights appears in
Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651): “The force of Words, being [...] too weak to hold men to the
performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but two imaginable helps to
strengthen it. And those are either a Feare of the consequence of breaking their word;
or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to breake it. This later is a Generosity
too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or
sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind.” (Thomas Hobbes (1651),
Leviathan, Chapter XIV)
Reforming Institutions: ii. Inefficient Institutions. - If an institution is found to be
inefficient, it is crucial to determine what caused the inefficiencies and to determine the
related costs 8. For example, if the costs 8 are caused by externalities, a reform of
an institutions must take into account the incentives of the individuals causing them or
force them to compensate their victims, which will induce resistance by those who must
pay for it. Regarding processual inefficiencies it is perhaps best to consider benchmark
institutions, which offer more effective routines. As Rodrik (2008) points out, this may
be a second-best institution with respect to the country specific appropriateness.
III. Economic Desirability of Reforms: i. Inefficient Institutions. - Regardless of the
context, institutional inefficiencies should be avoided since their effects are purely of
negative nature. To make things even worse, highly inefficient institutions may even in-
duce institutional inferiority. High costs related to institutional inefficiency, for example
extensive licensing or entry costs (de Soto, 1989, and Djankov et al., 2002), can create
incentives for market participants to bypass them at lower costs 8˜ by bribing.
Niche Case: Interestingly, in the niche case of a given strong institutional inefficiency,
an induced institutional inferiority may even entail positive effects here. In this niche
case, as the costs for the bribing bypass (exploit) are lower than the original costs induced
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FIGURE 4. INSTITUTIONAL INEFFICIENCY INDUCING INSTITUTIONAL INFERIORITY
by the high inefficiency, 8˜ < 8, this expands the profitability horizon and more projects
are being realized because entrepreneurial activity is more profitable. Furthermore, the
increased entrepreneurial activity e may also have positive effects on a country’s wealth
5c(e), which arguably may surpass the potential negative effects of the institutional in-
feriority 8in f on the country’s wealth 5c(8in f ), leading to positive net wealth effect
5c ⇑. The above case also suggests that there may, under certain parameter values,
exist an optimal level of inferiority, if the inefficiency cannot be avoided. Such a corre-
lation was empirically observed by Me´ndez and Se´pulveda (2006) and Me´on and Weill
(2010), while Levy (2007) offers historical evidence. These efficiency gains relative
to an inefficient institution are better understood if one compares bribing to competi-
tive bidding procedures (Beck and Maher, 1986) which reveals similarities between both
mechanisms.
However, let us be very clear: the model strongly suggests that institutional inefficien-
cies should be avoided if possible.
Economic Desirability of Reforms: ii. Inferior Institutions. In general, it cannot be
overstated that the mathematical results of this article strongly indicate that institutional
inferiority is likely to be undesirable due to the partnership rents and the reduced en-
trepreneurial activity, which arguably reduces a countries wealth 5c(e) ⇓.
Niche Case: However, the model also allows for parameters values for which this is
not the case: the relationship is non-monotonic from a national perspective. This id-
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iosyncratic effect is best visualized with an example: A country hosts institutions of
inferior quality, which favor domestic entrepreneurs and allocate foreign entrepreneurs
to specific domestic venture partners. Subsequently, the model suggests that the foreign
entrepreneurs will adjust their contract offerings and reduce their entrepreneurial activ-
ity. After the contract negotiations the contracts are executed and the domestic players
(partner companies and institutions) reap bribing profits πb or enjoy partnership rents
π pr .
Given that the reduction of overall entrepreneurial activity e ⇓ generates less welfare
loss than the extra profits enjoyed by the domestic players, thus 5c(e) ⇓< 5c(πb +
π pr ) ⇑, inferior institutions are desirable for a domestic policy maker. Overall the wel-
fare of the country rises 5c ⇑, while foreign entrepreneurs suffer a decreased level of
profits 5 ⇓, which may be regarded as irrelevant from a national perspective. In ad-
dition, privileging incumbent firms over entrants may in certain contexts be desirable.
In addition the capital accumulation generated domestically may be necessary to open
a leeway for the next development stage and induce growth. For instance Acemoglu et
al. (2006) argue that rents generated by incumbents stimulate necessary investment for
countries lagging behind the global technology frontier. In line with this argument, Qian
(2003) argues that China’s rise is due to the proper application of imperfect institutions
as stepping stones.
Here, the question remains whether the government would not better of extracting
a surplus from a foreign entrepreneur by imposing a simple lump-sum tax, rather than
using the indirect approach of creating additional uncertainty for the foreign entrepreneur
through an institutional inferiority. However, some capital might be inaccessible by taxes
and but accessible by inferior institutions, for example through a tolerance of patent right
infringements and accesses to firm specific knowledge or technologies. Furthermore, in
practice a tax may be a less feasible instrument, because it potentially may create high
transaction costs and because multi-national organizations are often very professional in
reducing their tax burdens. Such (peculiarly) beneficiary effects of inferior institutions
were highlighted by scholars quite early, for instance by Leff (1964). However, we
emphasize that this is a niche case, which may only be relevant as a stepping stone, and
that we refrain from putting to much emphasis on it.
On the contrary, if the institutional inferiority is located on a domestic or regional basis
(i.e. a domestic entrepreneur trading with an domestic entrepreneur), then the impact of
an institutional inferiority is very likely to have only strongly negative, reallocative and
wasteful welfare effects. Entrepreneurial activity and, assuming beneficiary effects from
entrepreneurial activity, welfare will be reduced. Furthermore, if the costs of partnership
rents can be passed to the consumers of the entrepreneurial activity, consumers will suffer
a loss in consumer surplus. Given such a context, inferior institutions should obviously
be avoided and amended. For such negative effects, there is large body of supportive,
empirical, and argumentative evidence in the corruption and growth literature (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1993, Mauro, 1995, Rose-Ackerman, 1999, Me´on and Sekkat, 2005, and
Aidt, 2009). Dixit (2009) points out that a failure to protect (and a violation of) property
rights by the government and its agents is a major cause of poor economic performance
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in many countries. Furthermore, there is the danger that the institutional inferiority in-
duces damaging lock-in effects: considering the benefits some players enjoy, it will be
hard to introduce incentives in favor of a policy reform towards a second-best institution
(Coate and Morris, 1999, and Blackburn et al., 2006). This may lead to complication in
economic transitions and be a source of unsustainable development (Paldam, 2002, and
Aidt, 2009).
IV. Imperfections as Barriers. - Furthermore, imperfect institutions create barriers to
entering the domestic market and reduce entrepreneurial activity. This result is in line
with current findings in the literature. For instance Klapper et al. (2006) consider entry
barriers reducing entrepreneurial activity. Campos et al. (2010) show that corruption
is an important barrier to entry and thereby inflicts social costs. In addition, according
to Ricardo (1817) a liberal perspective would suggest that such barriers are undesirable
with regard to the benefits of free trade.26 Barriers to entry also curb entrepreneurial
selection and thus fuel inefficiencies.
But on the other side of the coin, entry barriers may be vindicated from a protectionist-
national perspective, since protected higher profits of incumbents create higher incentives
for domestic entrepreneurial activity and thereby fuel growth. Hausmann and Rodrik
(2003) argue that modest entry barriers shield incumbents from imitators, thus provid-
ing them with rents in equilibrium. These rents subsidize the risk-taking which goes
along with entrepreneurial activity, and thus promote domestic entrepreneurial activity.
Also, according to Bliss and Di Tella (1997), a profit-maximizing bureaucrat could wish
to reduce the number of firms, since bribe-profits of the remaining firms are potentially
higher. Thus, regarding the desirability of these entry barriers, the objective function of
the governance reformer plays an important role.
V. Addressing the Right Constraints. - We shall draw attention to the fact that many
developing countries face constraints of various natures in their ability to tackle and
implement reforms. Reforms and amendments are thus scare resources. Consequently
the above has to be judged in a holistic framework. The reforms which create higher
marginal benefits should be realized first. If for instance the main constraint for en-
trepreneurial activity is the literacy rate or an inefficient financial sector, then a reform
of the rule of law will clearly not be advisable and will only waste scarce resources. In-
spired by a framework proposed by Rodrik (2006), the figure below attempts to provide
a holistic framework for constraints of entrepreneurial activity and highlights the area
in which our model grips. Obviously, the figure below is necessarily imperfect and we
apologize for any omissions.
C. Strategic Management Implications
To formulate a necessarily inchoate collection of strategies based on the insights of
the principal-agent model of this article, it is worthwhile to expand the scope of this
industrial-organizational related framework and, loosely restating Brandenburger and
26See Ricardo (1817), pp. 146-185.
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FIGURE 5. HOLISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR CONSTRAINTS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY
Nalebuff (1996), to allow the companies to change the structure of the game itself. The
basic question is: What determines the magnitude of the exploitation (of the foreigner)
and how can companies reduce it?
I. Corporate Citizenship. - In the strategic management literature Hymer (1976), Za-
heer and Mosakowski (1995), and Mezias (2002) argue that there exists a set of lia-
bilities due to foreignness which inflict additional costs on foreign players in local or
domestic markets. According to Zaheer and Mosakowski (1995), Vernon (2001), and
Gardberg and Fombrun (2006) these liabilities are composed of transaction costs, infor-
mation costs, lack of familiarity with and awareness of the domestic institutional envi-
ronment, lack of legitimacy, and local biases. If one assumes, that the magnitude of the
exploitation or bribe is influenced by these liabilities of foreignness, then entrepreneurs
or companies should invest in measures to increase their local embeddedness.
Gardberg and Fombrun (2006) argue that corporate citizenship, understood as the so-
cioeconomic and philanthropic activities which companies undertake to fulfill perceived
duties as members of society, creates intangible assets such as reputational and social
capital as well as legitimacy. These intangible assets help companies to integrate into the
sociocognitive fabric of domestic and local communities, thus buffering the negative im-
pacts of the foreignness attribute. Indeed, research suggests that companies can leapfrog
such a nationalistic or regionalistic barrier by enhancing the perceived legitimacy to oper-
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ate in the considered domestic market (Oliver, 1991, and Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006).
Hence, if foreignness is identified as the reason for the exploitative behavior of partner-
companies, then investing in corporate citizenship might be one strategy for the initiator
to dampen the magnitude of exploits.
II. Internalization. - Another strategy might be to incorporate the institutions which
forbear the exploitation into the venture. Following this approach, the initiator partially
sells or shares the assets of the venture with the institution. The rationale behind this
approach is that once the institution becomes a claimant of residual cash flows generated
by the venture, it is incited not to tolerate any exploits. Thereby the initiator actively
changes the “rules of the game”: The institution and the initiator streamline their objec-
tive functions towards parallelism and the internalization transforms the exploitation into
an agency problem of the institution. Such an approach can be observed in China, where
community enterprises, so called “township and village enterprises”, are a common busi-
ness model. Such an approach may furthermore save the company transaction costs and
enhance a company’s position in an environment of imperfect institutions. However, a
joint venture with authorities can also backfire, because the company may actually lose
more bargaining power to the authority than they have sold in terms of shares. Thus to a
certain extent, according to von Hayek (1944), the positive effects of such a strategy are
accompanied by a loss of freedom, the company has made a few steps on “the road to
serfdom”.
The analogous approach of integration of the partner-company into the initiator’s com-
pany, in accordance with Williamson’s (1985) transaction cost theory, is also possible.
In a similar way, this transforms the economic governance problem into a corporate
governance problem. The vitality of this approach depends on whether internal or exter-
nal governance is more costly to the initiator. Dixit (2009) points out that examples of
such behavior can be found in family-owned conglomerates in less-developed countries,
which are integrated mainly to escape weak external governance and tolerate the ineffi-
ciencies caused, since exposure to external governance would be even costlier.
III. Competition. - As a next strategy, since the effects of the model are limited to the
case of non-competitive interaction between two parties, the initiator’s strategy might in-
clude fuelling competition between several partners or institutions across regions. Both
partnership rents and institutional inferiorities are sensitive to competition if the part-
ners or the institution are interested in trading with the initiator. The initiator might,
for instance, consider another foreign or domestic market for his activities and thereby
enhance his bargaining position.
However, such a strategy may have limited effects, since increasing competition alone
may not suffice to fully extinguish exploitations. For example Ades and Di Tella (1999)
point out corruption may be fuelled not only by rents from imperfect competition, but
also natural rents (e.g. revenue from rich natural resources). Furthermore, Bliss and Di
Tella (1997) argue that competition may not be an exogenous parameter, but could also
be endogenously determined by the objective function of a profit-maximizing bureau-
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crat.27
IV. Strategic Governance Alliances. - Another approach for companies wishing to
escape the “world of thieves” setting is to form “strategic governance alliances” which
shield individual companies from exploitations by threatening transgressors with sanc-
tions by all alliance members. When calculating the pay-off from exploiting, any trans-
gressor would then have to incorporate the profits forgone with other alliance members
into his objective function. If the profits lost are higher than the immediate gains from the
exploitation, then compliance with fair practices is ensured. However, the punishment
of the transgressor equals a private provision of a public good for all alliance members
except for the one who has been cheated. Thus, in order to overcome free-riding be-
havior a second layer of punishment directed at free-riders within the alliance must be
introduced. Such strategies and codices were successfully employed by medieval mer-
chant guilds in Europe, as Greif et al. (1994) show. Another work by Greif (1993) on the
11th century Maghribi traders’ coalition in the Mediterranean area shows that such coali-
tions worked extraordinarily well in very hostile institutional surroundings. A review of
ancient reports of the time reveals that only a handful of reports contain allegations of
misconduct. We wonder whether there are insights to be gained from the knowledge of
these guilds for modern alliances too. Such strategies may have become viable again,
especially since information on transgressors is distributable via modern communication
technologies very easily and transparently.
V. Private Enforcement. - Private enforcement of contracts and property rights under
the shadow law can be observed in practice. For example, before the modern Italian
state was installed, formal institutions in Italy could not perfectly fulfill parts of their
functions, especially in the poorer south of Italy. The civil society and merchants thus
reacted by hiring guards who would enforce their masters’ claims. For potential trans-
gressors this guardianship acted as a strong deterrence and credible threat (Gambetta,
1993). Another example of private enforcement is private collecting agencies which can
also be understood as private strategies to escape institutional imperfections.
VI. Embracing Imperfections. - From a corporate perspective institutional imper-
fections might also be a chance to fortify a corporate strategic alignment. The astute
initiator could thus bear the institutional imperfections, since they constitute an entry
barrier which defends his strategic position once he has entered the market. Companies
adopting this strategy will invest in human resources capable of navigating in imperfect
institutional surroundings, such as experts in relational contracting.
The model we applied is actually good news for all companies complying with good
practices. It predicts that honest behavior pays, especially if competitors are known
for not tolerating the laws of good business conduct. Adopting an honest strategy is
remunerated with the first-best volume of entrepreneurial activity, an interesting point
27But this is only the case if the bureaucrat is a monopolist. Fuelling competition between corrupt bureaucrats might
actually reduce bribes, for example by installing competing official institutions offering identical services.
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with regard to scale effects, and on top of this is rewarded with partnership rents. This is
clearly one of the most encouraging results of the model.
V. Conclusion
The propositions we derived from applying a standard principal-agent model to the
context of international or interregional entrepreneurial activity suggest that imperfect
institutions reduce the volume and the profits of entrepreneurial activity for the initiat-
ing entrepreneur. Analyzing the incentives structures in partnerships reveals that it is
optimal for entrepreneurs venturing under imperfect trading conditions to distribute and
pay partnership rents, as the imperfect institutions may induce abnormal uncertainty due
to the hidden information on the trustworthiness of the trading partner. Applied on a
national or regional basis the model mainly suggests redistributive and negative effects
of imperfect institutions on the wealth of a nation. However, applying the model to a
holistic international macroeconomic context or to countries with feeble institutions un-
veils niche-cases, where the wealth of a nation may (given specific parameter values) be
increased through an imperfect institution, which is mirrored in contemporary findings
and debates in the development literature.
TABLE 1—EFFECTS OF IMPERFECT INSTITUTIONS
Level of Level of Level of
entrepreneurial initiator’s host-country’s
Case activity wealth wealth
(1) (2) (3)
General case:
1. Imperfect institution ⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Niche cases:
1. Inferior institution &
foreign initiator ⇓ ⇓ ⇓,⇑,⇒
2. Inefficient institution &
exploit bypass ⇑ ⇑ ⇓,⇑,⇒
Note: The level of entrepreneurial activity is measured in e and the profit of the initiator in 5. The level of the host
country’s wealth incorporates the profit of domestic initiators 5, the profit of partners π , the payments to the institution
(θ − u)e and possible macroeconomic wealth effects of the level of e. In the general case the effects of imperfect
institutions (both inefficient and inferior) are described in a standard domestic setting. Niche case one assumes that the
initiator and his profit levels are accounted within the realm of a foreign economy. Niche case two describes a standard
domestic setting with strong institutional inefficiencies, where inferior institutions allow an exploit bypass. The arrows
describe the direction of possible level changes compared to the levels under second-best institutions. For niche case two,
the arrows describe possible level changes compared to the levels of inefficient institutions without the exploit bypass.
We highlighted several strategies (e.g. corporate citizenship, internalization, strategic
governance alliances, and private enforcement) which allow entrepreneurs to navigate in
and to escape from an imperfect institutional setting. Furthermore, a discussion of the
driving forces and the effects of the imperfections as well as the policies to remedy them
highlight the need for a holistic approach. Due to the existence of several trade-offs, no
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deterministic policy advice can be given on the basis of the derived propositions without
knowing the country-specific parameters necessary to judge the policy’s appropriateness.
The importance of the context rather reminds economists and policy advisers of the “art
of humility” in policy making. Since although institutions may be imperfect, they may
be so for a very good reason. A current institutional “species” of a country may be the
outcome of an experimental evolutionary process which has settled in a current equilib-
rium. The famous author Herbert G. Wells noted on this: “Biologically the species is
the accumulation of the experiments of all its successful individuals since the beginning,
and the World State of the Modern Utopist will, in its economic aspect, be a compendium
of established economic experience [...]” (Herbert G. Wells (1905), A modern Utopia,
Chapter III, 4). But at the same time they may be an accident or relict of history which
has erroneously been defended and survived previous suggestions of change: a winner of
the Nobel Prize in Literature once wrote: “[...] that all evolution in thought and conduct
must at first appear as heresy and misconduct.” (George B. Shaw (1923), Saint Joan,
Preface, The Law of Change is the Law of God.). So the questions are: Is the reason for
the current equilibrium still intact? And, since resources for reform are scarce, is there a
better equilibrium available at a reasonable price?
All this indicates that before advising institutional change, economists should inquire
very carefully into the context of the institutional setting: How do the domestic compa-
nies of the considered country trade? Have they many partners or just a few? Do they
trade a lot with foreign countries? Is the binding constraint on growth of this specific
country really the institutional sub-optimality, or is it from a holistic point of view an-
other issue? A good economic “country due diligence” is needed, otherwise any advice,
with our model in mind, is of uncertain outcome. For what Leonardo da Vinci once noted
on the art of painters, may also be true for the art of economists:
“Those who are in love with practice without knowledge are like the sailor who gets
into a ship without rudder or compass and who never can be certain whether he is going.”
(Leonardo da Vinci, Book I, 19.)
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX - OMITTED CALCULATIONS
A1. Preface to the Mathematical Appendix
The version of the principal-agent model, which we apply for the imperfect institution
setting in this article, is a well researched theoretical model. The derivations and calcu-
lations presented below are given for the reader’s convenience and belong to the standard
repertoire of the principal-agent realm. They build on the work of numerous researchers
of the principal-agent realm and the discovery of the revelation principle. With great re-
spect for the field’s historical development, we predominantly rely on the approaches and
terminology used in the book of Laffont and Martimont: The Theory of Incentives - The
Principal-Agent Model, 2002, which is one of the towering standard technical references
of this field of research.
A2. Equations (17)
In order to solve the problem of the equations numbered with (17), it is necessary to
determine which constraints are the relevant ones.
LEMMA 1: (A.) Constraint (II) is active and equal to zero. (B.) Therefore, constraint
(III) is also active and binding.
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LEMMA 1 (A.) We begin by establishing that constraint (II) is binding. Recall that
θ > θ . Observe that constraint (III) unveils us that
(A1) t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ.
This implies constraint (II) must be active and equal to zero. Imagine constraint (II) is not
equal to zero, which would imply accordingly constraint (I) also not equal to zero, since
t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ . This cannot be optimal, since the initiator could profitably
lower both t (θ) and t (θ) by an amount 1t without any changes in the incentive structure
and generate profits 1t . Hence, the second constraint must bind in the optimum (Laffont
and Martimont, 2002).
LEMMA 1 (B.) From Lemma 1 (A.) we know that t (θ)− e(θ)θ = 0. Combining this
insight again with constraint (III) yields
(A2) t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ = 0.
Now assume for a moment that constraint (III) would not be binding. Then, by inspection
of the equation above, the initiator could decrease his payments t (θ) by an amount1t (θ)
and thereby improve his profits by ϑ1t (θ). Clearly, this cannot be true in the optimum,
therefore the opposite must be true and constraint (III) must bind (Laffont and Martimont,
2002).
LEMMA 2: (A.) Constraint (I) and (B.) constraint (IV) are not relevant to the opti-
mization problem.
LEMMA 2 (A.) Note that t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ can be expanded by +e(θ)θ −
e(θ)θ without defects. A simple rearrangement yields
(A3) t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ + e(θ)(θ − θ).
We see that constraint (II) and (III) directly imply constraint (I).28 What remains is to
validate its slackness property. Again, from Lemma 1 (A.) we are assured that t (θ) −
e(θ)θ = 0. Furthermore, since θ − θ > 0 and if we assume e(θ) to be positive, the
slackness property is fulfilled.29 Constraint (I) can therefore be omitted (Laffont and
Martimont (2002).
LEMMA 2 (B.) Applying Lemma 1 (B.) yields
(A4)
t (θ)− e(θ)θ = t (θ)− e(θ)θ,
⇔ t (θ)− t (θ) = (e(θ)− e(θ))θ.
28Intuitively, this is in line with our argumentation above, we argued that partner θ must be given e∗(θ − θ) to induce
truthful behavior, hence he will enjoy a positive wealth level.
29We assume here for convenience, that entrepreneurial activity is desirable and e > 0. We shall prove this later.
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However, from equation (16) we already know that e(θ) ≥ e(θ). Combining this knowl-
edge with θ > θ and rearranging again shows
(A5)
t (θ)− t (θ) = (e(θ)− e(θ))θ ≤ (e(θ)− e(θ))θ,
⇔ t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θ.
Thereby we have shown that if constraints (II) and (III) are active and fulfilled, constraint
(IV) will hold implicitly also. Hence, we can neglect constraint (IV) (Laffont and Mar-
timont, 2002). Applying Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 this program is solvable. However,
before determining the optimum, we will rewrite the problem in terms of wealth levels π
and of entrepreneurial activity e. The rearranged problem of the principal reads (Laffont
and Martimont, 2002):
(A6)
maximize 5
(e(θ),π(θ));(e(θ),π(θ))
= ϑ(ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ)+ (1− ϑ)(ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ)
− (ϑπ(θ)+ (1− ϑ)π(θ))
subject to π(θ) ≥ 0,
π(θ) ≥ 0,
π(θ) ≥ π(θ)+ e(θ)(θ − θ),
π(θ) ≥ π(θ)− e(θ)(θ − θ).
Applying Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 this problem will shrink to
(A7)
maximize 5
(e(θ),π(θ));(e(θ),π(θ))
= ϑ(ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ)+ (1− ϑ)(ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ)
− (ϑπ(θ)+ (1− ϑ)π(θ))
subject to π(θ) = 0,
π(θ) = π(θ)+ e(θ)(θ − θ).
A substitution yields
(A8)
maximize 5
(e(θ),e(θ))
= ϑ(ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ)+ (1− ϑ)(ρ(e(θ))− e(θ)θ)− ϑe(θ)(θ − θ).
However, we assumed implicitly that it is profitable for the initiator not to exclude ex-
ploiting types from the venture.
LEMMA 3: The initiator maximizes his profits when venturing with all possible com-
panies.
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LEMMA 3. Following Laffon and Martimont (2002), for Lemma 3 to hold, the profit
of venturing with both possible partner-types must exceed the profits of venturing with
the more profitable partner alone. Or expressed in other words, the difference in both
profit levels yields a positive value. This we will now demonstrate. To start with, recall
that e⋄ = e∗. Observe that venturing with both partners is optimal, as compared to with
only one partner, when
(A9)
ϑ
(
ρ(e⋄)− e⋄θ − e⋄(θ − θ)
)
+ (1− ϑ)
(
ρ(e⋄)− e⋄θ
)
> ϑ
(
ρ(e∗)− e∗θ
)
,
⇔ −ϑe⋄(θ − θ)+ (1− ϑ)(ρ(e⋄)− e⋄θ) > 0,
⇔ ρ(e⋄)− e⋄θ −
(
ϑ
(1− ϑ)
e⋄(θ − θ)
)
> 0,
⇔ ρ(e⋄)− e⋄
(
θ +
ϑ
(1− ϑ)
(θ − θ)
)
> 0.
Applying equation (18) to this system yields
(A10) ρ(e⋄)− e⋄
(
δρ(e⋄(θ))
δe(θ)
)
> 0,
From this rearranged equation it is possible to show that the above is true. Since
(A11)
δρ(e)
δe
> 0
∧
δρ(e)
δe
δe
< 0,
it follows that ρ(e)− e ((δρ(e(θ)))/(δe(θ))) is strictly increasing in e. Since e cannot be
negative, and e⋄ must have a positive value due to equation (18), it follows that ρ(e⋄)−
e⋄
(
(δρ(e∗(θ)))/(δe(θ))
)
must be positive and it is optimal to venture with both partners
(Laffont and Martimont, 2002).30
A3. Equations (19)
In the following we will descriptively categorize the infinity of constraints of equations
(19) in order to reach a calculable version of the problem. The following considerations
build on earlier discoveries such as the revelation principle, see Myerson (1979) and
(1981), and follow an approach used in Laffont and Martimont (2002).
Participation. To start with, it is individually rational for a partner to participate in a
30This result is not generalizable, since a shut-down may occur if the model is changed marginally, for instance if one
allows for positive levels of initial endowments of wealth π (or positive fixed costs).
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contractual agreement only if he reaches at least his status-quo level of wealth
(A12)
t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ 0,
⇔ π(θ) ≥ 0.
Monotonicity. Secondly, in order to avoid that the partner pretends to be another type,
the initiator has to take into account the truth-telling constraints, such that it is optimal
for each possible partner-type to self-select the venture contract designed for its type θ
(Laffont and Martimont, 2002). Let θˆ ∈ 2 be a pretended value, then the following must
hold
(A13) t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θˆ)− e(θˆ)θ ∀ (θ, θˆ) ∈ 2×2.
However, if the above holds globally for all types of partners θ , then it must also hold
locally for particular pretended values θˇ ∈ 2 such that
(A14)
t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θˇ)− e(θˇ)θ
t (θˇ)− e(θˇ)θˇ ≥ t (θ)− e(θ)θˇ ∀ pairs (θ, θˇ) ∈ 2×2.
In a rearranged and added form, this system yields an additional insight
(A15)
t (θ)− e(θ)θ + t (θˇ)− e(θˇ)θˇ ≥ t (θˇ)− e(θˇ)θ + t (θ)− e(θ)θˇ
⇔ (θ − θˇ )
(
e(θˇ)− e(θ)
)
≥ 0.
Assuming θˇ > θ , we can see
(A16)
(
θ − θˇ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(
e(θˇ)− e(θ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
must be −
≥ 0.
Therefore, the truth-telling constraints dictate that the entrepreneurial volume e is de-
creasing in θ (Laffont and Martimont, 2002).31 This is in line with our discussion results
in equation (16), however this condition requires all levels of entrepreneurial activity to
be ranked in a monotonic way (Laffont and Martimont, 2002)
(A17)
δe(θ)
δθ
≤ 0.
Small pretensions. Following Laffont and Martimont (2002), a third point to note is
that the local truth-telling constraint t (θ) − e(θ)θ ≥ t (θˇ) − e(θˇ)θ is expandable by
31While, of course, the reverse case θˇ < θ yields a parallel result. Furthermore, we assume that e is differentiable
almost everywhere.
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+e(θˇ)θˇ − e(θˇ)θˇ . Rewriting this extended constraint in terms of wealth levels reveals
(A18) π(θ) ≥ π(θˇ)+ e(θˇ)(θˇ − θ).
From the point of view of the partner, this is an optimization problem with two steps, due
to the two variables. If the partner wants to maximize his profit from pretending, he will
calculate the following
(A19) argument of the maximum π =
θˇ ∈ 2
π(θˇ)+ e(θˇ)(θˇ − θ).
This will be maximized if θ = θˇ . Therefore, the partner proceeds and derives the first
order condition to determine his optimal behaviour32
(A20)
δπ(θˇ)
δθˇ
+ e(θˇ)+
δe(θˇ)
δθˇ
(θˇ − θ) = 0.
If we insert θ = θˇ into the above first order condition we arrive at
(A21)
δπ(θ)
δθ
= −e(θ),
which shows us what the constraints impose on small changes (Laffont and Martimont,
2002).
Large pretensions. To be complete, we need to check whether the optimum is indeed
also a global optimum. In others words, now we have set a condition for the partner not
to pretend slightly, but we also need to exclude his ability to pretend greatly. Returning
to the global truth-telling constraint
(A22) t (θ)− e(θ)θ ≥ t (θˆ)− e(θˆ)θ ∀ (θ, θˆ) ∈ 2×2,
we simulate a large pretension θˆ . In order to prove that such a large pretension is eco-
nomically uninteresting for the partner, it must be that there is a positive amount of profits
not realized by the partner, an opportunity loss ̟ due to the pretension. Therefore we
need to prove the following (Laffont and Martimont, 2002):
(A23) t (θ)− e(θ)θ = t (θˆ)− e(θˆ)θ +̟ ∀ (θ, θˆ) ∈ 2×2; ̟ ∈ R+.
LEMMA 4: There exists a ̟ ∈ R+, when a partner is not telling the truth. Hence, the
global truth-telling constraint is fulfilled.
LEMMA 4. The initiator will offer different transfers for different types, as we know
32Here we employ Leibniz’s law: δabδx =
aδb
δx +
bδa
δx .
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from the local truth-telling constraints. Therefore a difference in transfers to the partner
can be expressed in the following way33
(A24) t (θ)− t (θˆ) =
∫ θ
θˆ
σ
δe(σ )
δσ
δσ .
An integration by parts and a rearrangement of this term yields34
(A25)
t (θ)− t (θˆ) = e(θ)θ − e(θˆ)θˆ −
∫ θ
θˆ
e(σ )δσ ,
⇔ t (θ)− e(θ)θ = t (θˆ)− e(θˆ)θˆ −
∫ θ
θˆ
e(σ )δσ ,
⇔ t (θ)− e(θ)θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Truth
= t (θˆ)− e(θˆ)θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pretension
+ e(θˆ)(θ − θˆ )−
∫ θ
θˆ
e(σ )δσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to pretension
.
It remains to establish that ̟ = e(θˆ)(θ − θˆ ) −
∫ θ
θˆ
e(σ )δσ belongs to the realm of R+,
so we can indeed speak of losses instead of profits. However, since e is not increasing in
either θ nor σ , it follows that ̟ = e(θˆ)(θ − θˆ )−
∫ θ
θˆ
e(σ )δσ ≥ 0. Therefore, the global
truth-telling constraint for the partner is fulfilled by our approach and we can neglect it
in the following (Laffont and Martimont, 2002).
We are now in a position to collect the above results on the structure of the infinite
amount of constraints and summarize them. However, any results are only valid, if the
neglected monotonicity constraint (δe(θ))/(δθ) ≤ 0 holds.
LEMMA 5: The monotonicity constraint (δe(θ))/(δθ) ≤ 0 holds, the contract is thus
optimal.
LEMMA 5. We start by checking if e◦(θ) is decreasing in θ . The derivative at e◦
reads:35
(A26)
(
δ2ρ(e◦(θ))
δe2(θ)
)
δe◦(θ)
δθ
= 1+
δ
δθ
G(θ)
g(θ)
.
In assumption (A2.) we assumed diminishing marginal returns from entrepreneurial ac-
tivity, and in assumption (A5.) we postulated a monotone hazard rate. Therefore we can
33σ replaces θ here.
34The version of the rule employed here:∫ b
a f (x)
δg(x)
δx δx = [ f (x)g(x)]
b
a −
∫ b
a
δ f (x)
δx g(x)δx = f (b)g(b)− f (a)g(a)−
∫ b
a
δ f (x)
δx g(x)δx .
35
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write
(A27)

δ2ρ(e◦(θ))δe2(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−

 δe◦(θ)δθ = 1+ δδθ G(θ)g(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
,
⇔
δe◦(θ)
δθ
≤ 0,
which is the desired inequality for our approach to be valid (Laffont and Martimont,
2002). It is worth mentioning that our results are thus limited to these assumptions,
especially the monotone hazard rate.36
36It turns out that, if one does not assume this, this article would plunge into fancy mathematics, which clearly would
not be suited to carve out and model the economic effects.
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